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The Computer Journal

Continuous Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Encryption with Tight Security

Yanwei Zhou, Bo Yang, Hongxia Hou, Lina Zhang, Tao Wang, Mingxiao Hu

Published Jan 3, 2019• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.

DOI
10.1093/comjnl/bxy144

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Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |qqq| -TABDHE) assumption.
Leakage of private information has become a threat to the security of computing systems. It has become a common security requirement that a cryptography scheme should withstand various leakage attacks, even the continuous leakage attacks. However, in the current constructions on the (continuous) leakage‐resilient identity‐based encryption (CLR‐IBE) scheme, the leakage parameter is a fixed value. Aiming to solve these problems, in this study, the authors show how to construct the CLR‐IBE scheme, and the adaptive chosen‐ciphertext attacks security of proposed construction can be proved in the standard model. To further improve the practicability of CLR‐IBE scheme, they design an improved IBE scheme with continuous leakage amplified property, and the leakage parameter has an arbitrary length.
In this work, we present the first leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (LR-IBE) scheme that features (almost) tight security under the multi-challenge setting, in which the adversary could receive multiple challenging ciphertexts from multiple users. Meanwhile, our construction enjoys security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) under the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption. Apart from admitting the continual leakage of secret key, we provide strong security via additionally allowing the continual leakage of the master secret key.
The situation for post-challenge continuous auxiliary input leakage has not been considered in the cryptography schemes for previous literature. We present a semantic-security model with post-challenge continuous auxiliary inputs for identity-based encryption. In this model, the adversary is permitted to obtain some information of the private keys constantly and to query more information after seeing the challenge ciphertext through the side-channel attacks. Furthermore, we present an identity-based encryption scheme resilient to leakage under composite order groups. Our scheme is secure against post-challenge continuous auxiliary input, adaptive chosen-identity, and adaptive chosen plaintext attacks under three static assumptions in the standard model. Compared with existing identity-based encryption schemes under security properties and performance, our scheme is practical. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
With the purpose of taking physical attacks into account in security proofs, leakage-resilient cryptography has been initiated. Recently, many leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed. In this paper, we put forward the first leakage-resilient wicked identity-based encryption (wicked IBE) scheme. To achieve this goal, we first present a new wicked IBE scheme in the composite order groups. The security proof of this scheme is achieved via the dual system encryption technique. In contrast with existing wicked IBE schemes, the new proposal can be proved fully secure in the standard model, even when the maximum hierarchy depth is a polynomial in the security parameter. Moreover, its security is based on some standard assumptions in the composite groups, which are independent of the hierarchy depth of the scheme. Based on this newly proposed scheme, we then put forward a fully secure leakage-resilient wicked IBE scheme in the bounded memory-leakage model. The leakage here is not only allowed on the user's secret key, but also on the master secret key. Its security is proved in the standard model by a hybrid argument in a sequence of computationally indistinguishable games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first wicked IBE scheme in the context of leakage resilience.