What is Philosophically Interesting About Quantum Mechanics?

Joseph O’Neill, A. Schoth

Since its inception, Quantum Mechanics (QM) has engaged many philosophers the subspecialty of a few. More recently, QM has attracted the attention of a few neuroscientists modelling neuronal and higher brain function. This pedagogical review aims to make QM more accessible to neuroscientists and philosophers less familiar with its basics. Emphasis is on QM measurement and entanglement. We write at an intermediate technical level between elementary textbooks and contemporary journals. Against authoritative advice, we use the “crutch of visuality” to ease comprehension of notoriously difficult ideas in QM, e.g., complex Hilbert space, an apparatus setting the outcomes of an experiment. To keep more advanced readers interested, we sow philosophical comments throughout the text. These touch on under-discussed themes (e.g., complex numbers in QM), seek to clarify pedagogically neglected matters (e.g., particles of definite energy), and strike occasional possibly novel points about QM (e.g., the metaphysical double-humility of QM, the quantum state as an ontologico-epistemological hybrid). We strive ultimately to show that even orthodox QM is more concretely graspable and philosophically better thought-out than many have judged.

Ryan Michael Miller

Abstract The question of whether chemical structure is reducible to Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) should be of interest to philosophers of chemistry and philosophers of physics alike. Among the three realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, EQM resolves the measurement problem by claiming that measurements (now interpreted as instances of decoherence) have indeterminate outcomes absolutely speaking, but determinate outcomes relative to emergent worlds—Maudlin (Topoi, 14:7-15, 1995). Philosophers who wish to be sensitive to the practice of quantum chemistry e.g. Scerri (The changing views of a philosopher of chemistry on the question of reduction, 2016) should be interested in EQM because Franklin and Seifert (J. Philos. Sci, 2020) claim that resolving the measurement problem also resolves the reducibility of chemical structure, and EQM is the interpretation which involves no mathematical structure beyond that used by practicing scientists. Philosophers interested in the quantum interpretation debate should be interested in the reducibility of chemistry because chemical structure is precisely the kind of determinate three-dimensional fact which EQM should be able to ground if it is to be empirically coherent—see Allori (Quantum Rep, 5:80-101, 2023). The prospects for reduction of chemical structure are poor if it cannot succeed in EQM; the prospects for EQM as a guide to ontology are poor if it cannot reduce chemical structure. Unfortunately for proponents of chemical reduction and EQM, there are three serious barriers to the reduction of chemistry to EQM. The first concern is that quantum treatments of chemical structure rely on the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which holds nuclear locations fixed while minimizing the energy of the electronic configuration—Hendry (Philosophical Perspectives in Quantum Chemistry, 147-172, 2022), but this approximation is not licensed by EQM. The Born-Oppenheimer approximation relies on nuclei and molecular orbitals being simultaneously present, but in the three-dimensional ontology following from the Everett interpretation these only emerge at different energy scales and are not simultaneously present—Miller (Found. Chem, 25:405-417, 2023). The second concern is that the emergent worlds of EQM are supposed to be decoherent at the macro-scale—Wilson (The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism 2020), but the recent development of superchemistry suggests that chemical reactions can occur in coherent states—Zhang et al. (Nat. Phys, 1-5, 2023). The third concern is that emergent worlds are only pragmatic pseudo-processes—Wallace (The Emergent Multiverse: Quantum Theory According to the Everett Interpretation, 2012b), but this means EQM trades realist physics for mere instrumentalism about chemistry. Absent a commitment to chemical realism, reduction is an empty promise. The prospects for reduction of chemical structure to EQM are therefore poor.

Philip C. E. Stamp

Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.