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Quantum measurement as theory: Its structure and problems.

Marco Del Seta

Published Jan 1, 1998• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

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This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem that does not relinquish any of the explicit premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse interpretations, selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum propensities. 1. Introduction 2. The problem of quantum measurement 2.1 The ignorance interpretation of mixtures 2.2 The eigenstate–eigenvalue link 2.3 The quantum theory of measurement 3. The insolubility proof of the quantum measurement 3.1 Some notation 3.2 The transfer of probability condition (TPC) 3.3 The occurrence of outcomes condition (OOC) 4. A defence of the insolubility proof 4.1 Stein's critique 4.2 Ignorance is not required 4.3 The problem of quantum measurement is an idealisation 5. Selections 5.1 Representing dispositional properties 5.2 Selections solve the measurement problem 5.3 Selections and ignorance 6. Non-ideal selections 6.1 No-collapse interpretations and non-ideal measurements 6.2 Exact and approximate measurements 6.3 Selections for non-ideal interactions 6.4 Approximate selections 6.5 Implications for ignorance 7. Selective interactions test quantum propensities 7.1 Equivalence classes as physical ‘aspects’: a critique 7.2 Quantum dispositions 7.3 Selections as a propensity modal interpretation 7.4 A comparison with Popper's propensity interpretation

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Decoherence is widely felt to have something to do with the quantum measurement problem, but getting clear on just what is made difficult by the fact that the 'measurement problem', as traditionally presented in foundational and philosophical discussions, has become somewhat disconnected from the conceptual problems posed by real physics. This, in turn, is because quantum mechanics as discussed in textbooks and in foundational discussions has become somewhat removed from scientific practice, especially where the analysis of measurement is concerned. This paper has two goals: firstly (§§1-2), to present an account of how quantum measurements are actually dealt with in modern physics (hint: it does not involve a collapse of the wave function) and to state the measurement problem from the perspective of that account; and secondly (§§3-4), to clarify what role decoherence plays in modern measurement theory and what effect it has on the various strategies that have been proposed to solve the measurement problem.

arXiv:1111.2187•Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences•Aug 20, 2012•65 citations
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem that does not relinquish any of the explicit premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse-interpretations selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum propensities.
This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem that does not relinquish any of the premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse-interpretations selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum dispositions.
Although it is 70 years old, there are still areas of quantum theory which are open to interpretation. This book deals with such interpretational problems, and in particular with the issue of the measurement process. The main theme is whether quantum mechanics can be viewed as a (semantically) complete theory, namely as a theory capable of describing not only the physical object under observation but also the measuring instruments used to detect the properties of that physical object. The problematic aspects arise from the fact that the measuring instruments themselves behave as classical physical systems. Thus, we are faced with the open problem of the transition from the quantum to the classical, or more explicitly, the problem of why the composition of many quantum micro-objects gives rise to classical macro-objects. This book goes carefully, exhaustively, and deeply into the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics induced by the measurement process. The solution of many relevant issues, as well as the problems that remain unsolved, emerge clearly. The discussion itself is self-contained and the technical parts are reader-friendly. This book is of value to graduate students and researchers who have an interest in the physical, mathematical, and philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics.
This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem that does not relinquish any of the explicit premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse interpretations, selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum propensities. 1. Introduction 2. The problem of quantum measurement 2.1 The ignorance interpretation of mixtures 2.2 The eigenstate–eigenvalue link 2.3 The quantum theory of measurement 3. The insolubility proof of the quantum measurement 3.1 Some notation 3.2 The transfer of probability condition (TPC) 3.3 The occurrence of outcomes condition (OOC) 4. A defence of the insolubility proof 4.1 Stein's critique 4.2 Ignorance is not required 4.3 The problem of quantum measurement is an idealisation 5. Selections 5.1 Representing dispositional properties 5.2 Selections solve the measurement problem 5.3 Selections and ignorance 6. Non-ideal selections 6.1 No-collapse interpretations and non-ideal measurements 6.2 Exact and approximate measurements 6.3 Selections for non-ideal interactions 6.4 Approximate selections 6.5 Implications for ignorance 7. Selective interactions test quantum propensities 7.1 Equivalence classes as physical ‘aspects’: a critique 7.2 Quantum dispositions 7.3 Selections as a propensity modal interpretation 7.4 A comparison with Popper's propensity interpretation
Quantum mechanics under the Copenhagen interpretation is one of the most experimentally well verified formalisms. However, it is known that the interpretation makes explicit reference to external observation or "measurement." One says that the Copenhagen interpretation suffers from the measurement problem. This deficiency of the interpretation excludes it as a viable fundamental formalism and prevents the use of standard quantum mechanics in discussions of quantum cosmology. Numerous alternative interpretations have been developed with the goals of reproducing its predictive success while obviating the measurement problem. While several interpretations make distinct, falsifiable, predictions, many claim to precisely reproduce the results of standard quantum mechanics. The sheer number of interpretations raises several issues. If the experimental predictions are identical, how are they to be assessed? On what grounds can an interpretation be said to trump another? Without recourse to experimental findings, one may continue to assess an interpretation on its logical structure, self-consistency, and simplicity (number and plausibility of its assumptions). We argue, and where possible, demonstrate, that all common interpretations have unresolved deficiencies. Among these deficiencies are failures to resolve the measurement problem, fine-tuning problems, logical/mathematical inconsistencies, disagreement with experiment, and others. Shortcomings as severe as these call into question the viability of any of the common interpretations. When appropriate, we indicate where future work may resolve some of these issues.
Decoherence is widely felt to have something to do with the quantum measurement problem, but getting clear on just what is made difficult by the fact that the 'measurement problem', as traditionally presented in foundational and philosophical discussions, has become somewhat disconnected from the conceptual problems posed by real physics. This, in turn, is because quantum mechanics as discussed in textbooks and in foundational discussions has become somewhat removed from scientific practice, especially where the analysis of measurement is concerned. This paper has two goals: firstly (§§1-2), to present an account of how quantum measurements are actually dealt with in modern physics (hint: it does not involve a collapse of the wave function) and to state the measurement problem from the perspective of that account; and secondly (§§3-4), to clarify what role decoherence plays in modern measurement theory and what effect it has on the various strategies that have been proposed to solve the measurement problem.