This article documents an empirical pilot study conducted to determine whether decisions of image trustworthiness are contextual. Contextuality is an active area of investigation in quantum cognition, however there has been little compelling evidence of its presence in human information processing. A Bell scenario experimental design was employed which manipulated both content and representational features in order to minimize the difference in marginal probabilities across experimental conditions. In addition, participants were subjected to time pressure in order to promote more spontaneous decisions. Results revealed no significant differences in marginal probabilities, however, no evidence of contextuality was found. The study revealed a tension between the requirement for minimizing the difference in marginal probabilities and the need to produce the strong correlations required to empirically ascertain contextuality.
This article documents an empirical pilot study conducted to determine whether decisions of image trustworthiness are contextual. Contextuality is an active area of investigation in quantum cognition, however there has been little compelling evidence of its presence in human information processing. A Bell scenario experimental design was employed which manipulated both content and representational features in order to minimize the difference in marginal probabilities across experimental conditions. In addition, participants were subjected to time pressure in order to promote more spontaneous decisions. Results revealed no significant differences in marginal probabilities, however, no evidence of contextuality was found. The study revealed a tension between the requirement for minimizing the difference in marginal probabilities and the need to produce the strong correlations required to empirically ascertain contextuality.
The context-sensitivity of cognition has been demonstrated across a wide range of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, judgement and decision making. A related term, 'contextuality', has appeared from the field of quantum cognition, with mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that cognitive phenomena are sometimes contextual. Contextuality is a subtle notion that influences how we must view the properties of the cognitive phenomenon being studied. This article addresses the questions: What does it mean for a cognitive phenomenon to be contextual? What are the implications of contextuality for probabilistic models of cognition? How does contextuality differ from context-sensitivity? Starting from George Boole's "conditions of possible experience", we argue that a probabilistic model of a cognitive phenomenon is necessarily subject to an assumption of realism. By this we mean that the phenomenon being studied is assumed to have cognitive properties with a definite value independent of observation. In contrast, quantum cognition holds that a cognitive property maybe indeterminate, i.e., its properties do not have well established values prior to observation. We argue that indeterminacy is sufficient for incompatibility between cognitive properties. In turn, incompatibility is necessary for their contextuality. The significance of this argument for cognitive psychology is the following:if a cognitive phenomenon is found to be contextual, then there is reason to believe it may be indeterminate. We illustrate by means of two crowdsourced experiments how context-sensitivity and contextuality of cognitive properties in the form of facial trait judgements can be characterized from empirical data. Finally, we conceptually and formally contrast contextuality with context-sensitivity. We propose that both involve a form of context dependence, with causality being the differentiating factor: the context dependence in context-sensitivity has a causal basis, whereas the context dependence in contextuality is acausal. The resulting implications for probabilistic models of cognition are discussed.
This paper describes a crowdsourced experiment in which participants were asked to judge which of two simultaneously presented facial images (one real, one AI-generated) was fake. With the growing presence of synthetic imagery in digital environments, cognitive systems must adapt to novel and often deceptive visual stimuli. Recent developments in cognitive science propose that some mental processes may exhibit quantum-like characteristics, particularly in their context sensitivity. Drawing on Tezzin's "generalized fair coin" model, this study applied Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory to investigate whether human judgments of human faces exhibit quantum-like contextuality. Across 20 trials, each treated as a "generalized coin", bootstrap resampling (10,000 iterations per coin) revealed that nine trials demonstrated quantum-like contextuality. Notably, Coin 4 exhibited strong context-sensitive causal asymmetry, where both the real and synthetic faces elicited inverse judgments due to their unusually strong resemblance to one another. These results support the growing evidence that cognitive judgments are sometimes quantum-like contextual, suggesting that adopting comparative strategies, such as evaluating unfamiliar faces alongside known-real exemplars, may enhance accuracy in detecting synthetic images. Such pairwise methods align with the strengths of human perception and may inform future interventions, user interfaces, or educational tools aimed at improving visual judgment under uncertainty.
Contextuality provides a unifying paradigm for nonclassical aspects of quantum probabilities and resources of quantum information. Unfortunately, most forms of quantum contextuality remain experimentally unexplored due to the difficulty of performing sequences of projective measurements on individual quantum systems. Here we show that two-point correlations between binary compatible observables are sufficient to reveal any form of contextuality. This allows us to design simple experiments that are more robust against imperfections and easier to analyze, thus opening the door for observing interesting forms of contextuality, including those requiring quantum systems of high dimensions. In addition, it allows us to connect contextuality to communication complexity scenarios and reformulate a recent result relating contextuality and quantum computation.
In quantum physics there are well-known situations when measurements of the same property in different contexts (under different conditions) have the same probability distribution but cannot be represented by one and the same random variable. Such systems of random variables are called contextual. More generally, true contextuality is observed when different contexts force measurements of the same property (in psychology, responses to the same question) to be more dissimilar random variables than warranted by the difference of their distributions. The difference in distributions is itself a form of context-dependence but of another nature: it is attributable to direct causal influences exerted by contexts upon the random variables. The Contextuality-by-Default theory allows one to separate true contextuality from direct influences in the overall context-dependence. The Contextuality-by-Default analysis of numerous previous attempts to demonstrate contextuality in human judgments shows that all context-dependence in them can be accounted for by direct influences, with no true contextuality present. However, contextual systems in human behavior can be found. In this paper we present a series of crowd-sourcing experiments that exhibit true contextuality in simple decision making. The design of these experiments is an elaboration of one introduced in the Snow Queen experiment (Decision 5, 193-204, 2018), in which contextuality was for the first time demonstrated unequivocally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
This paper is devoted to an experimental investigation of cognitive contextuality inspired by quantum contextuality research. This contextuality is related to, but not identical to context-sensitivity which is well-studied in cognitive psychology and decision making. This paper is a part of quantum-like modeling, i.e., exploring the methodology of quantum theory outside of physics. We examined the bistable perception of cup-like objects, which strongly depends on experimental contexts. Our experimental data confirmed the existence of cognitive hysteresis, the important role of memory, and the non-commutative structure of cognitive observables. In physics, quantum contextuality is assessed using Bell-CHSH inequalities, and their violation is incorrectly believed to imply the nonlocality of Nature. The violation of Bell-type inequalities in cognitive and social science strongly indicates that the metaphysical implications of these inequalities are quite limited. In our experiments, modified Leggett-Garg inequalities were also significantly violated, but this only means that experimental data from experiments performed in different contexts cannot be modeled by a unique set of noncontextual, jointly distributed random variables. In our experiments, we know the empirical probability distributions measured in different contexts; thus, we can obtain much more detailed and reliable information about contextuality in human cognition by performing nonparametric compatibility tests.
In a recent paper Basieva, Cervantes, Dzhafarov, and Khrennikov (2019) presented a series of experiments which they claimed show evidence for contextuality in human judgments. This was based on a set of modified Bell-like inequalities designed to rule out effects caused by signalling. In this comment we show that it is, however, possible to construct a non-contextual model which explains the experimental data via direct influences, which we take to mean that a measurement outcome has a (model-specific) causal dependence on other measurements. We trace the apparent inconsistency to a definition of signalling which does not account for all possible forms of direct influence. Further, we cast doubt on the idea that any experimental data in psychology could provide conclusive evidence for contextuality beyond that explainable by direct influence.