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Communications in Theoretical Physics

Eavesdropping on Quantum Secure Direct Communication with W State in Noisy Channel

Yuan Hao, Liu Yin-Min, Zhang Wen, Zhanjun Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2008• 13 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.

DOI
10.1088/0253-6102/49/1/22

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Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.
The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.
An improvement (Y-protocol) [Commun. Theor. Phys. 49 (2008) 103] on the quantum secure direct communication with W state (C-protocol) [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is proposed by Yuan et al. The quantum bit error rate induced by eavesdropper is 4.17% in C-protocol and 6.25% in Y-protocol. In this paper, another improvement on C-protocol is given. The quantum bit error rate of the eavesdropping will increase to 8.75%, which is 1.1 times larger than that in C-protocol and 0.4 times larger than that in Y-protocol.
量的安全安全直接通讯协议(即， C-S QSDC 协议) 最近由 Cao 和歌求婚了[下巴。Phys。Lett。23 (2006 ) 290 ] 在可观的量隧道噪音的情况中被分析。如果量隧道噪音引起的量小点错误率(QBER ) 比 4.17% 高，偷听的计划被介绍，它表明 C-S QSDC 协议不是安全的。我们的偷听的计划为那些检查 qubits 导致大约 4.17% QBER。然而，如此的 QBER 能在如果偷听者伊夫在理想的代替原来的吵闹的隧道，由吵闹的量隧道导致的对应物被隐藏。而且，如果量隧道噪音导致的 QBER 比 4.17% 低，那么仍然在偷听策划伊夫能偷听秘密的部分由安全地攻击发送消息很少的播送 qubits。最后， C-S QSDC 协议上的改进被提出。
To analyze the security of two-step quantum direct communication protocol (QDCP) by using Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen pair proposed by Deng et al. [Phys. Rev. A 68 (2003) 042317] in collective-rotation noise channel, an excellent model of noise analysis is proposed. In the security analysis, the method of the entropy theory is introduced, and is compared with QDCP, an error rate point Q 0 (M : (Q 0 , 1.0)) is given. In different noise levels, if Eve wants to obtain the same amount of information, the error rate Q is distinguishable. The larger the noise level is, the larger the error rate Q is. When the noise level is lower than 11%, the high error rate is 0.153 without eavesdropping. Lastly, the security of the proposed protocol is discussed. It turns out that the quantum channel will be safe when Q < 0.153. Similarly, if error rate Q > 0.153 = Q 0 , eavesdropping information I > 1, which means that there exist eavesdroppers in the quantum channel, and the quantum channel will not be safe anymore.