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Cognitive Science

Half Day Tutorial on Using Quantum Probability Theory to Model Cognition.

Emmanuel M. Pothos, Zheng Wang, Jerome R. Busemeyer

Published Jan 1, 2013• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Half Day Tutorial on Using Quantum Probability Theory to Model Cognition Emmanuel M. Pothos (Emmanuel.pothos.1@city.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, City University London, London, EC1R 0JD, UK Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) School of Communication, Derby Hall, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. Keywords: probability theory, Bayesian probability, quantum theory, decision making, probabilistic models. General Purpose This tutorial introduces why and how to build cognitive models using quantum probability (QP) theory. In the tutorial, we will show that QP is inherently consistent with deeply rooted psychological conceptions and intuitions. It offers a fresh conceptual framework for explaining some puzzling empirical findings of cognition, and provides a rich new source of alternative formal tools, compared to classical probability (CP) theory, for cognitive modeling. CP models, including Bayesian models, have had an enormous influence in cognitive science (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). Such formal models are appealing for many reasons. First, CP theory provides an integrated, coherent, self-consistent set of principles, which can be flexibly applied in any inductive inference situation. Second, such approaches are more falsifiable. Core principles of CP theory are inter-dependent, and identifying an empirical violation of one principle in a setting could invalidate the applicability of CP theory as a whole in that setting. Third, CP principles are intuitive. In the words of Laplace (1816, cited in Perfors et al., 2011), “probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation.” However, human cognition often goes against the description and prescription from CP theory. In one of the most influential empirical traditions in cognitive psychology, Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues have reported persistent, clear violations of CP principles in decision making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, consider the famous conjunction fallacy. Participants are told of a person, Linda, looking very much like a feminist and unlike a bank teller. Then, they are asked to judge probabilities of some events. Violating CP rules, people think the probability that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist is higher than the probability that she is just a bank teller. According to CP theory, it is a fallacy to think P(A and B)>P(A). Importantly, even when we become aware of our “fallacy,” we cannot shake off the impression that Linda is indeed more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist, than to be just a bank teller. Important findings like this have led to intense and extensive controversy about the mechanisms which guide human cognition and decision making. The inspiration for Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu) Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468 Indiana, USA. exploring QP theory in cognitive modeling partly arises as a way to resolve this controversy. The physical theory of quantum mechanics is a marriage between a framework for how to assign probabilities to events and assumptions regarding the nature of the physical world. We can call the former QP theory (or just quantum theory). Can it be applied outside of physics? The motivation for doing so is twofold. First, QP theory is a highly rigorous framework for probabilistic inference. It has been developed over several decades by some of the most brilliant scientists of all time (e.g., Bohr, Dirac, von Neumann, Planck) and has been intensely scrutinized ever since. Thus, the application of QP theory in cognitive modeling has exactly the same formal advantages as that of CP theory. Second, quantum theory allows us to consider the possible relevance in cognitive modeling of several novel concepts. For example, in quantum theory, a cognitive system can be in a superposition state. This means that relative to a question or measurement, the system is in an indefinite state, with all definite states having potential to be expressed. This provides an intrinsic formal representation of the conflict, ambiguity, or uncertainty that people experience in cognitive processes. For another example: states can be entangled, which means a change in one part of the system inexorably and instantaneously affects another part. Entanglement is a form of extreme association, which can be helpful for formalizing important cognitive processes, such as holism, cognitive dissonance, and social projection. Fundamental quantum conceptions, such as superposition, entanglement, interference, and complementarity, have no formal counterparts in cognitive theory. We are part of a growing group of researchers who have been intensely exploring their applicability in understanding human cognition. Quantum theory reveals alternative intuitions in probabilistic models of cognition. The quantum cognition research program aims to explore whether these alternative intuitions can explain paradoxical findings in decision, memory, and other areas of cognitive processing. The tutorial introduce the basic principles of quantum theory, in the context of well-known empirical findings in psychological literature. The basic elements of QP theory will require only some knowledge of linear algebra. No background in physics or quantum theory is assumed. The tutorial will be self-contained. It will show how probability

