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Reply to Comments on "Quantum Key Distribution for d-level systems for generalized Bell states" [Phys. Rev. A, 052331, (2002)] and "Quantum secret sharing based on a reusable Greenberger-Horne -Zeilinger states as secure carriers" [Phys. Rev. A, 67, 044302, (2003)]"

Vahid Karimipour

Published Jun 17, 2005• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We show that the criticisms of two recent comments \cite{ch1,ch2} on the insecurity of quantum key distributions proposed in \cite{zhang} and \cite{v1} and the secret sharing protocol proposed in \cite{v2} are based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence are invalid.

Related papers

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne- Zeilinger states as secure carriers’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

We show that the criticism of a recent Comment by Gao et al. on the insecurity of the quantum secret sharing protocol [proposed in S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)] is based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence is invalid.

arXiv:quant-ph/0506145•Physical Review A•Nov 18, 2005•6 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum key distribution for d -level systems with generalized Bell states’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to $d$-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.

arXiv:quant-ph/0509189•Physical Review A•Dec 20, 2005•2 citations

Comment II on “Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers”

DU Jian-zhong, Su‐Juan Qin, Qiaoyan Wen +1 more

In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure because a cheater can gain all the secret bits before sharing, while introducing one data bit error at most in the whole communication, which makes the cheater avoid the detection by the communication parities.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605088•Physical Review A•Jul 21, 2006•5 citations

Comment on “Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers”

Fei Gao, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiaoyan Wen +1 more

In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure if Eve employs a special strategy to attack.

arXiv:quant-ph/0505052•Physical Review A•Sep 20, 2005•42 citations

Reply to “Comment II on ‘Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers’ ”

Vahid Karimipour

In the preceding Comment [Jian-Zhong Du, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu, Phys. Rev. A 74, 016301 (2006)], it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.

arXiv:quant-ph/0605099•Physical Review A•Jul 21, 2006•3 citations

Comment II on "Quantum secret sharing based on reusable Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states as secure carriers" (3 pages)

Feng Guo, Fayuan Zhu, Fei Gao +1 more

Physical Review A•Jan 1, 2006•0 citations
In the preceding Comment it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Zhang, Li, and Gao [Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)] and its generalization to ddd-level systems by Karimipour, Bahraminasab, and Bagherinezhad [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)] are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the Comment. We invalidate the arguments of the Comment and show that the protocols are still secure.
In the preceding Comment [Jian-Zhong Du, Su-Juan Qin, Qiao-Yan Wen, and Fu-Chen Zhu, Phys. Rev. A 74, 016301 (2006)], it has been shown that in a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], one of the receivers can cheat by splitting the entanglement of the carrier and intercepting the secret, without being detected. In this reply we show that a simple modification of the protocol prevents the receivers from this kind of cheating.