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arXiv:quant-ph/0612206

Revisiting controlled quantum secure direct communication using a non-symmetric quantum channel with quantum superdense coding

Jun Liu, Zhanjun Zhang

Published Dec 25, 2006• 0 citations
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Abstract

Recently Xia and Song [Phys. Lett. A (In press)] have proposed a controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) protocol. They claimed that in their protocol only with the help of the controller Charlie, the receiver Alice can successfully extract the secret message from the sender Bob. In this letter, first we will show that within their protocol the controller Charlie's role can be excluded due to their unreasonable design. We then revise the Xia-Song CQSDC protocol such that its original advantages are retained and the CQSDC can be really realized.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0612206

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Recently Xia and Song [Phys. Lett. A (In press)] have proposed a controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) protocol. They claimed that in their protocol only with the help of the controller Charlie, the receiver Alice can successfully extract the secret message from the sender Bob. In this letter, first we will show that within their protocol the controller Charlie's role can be excluded due to their unreasonable design. We then revise the Xia-Song CQSDC protocol such that its original advantages are retained and the CQSDC can be really realized.
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最近夏和歌[Phys。Lett。一 364 (2007 ) 117 ] 建议了控制的量安全直接通讯(CQSDC ) 协议。他们宣称在他们仅仅在控制器查理的帮助下的协议，接收装置爱丽斯能成功地从发送者鲍勃提取秘密消息。在这封信，如果它不为他们的无理的设计，首先，我们将证明在他们的协议以内，控制器查理的角色能被排除了。我们然后修订夏·松·克斯德克协议以便它的原来的优点被保留， CQSDC 能确实被认识到。
The quantum secure direct communication protocol recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) is revisited. A security leak is pointed out. Taking advantage of this leak, an eavesdropper may adopt the intercept–measure–resend strategy to attack the quantum channel such that in the C-S QSDC protocol the secret message can be completely eavesdropped. To fix the leak, the original version of the C-S QSDC protocol is revised. As a consequence, the security is improved and assured at least in the case of an ideal quantum channel.
It is found that the controlled quantum secure direct communication (CQSDC) based on a seven-qubit entangled state protocol [S. K. Wang, X. W. Zha and H. Wu, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57, 48 (2018)] can be passively attacked. That is to say, this protocol has the security loophole of information leakage. To be specific, the first bit of the sender’s two-bit message can be deduced by an attacker Eve according to the first and the third bits of Alice’s announcement and the first bit of the controller Charlie’s announcement. Then, a way to fix this loophole is discussed.