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The Potential of Quantum Probability for Modeling Cognitive Processes - eScholarship

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The Potential of Quantum Probability for Modeling Cognitive Processes Emmanuel M. Pothos (e.m.pothos@swansea.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Swansea University, SA2 8PP, UK Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu), Richard M. Shiffrin (shiffrin@indiana.edu), Jennifer S. Trueblood (jstruebl@indiana.edu) Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468, USA. Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) Ohio State University, School of Communication, Columbus 43210, USA. Reinhard K. Blutner (reinhard@blutner.de) Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Harald Atmanspacher (atmanspacher@collegium.ethz.ch) Department of Theory and Data Analysis, IGPP, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. Keywords: Quantum probability, formal approaches, decision making, conceptual combination General Background and Speakers Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to observables. In the context of physics, it has been successfully employed by researchers for over 100 years and has been the basis for some of the most impressive discoveries of the human mind (e.g., the transistor, and so the microchip, and the laser). But the applicability of QP theory is not limited to physical phenomena and, indeed, there has been growing interest in exploring the potential of QP theory in areas as diverse as economics (Baaquie, 2004), information theory (e.g., Grover, 1997), and psychology. We are interested in the latter objective. Probabilistic approaches to cognition have been recently enjoying considerable success (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). This is perhaps unsurprising. Several (if not most) aspects of cognitive processing involve inference about quantities which cannot be determined with certainty. Thus, probability theory seems an ideal tool for formalizing uncertainty in cognitive processes and describing the mechanisms which allow humans to be successful in an uncertain world. The question then becomes to identify the probabilistic framework which is most suitable for modeling particular aspects of cognition. Cognitive scientists have widely employed classical probability theory and there is no doubt that such approaches can be incredibly successful for particular problems (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007). But is Bayesian probability always the most suitable probabilistic framework for describing cognitive processes? Human inference often appears to violate fundamental laws of classical probability. For example, in the famous Linda problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) participants consider as more likely a conjunctive statement than a corresponding single premise one (i.e., Probability (AB this is the conjunction fallacy). In one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, naive participants choose to defect knowing their opponent defects, they choose to also defect knowing their opponent cooperates, but they reverse their judgment and choose to cooperate when their opponent’s action is unknown (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). This result is also hard to reconcile with classical probability theory, it violates the sure thing principle and the law of total probability. Findings such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle provide the motivation for exploring probabilistic frameworks alternative to classic probability theory. QP theory is mostly consistent with classical probability theory, but for a crucial difference. In classical probability theory Probability (AB Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), these properties of QP theory can lead to successful and simple QP models for empirical findings, such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle. Finally, QP theory remains suitable for describing cognition without involving any claim that the brain is a quantum computer. Rather, we adopt what is a standard approach in cognitive science and ask: 'does quantum probability theory produce results which predict human behavior well?’ The application of QP theory in cognition holds a lot of promise. The main objective of this symposium is to present the key ideas to the cognitive science community and summarize progress with QP theory cognitive models. What

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Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.

