The QPQ-CD (Quantum and PostQuantum CipherKey Dynamic uses a dynamic key after the registration of the
mobile at the 5G Network. The algorithm could be divided in two parts : The Quantum Cryptography (QC) and
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) . The Post Quantum Cryptography will use 12 families of algorithms which are
duplicate algorithm of : MD45, MD45xor, MD54, MD54xor, SHA256, SHA256xor for treating the 2 output QHT
separately and QAT of the Quantum algorithm. Before the selector of the next key, the 12 keys of 256 bits are
optimized of one bit change and selected the best effective probability. It will be based on probability by the
extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and probability of disorder or binary entropy and
probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the following key after QPQ-CD thus has the
behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very far from the previous key; several bits
changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the penalty of bad extremity proximity. All
key chosen keys have a probability by the extremity and proximity between 50% until 100%. The probability of the
bit changed is to 50%, the entropy is near 100%. The result is only obtained if the system uses optimization of one
bit changed. Any chart representative also permits to include all 12 keys obtained after the Post Quantum algorithm
have all chance to be selected by the system. So all varieties of PostQuantum Cryptography is necessary to be
implemented on the QPQ-CD. All the result is simulated with Matlab.
The QPQ-CD (Quantum and PostQuantum CipherKey Dynamic uses a dynamic key after the registration of the
mobile at the 5G Network. The algorithm could be divided in two parts : The Quantum Cryptography (QC) and
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) . The Post Quantum Cryptography will use 12 families of algorithms which are
duplicate algorithm of : MD45, MD45xor, MD54, MD54xor, SHA256, SHA256xor for treating the 2 output QHT
separately and QAT of the Quantum algorithm. Before the selector of the next key, the 12 keys of 256 bits are
optimized of one bit change and selected the best effective probability. It will be based on probability by the
extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and probability of disorder or binary entropy and
probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the following key after QPQ-CD thus has the
behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very far from the previous key; several bits
changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the penalty of bad extremity proximity. All
key chosen keys have a probability by the extremity and proximity between 50% until 100%. The probability of the
bit changed is to 50%, the entropy is near 100%. The result is only obtained if the system uses optimization of one
bit changed. Any chart representative also permits to include all 12 keys obtained after the Post Quantum algorithm
have all chance to be selected by the system. So all varieties of PostQuantum Cryptography is necessary to be
implemented on the QPQ-CD. All the result is simulated with Matlab.
The 5G telecommunication network security is based on the standard specified by 3GPP (3rd Generation
Partnership Project) and on the security of the master key shared between the UE (User Equipment) and the
operator. To authenticate to the network, the 5G-AKA (5G-Authentication Key Agreement) protocol uses mutual
authentication. Users resp. operators use cryptography to verify the authenticity of the operator resp. users.
However, knowledge of the master key can create a hacker network that can capture the traffic of users. The QPQ-
CD module (Quantum and Post Quantum Cipherkey Dynamic) consists of modifying the 3GPP standard by adding
a recurrent change of this key to each successful authentication. The quantum part of QPQ-CD will be formed by a
quantum confusion technique based on the Hilbert QHT (Quantum Hilbert Transform) method and the Arnold QAT
(Quantum Arnold Transform) method on 3 matrices. The Post-Quantum part of QPQ-CD will focus on multiple
hashing methods. The 12 families of hash algorithm used will reduce the matrices to 256 bits. An optimizer based on
a one-bit change and an effective probability selector perfect the choice of the next key. The effective probability of
the key will be based on probability of extremity, probability of proximity, probability of a bit changed, and
probability of disorder or binary entropy and probability of penalties. According to the order of its probabilities, the
following key after QPQ-CD thus has the behavior: very far from the ends of the key (00 ... 000 and 11 ... 111); very
far from the previous key; several bits changed and very messy from the point of view bit zero and bit one and the
penalty of bad extremity proximity. One of the 5 approaches of selectors and key optimizer will be perfected to
refine the result. By simulating on MATLAB several authentication tests, the probability of the extremity and
proximity will both be greater than or equal to 50% and the probability in case of binary entropy and disorder will
be close to 100%. The effective probability of selection at this time will be greater than 50%
The QPQ-CD (Quantum and PostQuantum CipherKey Dynamic uses a dynamic key after the registration of the
mobile at the 5G Network. The algorithm could be divided in two parts : The Quantum Cryptography and
Post Quantum Cryptography. The Quantum Cryptography used Quantum Image Scrambling methods
with the Red, Green, and Blue Component which are treated separately by the two algorithms QAT and
