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Designs Codes and Cryptography

Authentication and authenticated key exchanges

Whitfield Diffie, Paul C. van Oorschot, Michael J. Wiener

Published Jun 1, 1992• 1,155 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00124891

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We study witness-authenticated key exchange (WAKE), in which parties authenticate through knowledge of a witness to any NP statement. WAKE achieves generic authenticated key exchange in the absence of trusted parties; WAKE is most suitable when a certificate authority is either unavailable or undesirable, as in highly decentralized networks. In practice WAKE approximates witness encryption, its elusive non-interactive analogue, at the cost of minimal interaction. This work is the first to propose, model and build witness-authenticated key exchange amongst groups of more than two parties, as well as the first to provide practical and provably secure constructions in the two-party case for general NP statements. Specifically our contributions are: both game-based and universally composable (Canetti, FOCS ’01) definitions for WAKE along with equivalence conditions between the two definitions, a highly general compiler that introduces witness-authentication to any key exchange protocol along with, as a direct consequence, a three-round group WAKE protocol from DDH and signatures of knowledge (SOK), and an optimized two-round group WAKE construction from DDH and SOK along with experimental benchmarks to demonstrate concrete practicality. Additionally, we study the specialized two-party case and provide a critique of prior work on this topic (Ngo et al., Financial Crypto ’21) by pinpointing nontrivial weaknesses in the model, constructions and security proofs seen therein. We rectify those limitations with this work, significantly diverging in our techniques, design and approach.

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Several practical protocols for authentication and key exchange

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Information Processing Letters•Jan 1, 1995•16 citations
Abstract. We initiate the formal study on authenticated key exchange (AKE) under bad randomness. This could happen when (1) an adversary compromises the randomness source and hence directly controls the randomness of each AKE session; and (2) the randomness repeats in different AKE sessions due to reset attacks. We construct two formal security models, Reset-1 and Reset-2, to capture these two bad randomness situations respectively, and investigate the security of some widely used AKE protocols in these models by showing that they become insecure when the adversary is able to manipulate the randomness. On the positive side, we propose simple but generic methods to make AKE protocols secure in Reset-1 and Reset-2 models. The methods work in a modular way: first, we strengthen a widely used AKE protocol to achieve Reset-2 security, then we show how to transform any Reset-2 secure AKE protocol to a new one which also satisfies Reset-1 security.
We study witness-authenticated key exchange (WAKE), in which parties authenticate through knowledge of a witness to any NP statement. WAKE achieves generic authenticated key exchange in the absence of trusted parties; WAKE is most suitable when a certificate authority is either unavailable or undesirable, as in highly decentralized networks. In practice WAKE approximates witness encryption, its elusive non-interactive analogue, at the cost of minimal interaction. This work is the first to propose, model and build witness-authenticated key exchange amongst groups of more than two parties, as well as the first to provide practical and provably secure constructions in the two-party case for general NP statements. Specifically our contributions are: both game-based and universally composable (Canetti, FOCS ’01) definitions for WAKE along with equivalence conditions between the two definitions, a highly general compiler that introduces witness-authentication to any key exchange protocol along with, as a direct consequence, a three-round group WAKE protocol from DDH and signatures of knowledge (SOK), and an optimized two-round group WAKE construction from DDH and SOK along with experimental benchmarks to demonstrate concrete practicality. Additionally, we study the specialized two-party case and provide a critique of prior work on this topic (Ngo et al., Financial Crypto ’21) by pinpointing nontrivial weaknesses in the model, constructions and security proofs seen therein. We rectify those limitations with this work, significantly diverging in our techniques, design and approach.