People experience simple affective evaluations every day. Commonplace events, such as listening to breakfast radio, deliberating over what to have for lunch, or unwinding in front of the television in the evening, all have the potential to generate a positive or negative affective impression, depending on how we feel about the music on the radio, the menu choices, or the television program we are watching. Affective evaluation is a fundamental and basic activity of the human cognitive system and is central to most theories of cognition and emotion (Musch and Klauer 2003). Research on affective priming suggests that affective evaluations can be formed automatically, independently of other cognitive processes, without fully processing the features of the stimulus and can be generated in response to novel stimuli (e.g., Bargh et al. 1992; Damasio 1994; Duckworth et al. 2002; Fazio et al. 1986; Greenwald et al. 1989; LeDoux 1996; Zajonc 1980). What is perhaps more surprising is that the process of articulating an affective evaluation might also be constructive . That is, the simple affective impression that we might form in response to music, food, or a television program, can alter relevant representations depending on whether or not we are required to state our affective impression. This was the main premise in recent research by White et al. (2013, 2014), which was inspired by cognitive applications of quantum probability (QP) theory. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
People experience simple affective evaluations every day. Commonplace events, such as listening to breakfast radio, deliberating over what to have for lunch, or unwinding in front of the television in the evening, all have the potential to generate a positive or negative affective impression, depending on how we feel about the music on the radio, the menu choices, or the television program we are watching. Affective evaluation is a fundamental and basic activity of the human cognitive system and is central to most theories of cognition and emotion (Musch and Klauer 2003). Research on affective priming suggests that affective evaluations can be formed automatically, independently of other cognitive processes, without fully processing the features of the stimulus and can be generated in response to novel stimuli (e.g., Bargh et al. 1992; Damasio 1994; Duckworth et al. 2002; Fazio et al. 1986; Greenwald et al. 1989; LeDoux 1996; Zajonc 1980). What is perhaps more surprising is that the process of articulating an affective evaluation might also be constructive . That is, the simple affective impression that we might form in response to music, food, or a television program, can alter relevant representations depending on whether or not we are required to state our affective impression. This was the main premise in recent research by White et al. (2013, 2014), which was inspired by cognitive applications of quantum probability (QP) theory. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
The idea that choices can have a constructive effect has received a great deal of empirical support. The act of choosing appears to influence subsequent preferences for the options available. Recent research has proposed a cognitive model based on quantum probability (QP), which suggests that whether or not a participant provides an affective evaluation for a positively or negatively valenced stimulus can also be constructive and so, for example, influence the affective evaluation of a second oppositely valenced stimulus. However, there are some outstanding methodological questions in relation to this previous research. This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to resolve these questions. Experiment 1, using a binary response format, provides partial support for the interaction predicted by the QP model; and Experiment 2, which controls for the length of time participants have to respond, fully supports the QP model. Finally, Experiment 3 sought to determine whether the key effect can generalize beyond affective judgements about visual stimuli. Using judgements about the trustworthiness of well-known people, the predictions of the QP model were confirmed. Together, these three experiments provide further support for the QP model of the constructive effect of simple evaluations.
The Potential of Quantum Probability for Modeling Cognitive Processes Emmanuel M. Pothos (e.m.pothos@swansea.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Swansea University, SA2 8PP, UK Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu), Richard M. Shiffrin (shiffrin@indiana.edu), Jennifer S. Trueblood (jstruebl@indiana.edu) Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468, USA. Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) Ohio State University, School of Communication, Columbus 43210, USA. Reinhard K. Blutner (reinhard@blutner.de) Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Harald Atmanspacher (atmanspacher@collegium.ethz.ch) Department of Theory and Data Analysis, IGPP, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. Keywords: Quantum probability, formal approaches, decision making, conceptual combination General Background and Speakers Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to observables. In the context of physics, it has been successfully employed by researchers for over 100 years and has been the basis for some of the most impressive discoveries of the human mind (e.g., the transistor, and so the microchip, and the laser). But the applicability of QP theory is not limited to physical phenomena and, indeed, there has been growing interest in exploring the potential of QP theory in areas as diverse as economics (Baaquie, 2004), information theory (e.g., Grover, 1997), and psychology. We are interested in the latter objective. Probabilistic approaches to cognition have been recently enjoying considerable success (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). This is perhaps unsurprising. Several (if not most) aspects of cognitive processing involve inference about quantities which cannot be determined with certainty. Thus, probability theory seems an ideal tool for formalizing uncertainty in cognitive processes and describing the mechanisms which allow humans to be successful in an uncertain world. The question then becomes to identify the probabilistic framework which is most suitable for modeling particular aspects of cognition. Cognitive scientists have widely employed classical probability theory and there is no doubt that such approaches can be incredibly successful for particular problems (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007). But is Bayesian probability always the most suitable probabilistic framework for describing cognitive processes? Human inference often appears to violate fundamental laws of classical probability. For example, in the famous Linda problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) participants consider as more likely a conjunctive statement than a corresponding single premise one (i.e., Probability (AB this is the conjunction fallacy). In one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, naive participants choose to defect knowing their opponent defects, they choose to also defect knowing their opponent cooperates, but they reverse their judgment and choose to cooperate when their opponent’s action is unknown (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). This result is also hard to reconcile with classical probability theory, it violates the sure thing principle and the law of total probability. Findings such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle provide the motivation for exploring probabilistic frameworks alternative to classic probability theory. QP theory is mostly consistent with classical probability theory, but for a crucial difference. In classical probability theory Probability (AB Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), these properties of QP theory can lead to successful and simple QP models for empirical findings, such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle. Finally, QP theory remains suitable for describing cognition without involving any claim that the brain is a quantum computer. Rather, we adopt what is a standard approach in cognitive science and ask: 'does quantum probability theory produce results which predict human behavior well?’ The application of QP theory in cognition holds a lot of promise. The main objective of this symposium is to present the key ideas to the cognitive science community and summarize progress with QP theory cognitive models. What
