We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus(PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics whose language is Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus(PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics whose language is Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories.
We analyze the measurement problem in quantum mechanics from two aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. First, Wittgenstein emphasizes how the first false step can be voided so that a philosophical problem is dissolved, rather than solved. In the unsuccessful theories of the measurement problem, the postulate of classicality of apparatus (PCA) turned out to be the first false step implicitly adopted. By discarding the PCA and by adopting the microscopic quantum jump interpretation simultaneously, the measurement problem itself disappeared completely. Second, from Wittgenstein’s view of languages, the microscopic world is described by quantum mechanics, whose language is the Schrödinger equation, while the macroscopic world is described by classical physics, whose language is either calculus for Newtonian mechanics or vector analysis for electromagnetism. Both worlds are described by mathematical languages, but they are distinct. The measurement problem deals with the transition from microscopic to macroscopic. There is no single physical theory to explain this transition, and there is no corresponding mathematical language to describe it. This shows why the measurement problem must be described by an ordinary language in use. As concrete examples of the unsuccessful theories, we discuss the works of Niels Bohr and John von Neumann. This is a unique situation in which philosophy is used to assess the validity of physical theories. Finally, we show the classicality of a one-particle state with an extreme number of bosons. Therefore, there is no change in language in a macroscopic quantum jump.
The field of interpretation of quantum mechanics emerged in an attempt to solve the measurement problem. This turned on the perception that Niels Bohr avoided addressing the measurement problem by taking an instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. I argue that this view is mistaken and Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is realist. Moreover, Bohr's interpretation, which is different from textbook quantum mechanics (which is due more to Von Neumann and Paul Dirac), succeeds in solving the measurement problem. While the claim that Bohr dissolves the measurement problem within the limits of the epistemological framework he assumes has been made by a few authors, rarely has the case been made that Bohr's project unambiguously and completely overcomes the measurement problem. I make the strong case that Bohr eliminated the measurement problem altogether. For this, I put forward two new postulates through which to make sense of Bohr's interpretation. The article thus seeks to single out Bohr's interpretation from the various views that go together under the umbrella of orthodox quantum mechanics, and which have been traditionally considered susceptible to the measurement problem. It shows that Bohr's interpretation should be classified along with those like hidden variable theories, collapse models, modal interpretations etc., which offer a solution to the measurement problem and are committed to a realist ontology.
Recently we proposed “a new interpretation of quantum mechanics (called quantum and classical measurement theory)” in this journal (JQIS: Vol. 1, No. 2), which was characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics. This turn from physics to language does not only realize the remarkable extension of quantum mechanics but also yield the quantum mechanical world view (i.e., the philosophy of quantum mechanics). And thus, the turn urges us to dream that traditional philosophies (i.e., Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, John Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Saussure, Wittgenstein, etc.) can be understood in the quantum mechanical world view. This dream will be challenged in this paper. We, of course, know that most scientists are skeptical to philosophy. Still, we can expect that readers find a good linguistic philosophy (i.e. philosophy of language) in quantum mechanics.
This paper examines the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly the concept of “language games” and rule-following. The discourse surrounding quantum mechanics – characterized by terms like superposition, measurement, observer and entanglement – is deeply metaphoric and often stretches the bounds of classical language-use. This creates interpretative confusions not just in science, but in the metaphysical and epistemological debates that follow. Building on Philosophical Investigations, this paper argues that many foundational problems in quantum mechanics (e.g., the measurement problem, wave-function collapse, observer effect) are not exclusively ontological or physical but are entangled in language-use anomalies. The paper proposes that interpretative divergence among schools (Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, QBism, etc.) can be partly understood as conflicts between distinct language games with different rule-sets about what counts as a “measurement”, “reality”, or “causality”. By reading quantum discourse through Wittgensteinian criteria of meaning-as-use, the paper shows how the scientific community performs tacit normativity in deploying quantum terms – frequently without shared agreement on referents. Quantum mechanics, then, becomes a philosophical case study in the fragility and productivity of linguistic scaffolds in scientific theory. Finally, this paper makes a case for a deflationary yet clarifying approach: instead of seeking a “true” interpretation of quantum mechanics, we may better understand the philosophical stakes by analyzing the discursive rules, contextual boundaries, and pragmatic criteria that underlie quantum speech acts.
What is a physical object according to the theory of quantum mechanics? The first answer to be considered is that given by Bohr in terms of the concept of complementarity. This interpretation is illustrated by way of an example, the two slit experiment, which highlights some of the associated problems of ontology. One such problem is the so-called problem of measurement or observation. Various interpretations of measurement in Quantum Theory, including those of Heisenberg, von Neumann, Everett and Bohr, are compared and contrasted. A second problem concerns whether or not QT can be considered complete and therefore satisfactory as a basis for physics. Various attempts to complete QT by means of the addition of ‘hidden variables’ to the quantum mechanical state function are considered and their aims and achievements assessed. Finally, we investigate some of the characteristic ontological problems for the orthodox interpretation of Relativistic Quantum Theory.
According to one possible diagnosis of the quantum measurement problem, it is a consequence of quantum fundamentalism claiming that ontology and epistemology of the world are exclusively quantum, and classical physics is only an approximation. For N. Bohr, the measurement problem is a pseudo-problem because any quantum phenomenon presupposes the classical context of an experimental setup and the use of classical concepts to describe it. We consider Bohr's position from the point of view of our contextual quantum realism (CQR), inspired by the later Wittgenstein philosophy. Our approach is consistent with H. Zinkernagel's interpretation, according to which Bohr's position is not only epistemological anti-fundamentalism, but also ontological anti-fundamentalism.