5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
5G serves as a catalyst for transformative digital innovation by enabling convergence with various services in our daily lives. The success of this paradigm shift undeniably hinges on robust security measures, with primary authentication— securing access to the 5G network—being paramount. Two protocols, 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) and the Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Agreement Prime (EAP-AKA’), have been standardized for this purpose, with the former designed for 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) devices and the latter for non-3GPP devices. However, recent studies have exposed vulnerabilities in the 5G-AKA protocol, rendering it susceptible to security breaches, including linkability attacks. Furthermore, the advent of quantum computing poses significant quantum threats, underscoring the urgent need for the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being standardized, the lack of real-world deployment limits its proven robustness. In contrast, conventional cryptographic schemes have demonstrated reliability over decades of practical application. To address this gap, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has initiated the standardization of hybrid PQC algorithms (HPQC), combining classical and quantum-resistant techniques. Consequently, ensuring forward secrecy and resilience to quantum threats in the 5G-AKA protocol is critical. To address these security challenges, we propose the 5G-AKA-HPQC protocol. Our protocol is designed to maintain compatibility with existing standards while enhancing security by combining keys negotiated via the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with those derived from a PQC-Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). To rigorously and comprehensively validate the security of 5G-AKA-HPQC, we employ formal verification tools such as SVO Logic and ProVerif. The results confirm the protocol’s security and correctness. Furthermore, performance evaluations highlight the computational and communication overheads inherent to 5G-AKA-HPQC. With only average of 56.5 millisecond(+112.32%) on a total authentication time, proposed protocol provides its advantages. Also, on a environment of multiple UE registration, compared to single UE registration, the difference of increased rate of average authentication time is only 0.01%. The negligible difference 0.01% indicates that the addition of PQC does not lead to increased overhead in multi-UE registration environments, demonstrating its scalability and practical feasibility. In conclusion, our research provides significant insights into the design of secure, quantum-safe authentication protocols and lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure authentication and key agreement protocols for mobile telecommunications.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
To bridge the gap between emerging quantum threats and next-generation mobile network (6G) design, this paper introduces 10 concrete suggestions that must be considered in both standardization trends and practical feasibility. As a foundation, we surveyed the most standardization-ready proposals currently available, namely EAP-AKA’ and its extensions: EAP-AKA’ FS, EAP-AKA’ PQ-KEM, and EAP-AKA’ HPQC (i.e. EAP-AKA’ family). Although these protocols are designed to support forward secrecy and quantum resistance, comprehensive evaluations of their security and performance remain insufficient. Accordingly, we conducted a formal security analysis on EAP-AKA’ family using ProVerif and evaluated their performance through actual implementation on a 5G testbed built with UERANSIM and free5GC. Through these analysis, we verified that the current drafts still lack of full forward secrecy support and confirmed that persistent issues such as replay attacks still remain unresolved. Additionally, through the performance evaluation, it is demonstrated that computation and communication overheads increase the error rate of the environment up to 2.14x and affect authentication latency to increase up to 2.88x in the Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) enhanced protocols. To mitigate such increase, we have experimented distributing network functions such as gNB (Next Generation NodeB) and AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) and have shown 93.6% decrease in authentication latency could be achieved. Based on these research results, we identified structural limitations in the current protocol designs and proposed 10 suggestions, including standard-level modifications, mobile-network-level enhancements for PQC integration, and technical strategies to enable seamless quantum-safe mobile 6G networks.
