The presented dissertation deals with how to interpret the conception of reality within both the assumed metaphysical frameworks of the proponents of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis of the dissertation is based on assumption that EPR operated with presuppositions stemming from classical-physical determinism (e.g., the concept of particle independence) that, at the time of their paradox's formulation, no longer corresponded to the contemporary level of knowledge. In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation operates with a concept of reality that significantly differs from the metaphysics of classical physics. This dissertation identifies the EPR proponents' approach to reality as philosophical foundationalism and interprets it using the philosophy and semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce as a dualism that does not respect the essential role of representation in development of scientific theories. The aim is to present a metaphysical and semiotic framework that would be complementary to the interpretation of quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory which understands the representation of probability and uncertainty inherent in quantum mechanical descriptions as intrinsic parts of the conception of reality, rather...
The presented dissertation deals with how to interpret the conception of reality within both the assumed metaphysical frameworks of the proponents of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis of the dissertation is based on assumption that EPR operated with presuppositions stemming from classical-physical determinism (e.g., the concept of particle independence) that, at the time of their paradox's formulation, no longer corresponded to the contemporary level of knowledge. In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation operates with a concept of reality that significantly differs from the metaphysics of classical physics. This dissertation identifies the EPR proponents' approach to reality as philosophical foundationalism and interprets it using the philosophy and semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce as a dualism that does not respect the essential role of representation in development of scientific theories. The aim is to present a metaphysical and semiotic framework that would be complementary to the interpretation of quantum mechanics as an indeterministic theory which understands the representation of probability and uncertainty inherent in quantum mechanical descriptions as intrinsic parts of the conception of reality, rather...
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument, Bell’s theorem, and Hardy’s paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie–Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
Beginning in 1900 with 1-iax Planck's hypothesis of quanta, physics has been embarked on a course which has raised serious questions about the true nature of physical reality, about the foundational assumptions and structures of science, and about the relationships between physical reality and physical theory. In particular, attempts to give a physical interpretation to quantum theory seem to result in "pictures" of nature which are paradoxical. A subatomic entity is described by the theory as exhibiting the properties and behavior of both particle-like phenomena and wavelike phenomena. Since it seems unreasonable that a single entity could be both a point-like mass and a wave spread out through a region of space, quantum theory would seem to be less than satisfactory or less than complete at the interpretational level. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the underlying causes of this paradox. The dissertation proceeds by reviewing the development of quantum theory and the emergence of the paradox. Next, the problem of physical interpretation is examined and several of the more significant existing interpretations are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the foundations of science and the general structure of scientific theory are examined in a search for the origins of the paradox. As a result of these investigations and analyses, it is concluded that the paradoxical nature of the physical interpretation of quantum theory is the consequence of certain paradigms and preconceptualizations about physical reality which have been incorporated into the theory at the foundational level. These fundamental assU14ptions produce, within quantum theory, a forced marriage of the plenum and atomic views of physical reality. They also produce an ambiguity with respect to the nature of causality which is charaeteristic of the theory. These problems are reflected in the mathematical formalisms and physical concepts of the theory as well as in its metaphysical foundations. Lastly, methods of resoling the paradox are discussed. It is argued that a successful solution is possible, but that it would involve the creation of a new metaphor-an extension of the present language--which would lead science to a deeper, subquantum level in terms of which the present paradox would vanish.
The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.
This chapter examines the A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) argument and the opinion toward interpretational matters from various noted quantum physicists. The paradox of EPR can equally well be tested by polarization properties of pairs of photons. “When the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality” is an essential component of the EPR argument. A useful pragmatic perspective on quantum mechanics is provided by N. G. Van Kampen. He argues that the difficulties in quantum mechanics only surface when one starts philosophizing: “this philosophizing has given rise to a number of ‘interpretations’, in which ψ is endowed with more physical significance than is needed”. There is a plethora of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Among the most prominent interpretations one finds are the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation.
About twenty years ago, we proposed the mathematical formulation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and further, we concluded that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and EPR-paradox are not contradictory. This is true, however we now think that we should have argued about it under a certain firm interpretation of quantum mechanics. Recently we proposed the linguistic quantum interpretation (called quantum and classical measurement theory), which was characterized as a kind of metaphysical and linguistic turn of the Copenhagen interpretation. This turn from physics to language does not only extend quantum theory to classical systems but also yield the quantum mechanical world view (i.e., the philosophy of quantum mechanics, in other words, quantum philosophy). In fact, we can consider that traditional philosophies have progressed toward quantum philosophy. In this paper, we first review the linguistic quantum interpretation, and further, clarify the relation between EPR-paradox and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. That is, the linguistic interpretation says that EPR-paradox is closely related to the fact that syllogism does not generally hold in quantum physics. This fact should be compared to the non-locality of Bell's inequality.