The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is in our view an artifact of its philosophical and mathematical underpinnings. We describe a new philosophical view of theory formation, rooted in Wittgenstein, and Bishop's and Martin-Loef's constructivity, which obviates such discussions. We present an unfinished, but very encouraging, theory which is compatible with this philosophical framework. The theory is based on the concepts of counting and combinatorics in the framework provided by the combinatorial hierarchy, a unique hierarchy of bit strings which interact by an operation called discrimination. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact. 15 refs.
The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is in our view an artifact of its philosophical and mathematical underpinnings. We describe a new philosophical view of theory formation, rooted in Wittgenstein, and Bishop's and Martin-Loef's constructivity, which obviates such discussions. We present an unfinished, but very encouraging, theory which is compatible with this philosophical framework. The theory is based on the concepts of counting and combinatorics in the framework provided by the combinatorial hierarchy, a unique hierarchy of bit strings which interact by an operation called discrimination. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact. 15 refs.
The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is met by recognizing that the physicist participates when constructing and when applying the theory consisting of the formulated formal and measurement criteria (the expressions and rules) providing the necessary conditions which allow him to compute and measure facts, yet retains objectivity by requiring that these criteria, rules and facts be in corroborative equilibrium. We construct the particulate states of quantum physics by a recursive program which incorporates the non-determinism born of communication between asynchronous processes over a shared memory. Their quantum numbers and coupling constants arise from the construction via the unique 4-level combinatorial hierarchy. The construction defines indivisible quantum events with the requisite supraluminal correlations, yet does not allow supraluminal communication. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar, and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact.
We present a discrete theory that meets the measurement problem in a new way. We generate a growing universe of bit strings, labeled by 2/sup 127/ + 136 strings organized by some representation of the closed, four level, combinatorial hierarchy, of bit-length N/sub 139/ greater than or equal to 139. The rest of the strings for each label, which grow in both length and number, are called addresses. The generating algorithm, called PROGRAM UNIVERSE, starts from a random choice between the two symbols ''0'' and ''1'' and grows (a) by discriminating between two randomly chosen strings and adjoining a novel result to the universe, or when the string so generated is not novel, by (b) adjoining a randomly chosen bit at the growing end of each string. We obtain, by appropriate definitions and interpretations, stable ''particles'' which satisfy the usual relativistic kinematics and quantized angular momentum without being localizable in a continuum space-time. The labeling scheme is congruent with the ''standard model'' of quarks and leptons with three generations, but for the problem at hand, the implementation of this aspect of the theory is unimportant. What matters most is that (a) these complicated ''particles'' have the periodicities familiar from relativistic ''deBroglie waves'' and resolve in a discrete way the ''wave-particle dualism'' and (b) can be ''touched'' by our discrete equivalent of ''soft photons'' in such a way as to follow, macroscopically, the usual Rutherford scattering trajectories with the associated bound states. Thus our theory could provide a discrete description of ''measurement'' in a way that allows no conceptual barrier between the ''micro'' and the ''macro'' worlds, if we are willing to base our physics on counting and exclude the ambiguities associated with the unobservable ''continuum''. 27 refs.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus(PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics whose language is Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories.
We construct the particulate states of quantum physics using a recursive computer program that incorporates non-determinism by means of locally arbitrary choices. Quantum numbers and coupling constants arise from the construction via the unique 4-level combinatorial hierarchy. The construction defines indivisible quantum events with the requisite supraluminal correlations, yet does not allow supraluminal communication. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G, connected to laboratory events via finite particle number scattering theory and the counter paradigm. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus (PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics, whose language is the Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics, whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition, and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories. Finally, we show the classicality of a one-particle state with an extreme number of bosons. Therefore, there is no change in language in a macroscopic quantum jump.
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.