Half Day Tutorial on Using Quantum Probability Theory to Model Cognition Emmanuel M. Pothos (Emmanuel.pothos.1@city.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, City University London, London, EC1R 0JD, UK Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) School of Communication, Derby Hall, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. Keywords: probability theory, Bayesian probability, quantum theory, decision making, probabilistic models. General Purpose This tutorial introduces why and how to build cognitive models using quantum probability (QP) theory. In the tutorial, we will show that QP is inherently consistent with deeply rooted psychological conceptions and intuitions. It offers a fresh conceptual framework for explaining some puzzling empirical findings of cognition, and provides a rich new source of alternative formal tools, compared to classical probability (CP) theory, for cognitive modeling. CP models, including Bayesian models, have had an enormous influence in cognitive science (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). Such formal models are appealing for many reasons. First, CP theory provides an integrated, coherent, self-consistent set of principles, which can be flexibly applied in any inductive inference situation. Second, such approaches are more falsifiable. Core principles of CP theory are inter-dependent, and identifying an empirical violation of one principle in a setting could invalidate the applicability of CP theory as a whole in that setting. Third, CP principles are intuitive. In the words of Laplace (1816, cited in Perfors et al., 2011), “probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation.” However, human cognition often goes against the description and prescription from CP theory. In one of the most influential empirical traditions in cognitive psychology, Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues have reported persistent, clear violations of CP principles in decision making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, consider the famous conjunction fallacy. Participants are told of a person, Linda, looking very much like a feminist and unlike a bank teller. Then, they are asked to judge probabilities of some events. Violating CP rules, people think the probability that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist is higher than the probability that she is just a bank teller. According to CP theory, it is a fallacy to think P(A and B)>P(A). Importantly, even when we become aware of our “fallacy,” we cannot shake off the impression that Linda is indeed more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist, than to be just a bank teller. Important findings like this have led to intense and extensive controversy about the mechanisms which guide human cognition and decision making. The inspiration for Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu) Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468 Indiana, USA. exploring QP theory in cognitive modeling partly arises as a way to resolve this controversy. The physical theory of quantum mechanics is a marriage between a framework for how to assign probabilities to events and assumptions regarding the nature of the physical world. We can call the former QP theory (or just quantum theory). Can it be applied outside of physics? The motivation for doing so is twofold. First, QP theory is a highly rigorous framework for probabilistic inference. It has been developed over several decades by some of the most brilliant scientists of all time (e.g., Bohr, Dirac, von Neumann, Planck) and has been intensely scrutinized ever since. Thus, the application of QP theory in cognitive modeling has exactly the same formal advantages as that of CP theory. Second, quantum theory allows us to consider the possible relevance in cognitive modeling of several novel concepts. For example, in quantum theory, a cognitive system can be in a superposition state. This means that relative to a question or measurement, the system is in an indefinite state, with all definite states having potential to be expressed. This provides an intrinsic formal representation of the conflict, ambiguity, or uncertainty that people experience in cognitive processes. For another example: states can be entangled, which means a change in one part of the system inexorably and instantaneously affects another part. Entanglement is a form of extreme association, which can be helpful for formalizing important cognitive processes, such as holism, cognitive dissonance, and social projection. Fundamental quantum conceptions, such as superposition, entanglement, interference, and complementarity, have no formal counterparts in cognitive theory. We are part of a growing group of researchers who have been intensely exploring their applicability in understanding human cognition. Quantum theory reveals alternative intuitions in probabilistic models of cognition. The quantum cognition research program aims to explore whether these alternative intuitions can explain paradoxical findings in decision, memory, and other areas of cognitive processing. The tutorial introduce the basic principles of quantum theory, in the context of well-known empirical findings in psychological literature. The basic elements of QP theory will require only some knowledge of linear algebra. No background in physics or quantum theory is assumed. The tutorial will be self-contained. It will show how probability
A novel decision bias, called the evaluation bias (EB), was reported by White et al. (2014). In a sequence of two stimuli of opposite affective valence, evaluating the first stimulus leads to a more contrasting evaluation for the second one, compared to when the first stimulus is just observed. The EB is consistent with a long tradition of constructive influences or decision biases in questionnaire judgments. The prediction of the EB was based on the application of a quantum probability model, taking advantage of the unique role of evaluations in quantum probability. In the present work, we develop the quantum model so as to examine whether similar predictions are possible in the context of real questionnaires, where precise control over the relative valence of stimulus pairs is impossible. It is shown that an EB prediction can be extracted and we test this prediction in an organizational opinion survey, administered to a range of organizations across four experiments (total N = 868 and 84 organizations) and with two different languages. In all experiments, there was clear evidence for an EB. We examine the result with the quantum model and Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model. Both models can broadly capture the empirical findings and so offer promise for providing a formal understanding of constructive influences.
Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to observables. In the context of physics, it has been successfully employed by researchers for over 100 years and has been the basis for some of the most impressive discoveries of the human mind (e.g., the transistor, and so the microchip, and the laser). But the applicability of QP theory is not limited to physical phenomena and, indeed, there has been growing interest in exploring the potential of QP theory in areas as diverse as economics (Baaquie, 2004), information theory (e.g., Grover, 1997), and psychology.
Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.