Advancements in 5G are largely driven by its adoption across a variety of applications, including smart homes, smart healthcare, autonomous vehicles, transportation, and Industry 5.0. However, this widespread usage raises significant security and privacy concerns, particularly regarding authentication. To secure 5G communications, 3GPP has standardised the 5G-Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol. Despite this, state-of-the-art research has revealed that 5G-AKA suffers from several vulnerabilities. In response, numerous alternative authentication schemes have been proposed. Nevertheless, many of these protocols continue to be susceptible to classical security threats, such as malicious serving network (SN) attacks, ephemeral secret leakage, traceability, anonymity violations, and, most critically, a lack of Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). Additionally, recent advancements in quantum computing pose a substantial risk to the security of 5G-AKA and its variants, rendering them insecure in the post-quantum era. Although a few post-quantum cryptography-based protocols have been introduced, studies show that they are either computationally expensive or still vulnerable to quantum attacks. In order to tackle these challenges, we propose two versions of a novel authentication protocol that not only provide comprehensive security guarantees but are also computationally efficient. Version 1 utilises a hybrid cryptographic approach (AES + KEM) and achieves the lowest computational cost—even lower than Version 2, which relies solely on KEM. Both versions offer the same level of security, but Version 1 is significantly more efficient in terms of resource usage. We have validated our proposed protocols using the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and the Scyther tool. Furthermore, we evaluated their performance against existing protocols under both known and unknown attack scenarios. The results show that our protocols incur lower computational, communication, and energy overhead, as well as strong resilience against unknown attacks, outperforming several existing authentication schemes. Furthermore, we implement a testbed to demonstrate the real-time applicability of both proposed versions.
5G communication enables digital innovation by integrating a wide range of services, making security, especially primary authentication, critically important. To secure 5G communication, the 3GPP has designed the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol. However, current trends show a growing interest in post-quantum security, and 5G-AKA is not resistant to quantum-era threats due to several classical vulnerabilities. To address these limitations, various enhanced versions of 5G-AKA have been proposed, claiming to provide security against attacks that exploit its weaknesses. However, state-of-the-art research reveals that many of these versions remain susceptible to classical threats, such as attacks from malicious serving networks (SNs), ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks, and fail to provide perfect forward secrecy. Additionally, they are not secure against quantum attacks. In response to these challenges, we propose a Post-Quantum Secure, Lattice-Based 5G-AKA Protocol that is resistant to malicious serving networks and ensures perfect forward secrecy. Our proposed protocol is built on lattice-based cryptography, making it one of the first 5G-AKA variants designed with post-quantum security in mind. We validate the security of our protocol using formal verification techniques, including the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and the Scyther tool. Furthermore, we perform a comparative analysis with existing protocols to highlight the improvements. Finally, we implement our protocol in a testbed environment to demonstrate its practical feasibility for real-time 5G applications.
Trustworthiness, privacy and resilience are expected to be essential requirements of 6G on top of various other conventional performance requirements such as data rate and latency. Primary authentication is a key procedure for initiating secure communication between User Equipment (UE) and Home Network (HN) in 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). However, primary authentication mechanisms used in 5G are vulnerable against quantum machines, replay attacks, and rouge base-station. To protect against these threats, we propose beyond 5G and 6G primary authentication methods to adapt hybrid mechanisms which combines Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and existing asymmetric algorithm with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) guarantee. We evaluate proposed methods using our in-house developed Simulator “WirelessPQCSim.” Our proposed Hybrid mechanisms provide enhanced security without additional CPU overhead with respect to exiting 5G system. We also achieved up to 6.7x speed-up for PQC-based methods with respect to 5G system and provide low latency which is one of the KPI for 6G system.
The authentication process in fifth-generation networks between the user equipment and the network relies on secure communication protocols, with the 5G authentication and key agreement (5G-AKA) being a prominent one. However, this protocol still has shortcomings, as identified in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)release, which poses vulnerabilities. Notably, a primary concern is the insufficient protection of user privacy. This deficiency allows attackers to potentially exploit weaknesses in encryption, signing, and update mechanisms, leading to the tracking of a user's identity, location, and activities. Furthermore, the5G-AKA protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which malicious actors can assume the identity of service providers or networks, leading to the interruption of communication between users and servers. Additionally, the protocol lacks robustness in guaranteeing mutual authentication, enabling attackers to forge authentication messages and manipulate user data. In this paper, we propose a key generation method based on the concept of post-quantum cryptography to provide robust resistance to attacks. Furthermore, we propose a key exchange method that authenticates the user's equipment and home network through the application of Kyber, where both parties possess pre-established static public keys. The proposal provides identity protection, non-traceability, mutual authentication, and confidentiality. We implement this protocol to test 5G-AKA's vulnerabilities and analyse its effectiveness against specific attacks. The experiment used Minnet simulation and Ryu controllers to implement 5G-AKA with standard-specified characteristics.