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arXiv:2003.07198

A classical attack on the coherent one way protocol for quantum key distribution

Michail Stoilov

Published Mar 12, 2020• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We propose a way to retrieve the secure key generated by the coherent one way protocol without reading the information transmitted on the quantum channel.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2003.07198

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