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The Computer Journal

A Leakage-Resilient CCA-Secure Identity-Based Encryption Scheme

Jiguo Li, Meilin Teng, Yichen Zhang, Qihong Yu

Published Jan 20, 2016• 64 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |$q$| -TABDHE) assumption.

DOI
10.1093/comjnl/bxv128

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Identity-based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side-channel attacks. Leakage-resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA-secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage-resilient IBE scheme in the bounded-leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al. 's leakage-resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage-resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent ( |qqq| -TABDHE) assumption.
Abstract In the actual applications, an adversary can break the security of cryptography scheme through various leakage attacks (e.g. side-channel attacks, cold-boot attacks, etc.), even the continuous leakage attacks. That is, a practical cryptography scheme must maintain its claimed security in the continuous leakage setting. However, the previous constructions on the leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme could tolerate a leakage that is bounded, and cannot resist the continuous leakage attacks. In order to further achieve the better security, a novel method to build the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme with tight security is presented in this paper, and the scheme’s security is proved, in the standard model, based on a stronger security assumption that depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. In addition, our proposal has several advantages over previous such constructions, e.g. shorter public parameters, higher communication efficiency, tight security, etc.
In this work, we present the first leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (LR-IBE) scheme that features (almost) tight security under the multi-challenge setting, in which the adversary could receive multiple challenging ciphertexts from multiple users. Meanwhile, our construction enjoys security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) under the Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption. Apart from admitting the continual leakage of secret key, we provide strong security via additionally allowing the continual leakage of the master secret key.
The goal of this paper is to design an id-based encryption (IBE) scheme that can flexibly tolerate leakage bounds, by only increasing the size of secret key proportionally, and the security level can be achieved to be against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). As our main technical tool for CCA security, we introduce an initiation of all-but-one lossy filter, which is a simple version of all-but-many lossy filter to the leakage resilient settings. As our main result, we use the all-but-one lossy filter to construct an IBE scheme that is secure against leakage resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), and the leakage rate is 1/2 − ο(1).
We design the first Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Encryption (LR-IBE) systems from static assumptions in the standard model. We derive these schemes by applying a hash proof technique from Alwen et.al. (Eurocrypt '10) to variants of the existing IBE schemes of Boneh-Boyen, Waters, and Lewko-Waters. As a result, we achieve leakage-resilience under the respective static assumptions of the original systems in the standard model, while also preserving the efficiency of the original schemes. Moreover, our results extend to the Bounded Retrieval Model (BRM), yielding the first regular and identity-based BRM encryption schemes from static assumptions in the standard model.
With the purpose of taking physical attacks into account in security proofs, leakage-resilient cryptography has been initiated. Recently, many leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed. In this paper, we put forward the first leakage-resilient wicked identity-based encryption (wicked IBE) scheme. To achieve this goal, we first present a new wicked IBE scheme in the composite order groups. The security proof of this scheme is achieved via the dual system encryption technique. In contrast with existing wicked IBE schemes, the new proposal can be proved fully secure in the standard model, even when the maximum hierarchy depth is a polynomial in the security parameter. Moreover, its security is based on some standard assumptions in the composite groups, which are independent of the hierarchy depth of the scheme. Based on this newly proposed scheme, we then put forward a fully secure leakage-resilient wicked IBE scheme in the bounded memory-leakage model. The leakage here is not only allowed on the user's secret key, but also on the master secret key. Its security is proved in the standard model by a hybrid argument in a sequence of computationally indistinguishable games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first wicked IBE scheme in the context of leakage resilience.