arXiv:2009.12284 · Physical Review A

Reply to “Comment on ‘Physics without determinism: Alternative interpretations of classical physics’ ”

Flavio Del Santo, Nicolas Gisin

Published Sep 30, 2020• 2 citations

Abstract

In this short note we reply to a Comment by Callegaro et al. [Callegaro, Pennecchi, and Bich, Phys. Rev. A 102, 036201 (2020)] that points out some weakness of the model of indeterministic physics that we proposed in our work [Del Santo and Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 100, 062107 (2019)], based on what we named ``finite information quantities'' (FIQs). While we acknowledge the merit of their criticism, we maintain that it applies only to a concrete example that we discussed in our work, whereas the main concept of FIQ remains valid and suitable for describing indeterministic physical models. We hint at a more sophisticated way to define FIQs which, taking inspiration from intuitionistic mathematics, would allow the criticisms in the preceding Comment to be overcome.

DOI: 10.1103/physreva.102.036202

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