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Half Day Tutorial on Using Quantum Probability Theory to Model Cognition Emmanuel M. Pothos (Emmanuel.pothos.1@city.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, City University London, London, EC1R 0JD, UK Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) School of Communication, Derby Hall, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. Keywords: probability theory, Bayesian probability, quantum theory, decision making, probabilistic models. General Purpose This tutorial introduces why and how to build cognitive models using quantum probability (QP) theory. In the tutorial, we will show that QP is inherently consistent with deeply rooted psychological conceptions and intuitions. It offers a fresh conceptual framework for explaining some puzzling empirical findings of cognition, and provides a rich new source of alternative formal tools, compared to classical probability (CP) theory, for cognitive modeling. CP models, including Bayesian models, have had an enormous influence in cognitive science (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). Such formal models are appealing for many reasons. First, CP theory provides an integrated, coherent, self-consistent set of principles, which can be flexibly applied in any inductive inference situation. Second, such approaches are more falsifiable. Core principles of CP theory are inter-dependent, and identifying an empirical violation of one principle in a setting could invalidate the applicability of CP theory as a whole in that setting. Third, CP principles are intuitive. In the words of Laplace (1816, cited in Perfors et al., 2011), “probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation.” However, human cognition often goes against the description and prescription from CP theory. In one of the most influential empirical traditions in cognitive psychology, Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues have reported persistent, clear violations of CP principles in decision making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, consider the famous conjunction fallacy. Participants are told of a person, Linda, looking very much like a feminist and unlike a bank teller. Then, they are asked to judge probabilities of some events. Violating CP rules, people think the probability that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist is higher than the probability that she is just a bank teller. According to CP theory, it is a fallacy to think P(A and B)>P(A). Importantly, even when we become aware of our “fallacy,” we cannot shake off the impression that Linda is indeed more likely to be a bank teller and a feminist, than to be just a bank teller. Important findings like this have led to intense and extensive controversy about the mechanisms which guide human cognition and decision making. The inspiration for Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu) Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468 Indiana, USA. exploring QP theory in cognitive modeling partly arises as a way to resolve this controversy. The physical theory of quantum mechanics is a marriage between a framework for how to assign probabilities to events and assumptions regarding the nature of the physical world. We can call the former QP theory (or just quantum theory). Can it be applied outside of physics? The motivation for doing so is twofold. First, QP theory is a highly rigorous framework for probabilistic inference. It has been developed over several decades by some of the most brilliant scientists of all time (e.g., Bohr, Dirac, von Neumann, Planck) and has been intensely scrutinized ever since. Thus, the application of QP theory in cognitive modeling has exactly the same formal advantages as that of CP theory. Second, quantum theory allows us to consider the possible relevance in cognitive modeling of several novel concepts. For example, in quantum theory, a cognitive system can be in a superposition state. This means that relative to a question or measurement, the system is in an indefinite state, with all definite states having potential to be expressed. This provides an intrinsic formal representation of the conflict, ambiguity, or uncertainty that people experience in cognitive processes. For another example: states can be entangled, which means a change in one part of the system inexorably and instantaneously affects another part. Entanglement is a form of extreme association, which can be helpful for formalizing important cognitive processes, such as holism, cognitive dissonance, and social projection. Fundamental quantum conceptions, such as superposition, entanglement, interference, and complementarity, have no formal counterparts in cognitive theory. We are part of a growing group of researchers who have been intensely exploring their applicability in understanding human cognition. Quantum theory reveals alternative intuitions in probabilistic models of cognition. The quantum cognition research program aims to explore whether these alternative intuitions can explain paradoxical findings in decision, memory, and other areas of cognitive processing. The tutorial introduce the basic principles of quantum theory, in the context of well-known empirical findings in psychological literature. The basic elements of QP theory will require only some knowledge of linear algebra. No background in physics or quantum theory is assumed. The tutorial will be self-contained. It will show how probability
