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Journal of the Chinese Institute of Engineers

Efficient chosen-ciphertext secure hybrid encryption scheme tolerating continuous leakage attacks

Yanwei Zhou, Bo Yang, Yong Hong Yu, Arshad Khan

Published Jan 2, 2019• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

For any PPT adversary, most traditional leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that all elements in ciphertext are random. What’s worse, in a continuous leakage setting, there are few leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives available. Currently, not many researchers are studying leakage-resilient hybrid encryption (LR-HE) scheme. Thus, two continuous leakage-resilient hybrid encryption (CLR-HE) schemes are constructed in this paper, and the schemes’ security are proven based on the standard static assumption. Our constructions not only can maintain their claimed security in a continuous leakage setting, but also enjoy better performances. Because of these good performances, our constructions can provide continuous leakage-resilient security in the Internet of Things.

DOI
10.1080/02533839.2018.1547663

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For any PPT adversary, most traditional leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that all elements in ciphertext are random. What’s worse, in a continuous leakage setting, there are few leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives available. Currently, not many researchers are studying leakage-resilient hybrid encryption (LR-HE) scheme. Thus, two continuous leakage-resilient hybrid encryption (CLR-HE) schemes are constructed in this paper, and the schemes’ security are proven based on the standard static assumption. Our constructions not only can maintain their claimed security in a continuous leakage setting, but also enjoy better performances. Because of these good performances, our constructions can provide continuous leakage-resilient security in the Internet of Things.
Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.
In this work, we present the first leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (LR-IBE) scheme that features (almost) tight security under the multi-challenge setting, in which the adversary could receive multiple challenging ciphertexts from multiple users. Meanwhile, our construction enjoys security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) under the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption. Apart from admitting the continual leakage of secret key, we provide strong security via additionally allowing the continual leakage of the master secret key.
We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (LR-CCA), from any Hash Proof System (HPS) and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Efficient constructions of HPSs and OT-LFs from the DDH and DCR assumptions suggest that our construction is a practical approach to LR-CCA security. Most of practical PKEs with LR-CCA security, like variants of Cramer-Shoup scheme, rooted from Hash Proof Systems, but with leakage rates at most 1/4 − o(1) (defined as the ratio of leakage amount to secret-key size). The instantiations of our construction from the DDH and DCR assumptions result in LR-CCA secure PKEs with leakage rate of 1/2 − o(1). On the other hand, our construction also creates a new approach for constructing IND-CCA secure (leakage-free) PKE schemes, which may be of independent interest.
Leakage of private information has become a threat to the security of computing systems. It has become a common security requirement that a cryptography scheme should withstand various leakage attacks, even the continuous leakage attacks. However, in the current constructions on the (continuous) leakage‐resilient identity‐based encryption (CLR‐IBE) scheme, the leakage parameter is a fixed value. Aiming to solve these problems, in this study, the authors show how to construct the CLR‐IBE scheme, and the adaptive chosen‐ciphertext attacks security of proposed construction can be proved in the standard model. To further improve the practicability of CLR‐IBE scheme, they design an improved IBE scheme with continuous leakage amplified property, and the leakage parameter has an arbitrary length.
The goal of this paper is to design an id-based encryption (IBE) scheme that can flexibly tolerate leakage bounds, by only increasing the size of secret key proportionally, and the security level can be achieved to be against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). As our main technical tool for CCA security, we introduce an initiation of all-but-one lossy filter, which is a simple version of all-but-many lossy filter to the leakage resilient settings. As our main result, we use the all-but-one lossy filter to construct an IBE scheme that is secure against leakage resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), and the leakage rate is 1/2 − ο(1).
Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |qqq| -TABDHE) assumption.