QHT. They change only the position of the image pixel without changing the value of this. QAT and QHT
use 2 method different : one is based on the permutation of the pixel position and the others is based on
one the space-filling curveIn this article, the performance of the Quantum Cryptography using at the
QPQ-CD is analyzed by the PSNR(Peak Signal to Noise Ratio), SSIM (Structural SIMilarity),
NPCR(Number of Pixel exchange rate), UACI (Unified Average Changing Intensity), Correlation and
the binary entropy. PSNR for the two methods is near than the value 8 which is a good visual quality
visualThe SSIM and Correlation also offers a best parameter which is near zero. The image transformed
by scrambling methods and originals are no similitude and no correlation. The NPCR give also a good
performance because 99% of pixels changed in the image. But the UACI is not more than 20%. So, the
intensity light of the new image doesn’t change with the maximum. The algorithm of the scrambling is not
resistant to the attack physic using difference power analysis. The binary entropy is less than 50%. There
are quite no disorder between the bits one and bit zeros. The QPQ-CD with evaluation of the Quantum
Cryptography is simulated to Matlab and all curve for this is represented in this article. The QAT and
QHT have quite a similar performance.
The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant challenges to traditional cryptographic systems, threatening the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of digital communications. This paper investigates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms into mobile communication systems to address these challenges. The study focuses on evaluating key PQC algorithms shortlisted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+, within the context of 5G and future mobile network architectures. The research encompasses the design and implementation of an experimental framework involving mobile devices, servers, and cloud-based infrastructure to simulate real-world communication scenarios. Performance metrics such as key generation time, signature generation, encryption and decryption speed, and resource consumption were analyzed across various devices to identify algorithms suitable for mobile environments. The findings reveal that lattice-based algorithms, such as Kyber and Dilithium, offer a promising balance between security and efficiency, making them ideal for resource-constrained devices. In contrast, hash-based algorithms like SPHINCS+ exhibit higher computational demands, limiting their practicality in certain applications. This work highlights the importance of algorithm selection and hardware optimization in ensuring secure and efficient communications in the quantum era. By integrating theoretical advancements in PQC with practical applications, this research lays the foundation for quantum-resistant security in mobile networks, ensuring secure and future-ready digital communications.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, prompting the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While PQC has been analyzed in theory, its performance in practical wireless communication environments remains underexplored. This paper presents a detailed implementation and performance evaluation of NIST-selected PQC algorithms in user equipment (UE) to UE communications over 5G networks. Using a full 5G emulation stack (Open5GS and UERANSIM) and PQC-enabled TLS 1.3 via BoringSSL and liboqs, we examine key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes across realistic network conditions. We evaluate performance based on handshake latency, CPU and memory usage, bandwidth, and retransmission rates, under varying cryptographic configurations and client loads. Our findings show that ML-KEM with ML-DSA offers the best efficiency for latency-sensitive applications, while SPHINCS+ and HQC combinations incur higher computational and transmission overheads, making them unsuitable for security-critical but time-sensitive 5G scenarios.
In the quantum computing era, classical cryptography algorithms are expected to be unsafe. To provide a solution to the problem that may occur to this effect, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms are being considered as replacements to classical algorithms. It is essential to consider the effect of using PQC algorithms on applications and services as many applications come with strict Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, especially in 5G and beyond 5G applications. Therefore, this paper proposes a technique for selecting a suitable PQC algorithm to achieve an effective utilization of PQC algorithms in applications/protocols. In this study, a rule-based selection technique is adopted. In particular, a PQC selection rule is generated based on an application/protocol traffic pattern/characteristics and the security requirements such as key/signature size, the strength of the PQC algorithm, time taken to share secret keys and so on. Thereafter, the process of selecting a PQC algorithm is presented. To select a suitable PQC algorithm, the use case in which an application traffic belongs is identified, and based on the traffic flow tag, a selection rule is applied. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated by experimenting with the PQC algorithms using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake. The evaluation results show that the proposed PQC selection method is useful in selecting a suitable algorithm based on real application traffic and the QoS requirements.