The Potential of Quantum Probability for Modeling Cognitive Processes Emmanuel M. Pothos (e.m.pothos@swansea.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Swansea University, SA2 8PP, UK Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu), Richard M. Shiffrin (shiffrin@indiana.edu), Jennifer S. Trueblood (jstruebl@indiana.edu) Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468, USA. Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) Ohio State University, School of Communication, Columbus 43210, USA. Reinhard K. Blutner (reinhard@blutner.de) Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Harald Atmanspacher (atmanspacher@collegium.ethz.ch) Department of Theory and Data Analysis, IGPP, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. Keywords: Quantum probability, formal approaches, decision making, conceptual combination General Background and Speakers Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to observables. In the context of physics, it has been successfully employed by researchers for over 100 years and has been the basis for some of the most impressive discoveries of the human mind (e.g., the transistor, and so the microchip, and the laser). But the applicability of QP theory is not limited to physical phenomena and, indeed, there has been growing interest in exploring the potential of QP theory in areas as diverse as economics (Baaquie, 2004), information theory (e.g., Grover, 1997), and psychology. We are interested in the latter objective. Probabilistic approaches to cognition have been recently enjoying considerable success (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). This is perhaps unsurprising. Several (if not most) aspects of cognitive processing involve inference about quantities which cannot be determined with certainty. Thus, probability theory seems an ideal tool for formalizing uncertainty in cognitive processes and describing the mechanisms which allow humans to be successful in an uncertain world. The question then becomes to identify the probabilistic framework which is most suitable for modeling particular aspects of cognition. Cognitive scientists have widely employed classical probability theory and there is no doubt that such approaches can be incredibly successful for particular problems (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007). But is Bayesian probability always the most suitable probabilistic framework for describing cognitive processes? Human inference often appears to violate fundamental laws of classical probability. For example, in the famous Linda problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) participants consider as more likely a conjunctive statement than a corresponding single premise one (i.e., Probability (AB this is the conjunction fallacy). In one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, naive participants choose to defect knowing their opponent defects, they choose to also defect knowing their opponent cooperates, but they reverse their judgment and choose to cooperate when their opponent’s action is unknown (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). This result is also hard to reconcile with classical probability theory, it violates the sure thing principle and the law of total probability. Findings such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle provide the motivation for exploring probabilistic frameworks alternative to classic probability theory. QP theory is mostly consistent with classical probability theory, but for a crucial difference. In classical probability theory Probability (AB Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), these properties of QP theory can lead to successful and simple QP models for empirical findings, such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle. Finally, QP theory remains suitable for describing cognition without involving any claim that the brain is a quantum computer. Rather, we adopt what is a standard approach in cognitive science and ask: 'does quantum probability theory produce results which predict human behavior well?’ The application of QP theory in cognition holds a lot of promise. The main objective of this symposium is to present the key ideas to the cognitive science community and summarize progress with QP theory cognitive models. What
Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.
How can we use quantum theory to model other phenomena of interest to researchers in cognition and decision making? Quantum theory is not easy for researchers in cognition and decision making to accept. In fact, quantum mechanics was not easy for physicists to accept either, but it was forced on them by several paradoxical findings that could not be explained using classical physics. We have a similar problem in cognition and decision making – there are numerous paradoxical findings that just seem irrational according to classic probability theory. For example, under some conditions, people judge the probability of event A and B to be greater than the probability of event B , which is called the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Also, under the same conditions, they judge the probability of A or B to be less than the probability of event A (Carlson & Yates, 1989), which is called the disjunction fallacy. In this chapter we examine how quantum probability theory explains these and other puzzling results from human probability judgment research. This chapter has two main parts. In the first part, we use a quantum model to derive qualitative predictions for conjunction errors, disjunction errors, and other closely related findings. The first section provides a general set of predictions that do not depend on specific assumptions about the features used to represent events, and the predictions are parameter free. In the second part, we examine the quantitative predictions of the quantum model for a Bayesian inference task, which we use to explain order effects on inference.
