Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2108.05735

Indeterministic finite-precision physics and intuitionistic mathematics

Tein van der Lugt

Published Aug 12, 2021• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In recent publications in physics and mathematics, concerns have been raised about the use of real numbers to describe quantities in physics, and in particular about the usual assumption that physical quantities are infinitely precise. In this thesis, we discuss some motivations for dropping this assumption, which we believe partly arises from the usual point-based approach to the mathematical continuum. We focus on the case of classical mechanics specifically, but the ideas could be extended to other theories as well. We analyse the alternative theory of classical mechanics presented by Gisin and Del Santo, which suggests that physical quantities can equivalently be thought of as being only determined up to finite precision at each point in time, and that doing so naturally leads to indeterminism. Next, we investigate whether we can use intuitionistic mathematics to mathematically express the idea of finite precision of quantities, arriving at the cautious conclusion that, as far as we can see, such attempts are thwarted by conceptual contradictions. Finally, we outline another approach to formalising finite-precision quantities in classical mechanics, which is inspired by the intuitionistic approach to the continuum but uses classical mathematics.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2108.05735

Related papers

Physics without determinism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics

Flavio Del Santo, Nicolas Gisin

Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').

arXiv:1909.03697•Physical Review A•Dec 5, 2019•102 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Physics without determinism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics’ ”

Flavio Del Santo, Nicolas Gisin

In this short note we reply to a Comment by Callegaro et al. [Callegaro, Pennecchi, and Bich, Phys. Rev. A 102, 036201 (2020)] that points out some weakness of the model of indeterministic physics that we proposed in our work [Del Santo and Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 100, 062107 (2019)], based on what we named ``finite information quantities'' (FIQs). While we acknowledge the merit of their criticism, we maintain that it applies only to a concrete example that we discussed in our work, whereas the main concept of FIQ remains valid and suitable for describing indeterministic physical models. We hint at a more sophisticated way to define FIQs which, taking inspiration from intuitionistic mathematics, would allow the criticisms in the preceding Comment to be overcome.

arXiv:2009.12284•Physical Review A•Sep 30, 2020•2 citations

Indeterminism in physics and intuitionistic mathematics

Nicolas Gisin

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to "speak" of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms.

arXiv:2011.02348•Synthese•Sep 3, 2021•63 citations

Indeterminism in Physics, Classical Chaos and Bohmian Mechanics: Are Real Numbers Really Real?

Nicolas Gisin

Abstract It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.

arXiv:1803.06824•Erkenntnis•Oct 23, 2019•53 citations

Indeterminism in Physics, Classical Chaos and Bohmian Mechanics.\\ Are Real Numbers Really Real?

Nicolas Gisin

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers.However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information.I argue that a finite volume of space can't contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant.Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is "random numbers", as their series of bits are truly random.I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers.This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory.Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic.Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.

•Jan 1, 2019•58 citations

The Prohibition of Absolute Precision: A Unifying Principle Across Classical and Quantum Physics

Pengyuan Zhao

Classical physics is traditionally characterized as deterministic and founded on the real number continuum, while quantum mechanics is distinguished by its indeterminism and fundamental uncertainty relations. This apparent dichotomy, however, obscures a deeper continuity. We argue that both frameworks embody a common ontological principle: the physical prohibition of absolute precision. In classical physics, this prohibition is implicit, manifesting in information-theoretic bounds, the non-physicality of infinite-precision initial conditions (chaos theory), and the breakdown of determinism in singular configurations (Norton's dome). These phenomena reveal that the classical reliance on mathematical real numbers with infinite information content is an unphysical idealization. Quantum mechanics, by contrast, does not merely reflect this prohibition; it provides its precise quantitative expression. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle \(\sigma_{x}\sigma_{p}\geq \hbar /2\) and the non-commutative structure of observables are the exact mathematical formulation of the fact that physical information is fundamentally finite. The Planck constant \(\hbar\) is the universal scale that quantifies the minimal phase space volume—the “atom” of information—below which no further refinement is possible. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a separate theory but the completion of classical physics: it supplies the missing quantification of the principle that nature admits no infinite information density, and consequently, no absolutely precise physical quantities.

•Mar 11, 2026•0 citations
In recent publications in physics and mathematics, concerns have been raised about the use of real numbers to describe quantities in physics, and in particular about the usual assumption that physical quantities are infinitely precise. In this thesis, we discuss some motivations for dropping this assumption, which we believe partly arises from the usual point-based approach to the mathematical continuum. We focus on the case of classical mechanics specifically, but the ideas could be extended to other theories as well. We analyse the alternative theory of classical mechanics presented by Gisin and Del Santo, which suggests that physical quantities can equivalently be thought of as being only determined up to finite precision at each point in time, and that doing so naturally leads to indeterminism. Next, we investigate whether we can use intuitionistic mathematics to mathematically express the idea of finite precision of quantities, arriving at the cautious conclusion that, as far as we can see, such attempts are thwarted by conceptual contradictions. Finally, we outline another approach to formalising finite-precision quantities in classical mechanics, which is inspired by the intuitionistic approach to the continuum but uses classical mathematics.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
In this short note we reply to a Comment by Callegaro et al. [Callegaro, Pennecchi, and Bich, Phys. Rev. A 102, 036201 (2020)] that points out some weakness of the model of indeterministic physics that we proposed in our work [Del Santo and Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 100, 062107 (2019)], based on what we named ``finite information quantities'' (FIQs). While we acknowledge the merit of their criticism, we maintain that it applies only to a concrete example that we discussed in our work, whereas the main concept of FIQ remains valid and suitable for describing indeterministic physical models. We hint at a more sophisticated way to define FIQs which, taking inspiration from intuitionistic mathematics, would allow the criticisms in the preceding Comment to be overcome.
Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to "speak" of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms.
Abstract It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.
It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers.However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information.I argue that a finite volume of space can't contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant.Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is "random numbers", as their series of bits are truly random.I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers.This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory.Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic.Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.
Classical physics is traditionally characterized as deterministic and founded on the real number continuum, while quantum mechanics is distinguished by its indeterminism and fundamental uncertainty relations. This apparent dichotomy, however, obscures a deeper continuity. We argue that both frameworks embody a common ontological principle: the physical prohibition of absolute precision. In classical physics, this prohibition is implicit, manifesting in information-theoretic bounds, the non-physicality of infinite-precision initial conditions (chaos theory), and the breakdown of determinism in singular configurations (Norton's dome). These phenomena reveal that the classical reliance on mathematical real numbers with infinite information content is an unphysical idealization. Quantum mechanics, by contrast, does not merely reflect this prohibition; it provides its precise quantitative expression. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle σxσp≥ℏ/2\sigma_{x}\sigma_{p}\geq \hbar /2σx​σp​≥ℏ/2 and the non-commutative structure of observables are the exact mathematical formulation of the fact that physical information is fundamentally finite. The Planck constant ℏ\hbarℏ is the universal scale that quantifies the minimal phase space volume—the “atom” of information—below which no further refinement is possible. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a separate theory but the completion of classical physics: it supplies the missing quantification of the principle that nature admits no infinite information density, and consequently, no absolutely precise physical quantities.