Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.
Introduction In this chapter I attempt to review a few somewhat loosely connected themes, which figure in recent work by physicists on decoherence and irreversibility in quantum mechanics. The looseness is forced upon us by the subject – any proper discussion inevitably drags in questions about thermodynamic reversibility and the various arrows of time, about the foundations of quantum mechanics and quantum measurement, about the nature of quantum coherence, and about the relationship between quantum and classical mechanics. There are inevitably many gaps in our understanding of these questions, both for the physicist and for the philosopher. Some philosophers may feel that the subject is too immature to be interesting to them – that it is not yet ripe for philosophical analysis. Indeed I have recently heard the opinion expressed that quantum mechanics in its entirety was still not amenable to such analysis – that if the physicists could not yet understand it, there was no point in philosophers trying! I hope this feeling is not too widespread amongst philosophers of science – I suspect that it may arise in part because the philosophical community (along with a good part of the scientific community) is unaware of some important advances that have been made in the last decade in understanding the physics of quantum processes at the macroscopic level, as well as the relation between classical and quantum mechanics. Much of the chapter is therefore unashamedly tutorial in nature; however, given the wide range of topics covered, I imagine that even physicists will find at least some of the material to be novel.
In the next few pages I provide previews of the book: Section 1.1 is a statement of the main ideas. Section 1.2 is a chapter by chapter guide. There are two principal themes: time's arrows and quantum measurement. In both areas I will make significant statements about what are usually called their foundations. These statements are related, and involve modification of the underlying hypotheses of statistical mechanics. The modified statistical mechanics contains notions that are at variance with certain primitive intuitions, but it is consistent with all known experiments. I will try to present these ideas as intellectually attractive, but this virtue will be offered as a reason for study, not as a reason for belief. Historically, intellectual satisfaction has not been a reliable guide to scientific truth. For this reason I have striven to provide experimental and observational tests where I could, even where such experiment is not feasible today. The need for this hardheaded, or perhaps, intellectually humble, approach is particularly felt in the two areas that I will address. The foundations of thermodynamics and the foundations of quantum mechanics have been among the most contentious areas of physics; indeed, some would deny their place within that discipline. In my opinion, this situation is a result of the paucity of relevant experiment.
Introduction Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one. My more immediate aim here is to give the social scientific reader an introductory understanding of the experimental findings of quantum theory, its key concepts, and the debates about its interpretation. The discussion assumes no prior knowledge of quantum physics and makes no use of mathematics. Quantum theory without equations might seem like an oxymoron, and certainly reading this Part will not enable anyone to use quantum theory. But to a perhaps surprising degree it is possible to understand quantum theory without being able to use it. Its findings can be communicated in ordinary language, and the same goes for its main concepts and interpretive debates. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a virtual cottage industry of books on quantum theory for a lay audience. Most are written by physicists, and many are quite good. However, it is not just popular treatments that do without equations: much of the professional philosophical literature does as well. (I draw on both kinds of literature below.) Philosophers of physics are trained to understand the math, of course, which is necessary for a full appreciation of the issues.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
More them any other topic in the foundations of physics, the problem of the arrow (or arrows!) of time seems to be characterized by a unique ‘slipperiness’: it is not only difficult to find answers to the questions once posed, but difficult to find meaningful questions to ask in the first place. Perhaps this is because an asymmetry with respect to the sense of time is built into us at an even deeper level than other ‘synthetic a priori’ conceptions about the world such as the continued existence of unknown objects. However that may be, in this situation, rather than trying to pose general questions which may turn out in the end to be ill-defined, there may be something to be said for trying to formulate much less speculative, indeed perhaps in retrospect trivial questions to which at least we have a hope of finding a definite answer. This is what I shall do in this essay: to be specific, I shall ask whether a test which is currently being designed concerning the validity of a certain ‘common-sense’ view of the macroscopic world (‘macrorealism’) would be affected if we were to relax our common-sense assumptions about the direction of causality in time. Let me start with a very brief review of established ideas concerning the formal (a)symmetry of the quantum theory with respect to the direction of time. The classic works on this subject are the paper of Aharonov et al. (‘ABL’) and the book by Belinfante. In these discussions the notion of ‘measurement’ is taken as primitive and undefined.
This is Part 1 of a four part paper, intended to redress some of the most fundamental confusions in the subject of physical time directionality, and represent the concepts accurately. There are widespread fallacies in the subject that need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics students and philosophers. Parts 1 and 2 are about quantum mechanics, Part 3 is about fundamental concepts, and Part 4 is about cosmology. We start in Part 1 by analysing the time reversal symmetry of quantum probability laws. Time reversal symmetry is defined as the property of invariance under the time reversal transformation, T: t -> -t. It is shown that quantum mechanics (classical or relativistic) is strongly time asymmetric in its probability laws. This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric or reversible. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large philosophical and scientific conclusions are drawn from it. But it is an error. The fact is that while quantum mechanics is widely claimed to be reversible on the basis of two formal mathematical properties (that it does have), these properties do not represent invariance under the time reversal transformation. A recent experiment (Batalhao at alia, 2015) showing irreversibility of quantum thermodynamics is discussed as an illustration of this result. Most physicists remain unaware of the errors, decades after they were first demonstrated. Orthodox specialists in the philosophy of time who are aware of the error continue to refer to the ‘time symmetry’ or ‘reversibility’ of quantum mechanics anyway – and exploit the ambiguity to claim false implications about physical time reversal symmetry in nature. The excuse for perpetrating the confusion is that, since it is has now become customary to refer to the formal properties of quantum mechanics as ‘reversibility’ or ‘time reversal symmetry’, we should just keep referring to them by this name, even though they are not time reversal symmetry. This causes endless confusion, in attempts to explain the physical irreversibility of our universe, and in philosophical discussions of implications of physics for the nature of time. The failure of time reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics changes the interpretation of modern physics in a deep way. It changes the problem of explaining the real irreversibility found throughout nature.
Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis