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arXiv:1909.03697 · Physical Review A

Physics without determinism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics

Flavio Del Santo, Nicolas Gisin

Published Dec 5, 2019• 102 citations

Abstract

Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.100.062107

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Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the

quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g.,

collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').

Classical physics is traditionally characterized as deterministic and founded on the real number continuum, while quantum mechanics is distinguished by its indeterminism and fundamental uncertainty relations. This apparent dichotomy, however, obscures a deeper continuity. We argue that both frameworks embody a common ontological principle: the physical prohibition of absolute precision. In classical physics, this prohibition is implicit, manifesting in information-theoretic bounds, the non-physicality of infinite-precision initial conditions (chaos theory), and the breakdown of determinism in singular configurations (Norton's dome). These phenomena reveal that the classical reliance on mathematical real numbers with infinite information content is an unphysical idealization. Quantum mechanics, by contrast, does not merely reflect this prohibition; it provides its precise quantitative expression. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle

\sigma_{x}\sigma_{p}\geq \hbar /2

and the non-commutative structure of observables are the exact mathematical formulation of the fact that physical information is fundamentally finite. The Planck constant

\hbar

is the universal scale that quantifies the minimal phase space volume—the “atom” of information—below which no further refinement is possible. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a separate theory but the completion of classical physics: it supplies the missing quantification of the principle that nature admits no infinite information density, and consequently, no absolutely precise physical quantities.

In recent publications in physics and mathematics, concerns have been raised about the use of real numbers to describe quantities in physics, and in particular about the usual assumption that physical quantities are infinitely precise. In this thesis, we discuss some motivations for dropping this assumption, which we believe partly arises from the usual point-based approach to the mathematical continuum. We focus on the case of classical mechanics specifically, but the ideas could be extended to other theories as well. We analyse the alternative theory of classical mechanics presented by Gisin and Del Santo, which suggests that physical quantities can equivalently be thought of as being only determined up to finite precision at each point in time, and that doing so naturally leads to indeterminism. Next, we investigate whether we can use intuitionistic mathematics to mathematically express the idea of finite precision of quantities, arriving at the cautious conclusion that, as far as we can see, such attempts are thwarted by conceptual contradictions. Finally, we outline another approach to formalising finite-precision quantities in classical mechanics, which is inspired by the intuitionistic approach to the continuum but uses classical mathematics.

Abstract It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.

What is fundamentally quantum? We argue that most of the features, problems, and paradoxes – such as the measurement problem, the Wigner's friend paradox and its proposed solutions, single particle nonlocality, and no-cloning – allegedly attributed to quantum physics have a classical analogue if one is to interpret classical physics as fundamentally indeterministic. What really characterizes non-classical effects are incompatible physical quantities, which, in quantum quantum theory are associated to the fundamental constant ℏ .