Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange

Whitfield Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, Michael J. Wiener

Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin

Recent work by Krawczyk [10] and Menezes [14] has highlighted the importance of under-standing well the guarantees and limitations of formal security models when using them to prove the security of protocols. In this paper we focus on security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. We observe that there are several classes of attacks on AKE protocols that lie outside the scope of the Canetti-Krawczyk model. Some of these additional attacks have already been considered by Krawczyk [10]. In an attempt to bring these attacks within the scope of the security model we extend the Canetti-Krawczyk model for AKE security by providing significantly greater powers to the adversary. Our contribution is a more compact, integrated, and comprehensive formulation of the security model. We then introduce a new AKE protocol called NAXOS and prove that it is secure against these stronger adversaries. 1

Xichen Zhang, Keitaro Hashimoto, Wakaha Ogata

Yun Song, Songhui Guo, Yeming Yang +1 more

Stronger anonymity password authentication key exchange protocols based on traditional cryptography are not resistant to quantum computing attacks, and there is no lattice-only anonymous password authentication key exchange protocol protocol that satisfies the strong anonymity requirement. Therefore, this paper constructs stronger anonymity PAKE protocol based on the ring learning with errors (RLWE) and smooth projective hash function (SPHF) based on ideal lattice. The proposed protocol can achieve stronger anonymity and resists to desynchronization attacks and quantum attack. The security of the protocol is proved under the BPR model. The security and performance analysis shows that the proposed PAKE protocol has better advantages in security and efficiency.

Qingfeng Cheng, Chuangui Ma, Fushan Wei

Since Bellare and Rogaway presented the first formal security model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols in 1993, many formal security models have been proposed. The extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model proposed by LaMacchia et al. is currently regarded as the strongest security model for two-party AKE protocols. In this paper, we first generalize the eCK model for tripartite AKE protocols, called teCK model, and enhance the security of the new model by adding a new reveal query. In the teCK model, the adversary has stronger powers, and can learn more secret information. Then we present a new tripartite AKE protocol based on the NAXOS protocol, called T-NAXOS protocol, and analyze its security in the teCK model under the random oracle assumption.

Christoph Bader, Dennis Hofheinz, Tibor Jager +2 more