The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is met by recognizing that the physicist participates when constructing and when applying the theory consisting of the formulated formal and measurement criteria (the expressions and rules) providing the necessary conditions which allow him to compute and measure facts, yet retains objectivity by requiring that these criteria, rules and facts be in corroborative equilibrium. We construct the particulate states of quantum physics by a recursive program which incorporates the non-determinism born of communication between asynchronous processes over a shared memory. Their quantum numbers and coupling constants arise from the construction via the unique 4-level combinatorial hierarchy. The construction defines indivisible quantum events with the requisite supraluminal correlations, yet does not allow supraluminal communication. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar, and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact.
The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is met by recognizing that the physicist participates when constructing and when applying the theory consisting of the formulated formal and measurement criteria (the expressions and rules) providing the necessary conditions which allow him to compute and measure facts, yet retains objectivity by requiring that these criteria, rules and facts be in corroborative equilibrium. We construct the particulate states of quantum physics by a recursive program which incorporates the non-determinism born of communication between asynchronous processes over a shared memory. Their quantum numbers and coupling constants arise from the construction via the unique 4-level combinatorial hierarchy. The construction defines indivisible quantum events with the requisite supraluminal correlations, yet does not allow supraluminal communication. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar, and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact.
We construct the particulate states of quantum physics using a recursive computer program that incorporates non-determinism by means of locally arbitrary choices. Quantum numbers and coupling constants arise from the construction via the unique 4-level combinatorial hierarchy. The construction defines indivisible quantum events with the requisite supraluminal correlations, yet does not allow supraluminal communication. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G, connected to laboratory events via finite particle number scattering theory and the counter paradigm. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact.
The ''measurement problem'' of contemporary physics is in our view an artifact of its philosophical and mathematical underpinnings. We describe a new philosophical view of theory formation, rooted in Wittgenstein, and Bishop's and Martin-Loef's constructivity, which obviates such discussions. We present an unfinished, but very encouraging, theory which is compatible with this philosophical framework. The theory is based on the concepts of counting and combinatorics in the framework provided by the combinatorial hierarchy, a unique hierarchy of bit strings which interact by an operation called discrimination. Measurement criteria incorporate c, h-bar and m/sub p/ or (not ''and'') G. The resulting theory is discrete throughout, contains no infinities, and, as far as we have developed it, is in agreement with quantum mechanical and cosmological fact. 15 refs.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called “Epistemic Constraint.” Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called "Epistemic Constraint." Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid's fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.