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International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security

Analysis of Two Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

Qingfeng Cheng, Guangguo Han, Chuangui Ma

Published Jan 1, 2009• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The design of secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols has always been a notorious hard problem. Many famous AKE protocols have been found flaws since they were finished. In this paper, we analyze two AKE protocols, which were proposed by Hassan et al. in 2007 and 2008. Then we present key compromise impersonation attack and ephemeral key compromise attack to their two AKE protocols.

DOI
10.1109/mines.2009.42

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The design of secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols has always been a notorious hard problem. Many famous AKE protocols have been found flaws since they were finished. In this paper, we analyze two AKE protocols, which were proposed by Hassan et al. in 2007 and 2008. Then we present key compromise impersonation attack and ephemeral key compromise attack to their two AKE protocols.
The extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model proposed by LaMacchia et al.is currently regarded as the strongest security model for authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols.In the eCK model,the adversary can make queries on the test session,and reveal both ephemeral private keys,both long-term keys,or one of each from the two different parties.In this paper,we analyze two AKE protocols designed in the eCK model based on the definition of eCK model.We propose ephemeral keys compromised attacks and long-term keys compromised attacks on one of them,and also propose ephemeral keys compromised attacks on the other one.The results of analysis show that both of them are insecure in the eCK model.
The importance of an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol has long been known in the field of cryptography. Two of the questions still being asked today are (1) what properties or features does a secure AKE protocol possess, and (2) How does one, in a step by step fashion, create a secure AKE protocol? This thesis aims to answer these two questions. \nThe thesis contains two parts: one is a survey of previous works on the desired features of the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol, and the other is a study of a previously proposed design methodology in designing secure AKE protocols, as well as contributing an original idea of such methodologies. Descriptions and comparisons of the two design methodologies are included. \nThe thesis surveys the literature and conducts a case study of the STS protocol, analyzes various attacks on STS through some known attacks to it, and extracts the desired properties and features of a secure AKE protocol via the case study. This part of the thesis does not propose any new result, but summarizes a complete list of issues one should take consideration of while designing an AKE protocol. We also show that at the end of this part, a secure version of STS which possesses the desired features of an AKE protocol. \nThe other major part of the thesis surveys one design methodology of creating a secure AKE protocol by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk; it is based on having a secure key exchange protocol then adding (mutual) authentication to it. The thesis then proposes another original design methodology; it starts with a secure mutual authentication protocol, then adds the secure key exchange feature without modifying overheads and number of flows of the original mutual authentication protocol. We show in this part the "secure" AKE protocol developed through these two design approaches is identical to the secure version of STS described in the other part, and thus possesses the desired features of a secure AKE protocol. We also give a proof of security of the secure AKE protocol developed under our design methodology.
Abstract. We initiate the formal study on authenticated key exchange (AKE) under bad randomness. This could happen when (1) an adversary compromises the randomness source and hence directly controls the randomness of each AKE session; and (2) the randomness repeats in different AKE sessions due to reset attacks. We construct two formal security models, Reset-1 and Reset-2, to capture these two bad randomness situations respectively, and investigate the security of some widely used AKE protocols in these models by showing that they become insecure when the adversary is able to manipulate the randomness. On the positive side, we propose simple but generic methods to make AKE protocols secure in Reset-1 and Reset-2 models. The methods work in a modular way: first, we strengthen a widely used AKE protocol to achieve Reset-2 security, then we show how to transform any Reset-2 secure AKE protocol to a new one which also satisfies Reset-1 security.
Mobile communications (e.g., emails, Snapchat and Facebook) over a wireless connection is a norm in our Internet-connected society. Ensuring the security of communications between devices is an ongoing challenge. A number of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed to verify the authenticity of a user and the integrity of messages sent over an insecure wireless communication channel. Recently, Tsai et al. proposed two AKE protocols designed for wireless network systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that their protocols are vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks through presenting concrete attacks, contrary to their claims.
In 2010, Fan et al. proposed a Smart Card-Based Authenticated Key Exchange protocol with CAPTCHAs for wireless mobile networks. In this paper, it is shown that their proposed protocol is vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) and ephemeral key compromise impersonation attacks while it does not provide the key confirmation attribute. Furthermore, it is inefficient due to number redundancy of rounds and computational costs. To overcome these weaknesses, two secure and efficient smart card-based Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols combined with CAPTCHAs are proposed for wireless mobile networks that provide many security attributes while they have a remarkable efficiency when compared with Fan et al.'s protocol in the terms of communication costs and computational complexities.