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The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science

Interpretations of Probability in Quantum Mechanics: A Case of “Experimental Metaphysics”

Geoffrey Paul Hellman

Published Jan 1, 2009• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-9107-0_12

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Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.
The presented dissertation deals with how to interpret the conception of reality within both the assumed metaphysical frameworks of the proponents of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis of the dissertation is based on assumption that EPR operated with presuppositions stemming from classical-physical determinism (e.g., the concept of particle independence) that, at the time of their paradox's formulation, no longer corresponded to the contemporary level of knowledge. In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation operates with a concept of reality that significantly differs from the metaphysics of classical physics. This dissertation identifies the EPR proponents' approach to reality as philosophical foundationalism and interprets it using the philosophy and semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce as a dualism that does not respect the essential role of representation in development of scientific theories. The aim is to present a metaphysical and semiotic framework that would be complementary to the interpretation of quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory which understands the representation of probability and uncertainty inherent in quantum mechanical descriptions as intrinsic parts of the conception of reality, rather...