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Chinese Physics Letters

Revisiting Quantum Secure Direct Communication with W State

Jun Liu, Liu Yi-Min, Hai-Jing Cao, Shi Shou-Hua, Zhanjun Zhang

Published Sep 27, 2006• 42 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/23/10/008

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The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.
Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.
Recently Xia and Song [Phys. Lett. A 364 (2007) 117] have proposed a controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) protocol. They claimed that in their protocol only with the help of the controller Charlie, the receiver Alice can successfully extract the secret message from the sender Bob. In this letter, first we will show that within their protocol the controller Charlie's role could have been excluded if it were not for their unreasonable design. We then revise the Xia–Song CQSDC protocol such that its original advantages are retained and the CQSDC can be really realized.
Recently Xia and Song [Phys. Lett. A (In press)] have proposed a controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) protocol. They claimed that in their protocol only with the help of the controller Charlie, the receiver Alice can successfully extract the secret message from the sender Bob. In this letter, first we will show that within their protocol the controller Charlie's role can be excluded due to their unreasonable design. We then revise the Xia-Song CQSDC protocol such that its original advantages are retained and the CQSDC can be really realized.
An improvement (Y-protocol) [Commun. Theor. Phys. 49 (2008) 103] on the quantum secure direct communication with W state (C-protocol) [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is proposed by Yuan et al. The quantum bit error rate induced by eavesdropper is 4.17% in C-protocol and 6.25% in Y-protocol. In this paper, another improvement on C-protocol is given. The quantum bit error rate of the eavesdropping will increase to 8.75%, which is 1.1 times larger than that in C-protocol and 0.4 times larger than that in Y-protocol.