This paper examines the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly the concept of “language games” and rule-following. The discourse surrounding quantum mechanics – characterized by terms like superposition, measurement, observer and entanglement – is deeply metaphoric and often stretches the bounds of classical language-use. This creates interpretative confusions not just in science, but in the metaphysical and epistemological debates that follow. Building on Philosophical Investigations, this paper argues that many foundational problems in quantum mechanics (e.g., the measurement problem, wave-function collapse, observer effect) are not exclusively ontological or physical but are entangled in language-use anomalies. The paper proposes that interpretative divergence among schools (Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, QBism, etc.) can be partly understood as conflicts between distinct language games with different rule-sets about what counts as a “measurement”, “reality”, or “causality”. By reading quantum discourse through Wittgensteinian criteria of meaning-as-use, the paper shows how the scientific community performs tacit normativity in deploying quantum terms – frequently without shared agreement on referents. Quantum mechanics, then, becomes a philosophical case study in the fragility and productivity of linguistic scaffolds in scientific theory. Finally, this paper makes a case for a deflationary yet clarifying approach: instead of seeking a “true” interpretation of quantum mechanics, we may better understand the philosophical stakes by analyzing the discursive rules, contextual boundaries, and pragmatic criteria that underlie quantum speech acts.
This paper examines the philosophical implications of quantum mechanics through the lens of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly the concept of “language games” and rule-following. The discourse surrounding quantum mechanics – characterized by terms like superposition, measurement, observer and entanglement – is deeply metaphoric and often stretches the bounds of classical language-use. This creates interpretative confusions not just in science, but in the metaphysical and epistemological debates that follow. Building on Philosophical Investigations, this paper argues that many foundational problems in quantum mechanics (e.g., the measurement problem, wave-function collapse, observer effect) are not exclusively ontological or physical but are entangled in language-use anomalies. The paper proposes that interpretative divergence among schools (Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, QBism, etc.) can be partly understood as conflicts between distinct language games with different rule-sets about what counts as a “measurement”, “reality”, or “causality”. By reading quantum discourse through Wittgensteinian criteria of meaning-as-use, the paper shows how the scientific community performs tacit normativity in deploying quantum terms – frequently without shared agreement on referents. Quantum mechanics, then, becomes a philosophical case study in the fragility and productivity of linguistic scaffolds in scientific theory. Finally, this paper makes a case for a deflationary yet clarifying approach: instead of seeking a “true” interpretation of quantum mechanics, we may better understand the philosophical stakes by analyzing the discursive rules, contextual boundaries, and pragmatic criteria that underlie quantum speech acts.
The new discoveries of QM led to re-assessing, broadening the meanings of many physical concepts, and formulating a new logic that was no longer based on the classical principles of non-contradiction, identity, and causality. Heisenberg considered the classical logic and the conception of language expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus inadequate for the understanding of the problems of language with which the physicists of the Copenhagen school had had to deal in order to define the foundations of Quantum Mechanics. On the contrary, he saw in Wittgenstein’s posthumous Philosophical Investigations the key to solving those problems. One may formulate a proportion and state that the use of language described in the Tractatus fits the use of language in Classical Mechanics, as the use of language described in PI fits the use of language in QM. I interpret the reflections of the physicists of the Copenhagen school on the limits of language relative to QM by highlighting how the epistemological revolution of quantum physics shares a conception of language similar to that expressed by late Wittgenstein in PI. I also aim to explain why Heisenberg considered it inappropriate to subsume the propositions and concepts of QM under the rules of the propositional logic of Tractatus. I explain why the philosophy of language expounded in PI, which is based on language games and resemblance families, sheds a light on how and why QM has contributed to renewing existing concepts (such as space, trajectory, observer, etc.) and to formulate a new logic (quantum logic).
I suggest a contextual realist interpretation of Carlo Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics. The principal point is a correct understanding of the concept of reality and taking into account the categorical distinction between the ideal and the real. Within my interpretation, consciousness of the observer does not play any metaphysical role. The proposed approach can also be understood as a return to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, corrected within the framework of contextual realism. The contextual realism allows one to get rid of the metaphysical problems encountered by various interpretations of quantum mechanics, including the relational one. A wave function neither literally reflects an “exterior reality”, nor is it merely a predictive mathematical tool. In particular, an entangled wave function can be viewed as the formal cause of quantum correlations whose reality is contextual. The reduction of a wave function is not a real physical process. And there are no autonomous quantum events which would be different from the facts of their representation. The quantum measurement problem results from a confusion between the categories of the ideal and the real. It is dissolved logically. The quantum theory plays the role of a Wittgensteinian rule (norm), “measuring” physical reality within a language game of its application.
For Kant causality is an a priori category of the understanding, a necessary condition for the possibility of any experience. Later Wittgenstein’s philosophy rejects transcendentalism. We can only speak of causes and effects if in some basic situations, or ‘language games’, we already treat some things as causes of what happens. Since the notion of cause becomes meaningful only within a language game, it is not unambiguous. Quantum causal language games presuppose the use of quantum theory. We treat the latter as Wittgenstein’s grammar of a quantum form of life’, or rule (norm), anchored in its applications — quantum phenomena as language games. Quantum correlations are often interpreted as a manifestation of the nonlocality of quantum mechanics. This is a view of quantum phenomena from the perspective of classical physics. Our contextual point of view rejects the nonlocality of quantum theory in the sense of instantaneous causal influence at a distance. But it does not admit its locality in the sense of classical causality either. We introduce the notion of quantum causality which allows us to treat quantum correlations as local, but context-dependent. Their formal cause is an entangled wave function. Any particular quantum correlation, identifiable in a context of its observation as a result of the wave function reduction, post factum can be treated as a classical causal correlation. From the point of view of the proposed contextual quantum realism, epistemology is secondary, and ontology is sensitive to context. Quantum correlations exist (are real) before application of the theory, independently of their identification (description, measurement), but have no identity, which appears only as a result of application of the theory and their identification in the context. In other words, they are real, but not pre-determined, not autonomous.
This work presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics. From a philosophical point of view, the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism are highlighted, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined, as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the ontological problem, the problem of the objectification of the wave function and the problem of the definition of discernibility. This is followed by an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories, and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics that profoundly modify the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism, the unified holistic approach.
We present a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of the measurement process in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality, moving from micro to macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the related ontological problems, the question of the objectification of the wave function, and that of the definition of discernibility. We consider also an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics philosophical approach, that are modifying the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism and unified holistic approaches, such as the Primordial Dynamic Space.
This paper presents a philosophical analysis of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem, the observer problem, decoherence, and quantum interpretation. It argues that the central difficulty in quantum mechanics is not only technical but interpretive: the theory has extraordinary predictive power without a single settled account of what is happening physically or ontologically. The paper frames this as an answerability problem, asking how interpretations should be judged when formal success outruns explanatory closure. It separates several meanings of observation—interaction, coupling, record formation, information update, and conscious awareness—and shows how collapsing these layers creates confusion in both physics and philosophy. It then compares major interpretations including Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse, QBism, relational quantum mechanics, and consistent histories, treating them as different ways of stabilizing explanatory burden around an underconstrained formal core. The paper also argues that decoherence is crucial for understanding record stability and the appearance of classicality, but does not by itself solve the single-outcome problem. Overall, the paper offers a clear framework for thinking about quantum foundations, scientific explanation, ontology, observation, and philosophy of science without overstating what current theory can responsibly claim.