The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
The advent of quantum computing has precipitated an estimated attack resistant cryptography system necessitating quantum attacks. The classical asymmetric algorithms, i.e., RSA and ECC are susceptible to Shor algorithm and a transition should be made to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) anymore. The novelty of this work lies in providing a unified comparative framework that analyzes PQC families through security assumptions, concrete key/ciphertext sizes, and implementation complexity an aspect not addressed collectively in prior surveys. This survey gives a general picture of the status of the design process and general evaluation of PQC accounting its application within the paradigm of the diversified networks including the IoT and 5G/6G and in the cyber-physical environment. Furthermore, this review uniquely synthesizes practical hybrid‑deployment strategies, including protocol layering, coexistence models, and backward‑compatibility mechanisms, offering actionable guidance for real‑world migration. Additionally, the manuscript contributes a prioritized list of open problems across IoT, 5G/6G, blockchain, and cyber‑physical systems, highlighting domains facing the most urgent quantum‑resilience challenges. In this paper, the authors will evaluate the most popular PQC schemes, including schemes based on lattice, code, hash, and isogeny, depending on their performance, scalability, and interoperability (with reference to the recent research). It also examines the problems of integration as implemented with respect to the computational overhead, latency and adoption of hybrid with classical cryptography. This is expounded more to the standardization of PQC by NISTs and with a focus on such algorithms as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Dilithium. The findings suggest that, hybrid PQC protocols are able to control quantum resistance and actual performance in numerous infrastructures in computing systems.
5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
The exponential advancement of quantum computing poses an unprecedented threat to blockchain technology and emerging Sixth Generation (6G) networks, necessitating an urgent transition to post-quantum cryptographic solutions. This comprehensive review proposed post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) integration within Blockchain Enabled 6G (BE6G) architectures, highlighting vulnerabilities by Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms according to existing cryptographic standards, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC). The paper addresses quantum computing fundamentals and blockchain security implications, exploring quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, and multivariate approaches. Through systematic examination of post-quantum threats, this review shows vulnerabilities affecting nearly 25% of existing cryptocurrency assets, presenting how quantum computers can break public-key systems in polynomial time. The study proposes solutions for implementing quantum-resistant blockchain architectures throughout 6G components, including Radio Access Network (RAN), edge computing, and core transport networks, while meeting ultra-low latency and scalability requirements. Key findings elaborate that hybrid cryptographic approaches combining classical and quantum-resistant algorithms provide promising directions. Lattice-based algorithms, particularly CRYSTALS-kyber and CRYSTALS-dilithium, are identified as primary deployment candidates. The review concludes that successful Quantum-Resistant Security deployment for BE6G Networks requires unprecedented coordination among telecommunication operators, blockchain developers, equipment manufacturers, and regulatory bodies. The ”harvest now, decrypt later” threat model creates sudden implementation, valuable for long-term digital infrastructure security.
The evolution of sixth-generation (6G) networks brings unprecedented demands for security, performance, and global interoperability. With the advent of scalable quantum computing, traditional cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECC are increasingly vulnerable, making Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) essential pillars for securing future communication infrastructures. This paper presents a comprehensive study on the standardization, implementation, and evaluation of PQC and quantum communication protocols within the context of 6G networks. We examine algorithmic candidates endorsed by NIST, such as Kyber and Dilithium, and analyze their performance, entropy guarantees, and deployment feasibility across diverse 6G use cases. A four-stage implementation roadmap is proposed, covering cryptographic testing, hybrid protocol integration, quantum entropy provisioning, and lifecycle cryptographic agility. Our evaluation framework introduces metrics for quantum resilience, protocol interoperability, energy efficiency, and compliance with ETSI, ITU, and IEEE standards. The paper also highlights key technical challenges such as latency overheads, entropy synchronization, and cross-domain cryptographic translation and outlines open research directions for scalable, secure, and sustainable deployment. By aligning cryptographic innovation with international standardization, this work contributes toward building a quantum-resilient, interoperable, and future-proof 6G ecosystem. The key results include handshake latency, which is 95 ms, entropy quality is 96%, interoperability 90 and the compliance score is 92%.
The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.
6G networks will require quantum-secure cryptography deployed across core infrastructure, edge nodes, resource-constrained IoT devices. Although post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms have been standardized by NIST, their practical deployability in bandwidth and latency limited wireless systems remains unclear. This paper presents a practical evaluation of NIST selected PQC schemes, including ML-KEM (Kyber), ML-DSA (Dilithium), and Falcon. Benchmarks conducted with OpenSSL and the OQS provider on heterogeneous platforms show that while computational performance is acceptable, ciphertext and signature size expansion significantly impact handshake reliability and bandwidth efficiency, particularly at the network edge. The results highlight key system-level trade-offs and motivate the need for PQC optimization and deployment-aware design for future quantum-secure 6G networks.