The present thesis (mostly) concerns the application of alternative mathematical methods to understand patterns in human cognition and to model them. The different chapters presented in this thesis show research that concerns the application of quantum probability (QP) theory in the modeling of human decision-making. Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to events. QP theory can be thought of as the probability rules from quantum mechanics, without any of the physics. This work is not about the application of quantum physics to brain physiology. Rather, we are interested in QP theory as a mathematical framework for cognitive modelling. This theory is potentially relevant in any behavioural situation that involves uncertainty. QP theory is analogous to classical probability theory, though QP theory and classical probability (CP) theory are founded from different sets of axioms (the Kolmogorov and Dirac/von Neumann axioms respectively) and so are subject to alternative constraints. In this thesis we show that especially over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in decision-making and cognitive models using a quantum probabilistic (QP) framework. We see how this development encompasses publications in major journals (see Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2014; and Yearsley and Pothos, 2014; among others), special issues, and dedicated workshops, as well as several comprehensive books (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Khrennikov, 2010; and Haven and Khrennikov, 2010). However, uncertainty itself is neither ethical nor unethical – yet it is inherent to most situations in which, for instance, moral judgments and decisions have to be made. For a descriptive understanding of judgment and decisions in moral situations, it is an important lesson to acknowledge both the cognitive side (bounded rationality) and the environment (ecological rationality) – and thus the uncertainty of the world and how the mind deals with it. This thesis also shows significant interest in moral and social psychology. Specifically, we consider present technologies that suggest a need for evaluating alternative contexts for ethical decision-making. How the research on human-machine interaction feeds back into humans’ understanding of themselves as moral agents? This key question ultimately relates to the nature of ethical theory itself. Overall, this dissertation presents and addresses not only standard aspects of decision- making processes, such as similarity judgments (Chapters 1 to 4) or the constructive role of articulating impressions (Chapter 5), but also standard aspects of social psychology, such as moral judgments (Chapters 6 and 7) and game theory (Chapter 8). As stated in the Declarations section, the present thesis is a combination of a standard and a publication- based dissertation.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of life; most events, affairs, and questions are uncertain. A key problem in behavioral sciences is how the mind copes with uncertain information. Quantum probability theory offers a set of principles for inference, which align well with intuition about psychological processes in certain cases: cases when it appears that inference is contextual, the mental state changes as a result of previous judgments, or there is interference between different possibilities. We motivate the use of quantum theory in cognition and its key characteristics. For each of these characteristics, we review relevant quantum cognitive models and empirical support. The scope of quantum cognitive models encompasses fallacies in decision-making (such as the conjunction fallacy or the disjunction effect), question order effects, conceptual combination, evidence accumulation, perception, over-/underdistribution effects in memory, and more. Quantum models often formalize psychological ideas previously expressed in heuristic terms, allow unified explanations of previously disparate findings, and have led to several surprising, novel predictions. We also cast a critical eye on quantum models and consider some of their shortcomings and issues regarding their further development.
Purpose: Decision-making under uncertainty remains a foundational challenge in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Classical Bayesian Probability Models (CBM) often fail to explain paradoxical cognitive behaviors such as order effects, ambiguity aversion, and context-dependent reasoning. This study seeks to compare Quantum Probability Theory (QPT) and Classical Bayesian Models in their ability to capture the dynamics of human decision-making. It aims to determine which framework more accurately reflects the cognitive mechanisms underlying reasoning under uncertainty. Methodology: A qualitative, exploratory research design was adopted, involving in-depth semi-structured interviews with 16 experts across psychology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive neuroscience. Participants were purposively selected for their theoretical and empirical expertise in probabilistic reasoning. Data were analyzed using reflexive thematic analysis, guided by the Dual-Process Theory and Busemeyer’s Quantum Cognition framework. The analysis emphasized participants’ perspectives on theoretical assumptions, cognitive plausibility, and predictive utility between QPT and CBM paradigms. Findings: Thematic findings reveal that Quantum Probability Theory offers superior explanatory power in contexts involving cognitive ambiguity, contextual dependence, and non-commutativity of mental operations. Participants consistently reported that QPT better models real-world reasoning tasks where classical logic collapses, capturing the fluid and context-sensitive nature of human judgment. Conversely, while CBM remains effective in structured, low-uncertainty scenarios, it fails to accommodate superposition and interference effects inherent in human cognition. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice, and Policy (Recommendations): The study contributes theoretically by demonstrating how quantum probabilistic models expand existing theories of bounded rationality and probabilistic reasoning in cognitive science. Practically, it encourages interdisciplinary collaboration between cognitive scientists, AI researchers, and philosophers to refine decision models that mirror human intuition more closely. Policy-wise, the findings support the integration of quantum-inspired approaches in the design of intelligent decision-support systems and cognitive architectures. The study recommends continued empirical validation of QPT within applied domains—such as behavioral economics, machine learning, and cognitive modeling—to strengthen its predictive and explanatory robustness.