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arXiv:2005.07079

Should Classical Physics Be Interpreted Indeterministically?

Wyman Kwok

Published Apr 25, 2020• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An indeterministic interpretation of classical physics has been proposed recently, in which the argument relies on attacking an alleged unwarranted metaphysical hidden assumption of the standard deterministic interpretation. This short paper aims at showing that it is arguably a strawman attack.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2005.07079

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Abstract Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
This article focuses on three themes concerning determinism and indeterminism. The first is observational equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic models. The article discusses several results about observational equivalence and presents an argument on how to choose between deterministic and indeterministic models involving indirect evidence. The second is whether Newtonian physics is indeterministic. The article argues that the answer depends on what one takes Newtonian mechanics to be and highlights how contemporary debates on this issue differ from those in the nineteenth century. The third theme is how the method of arbitrary functions can be used to make sense of deterministic probabilities. The article discusses various ways of interpreting the initial probability distributions and argues that they are best understood as physical, biological, and other quantities characterizing the particular situation. The fact that the method of arbitrary functions deserves more attention than it has received so far is also emphasized.
Contemporary physics, with two Einstein's theories (called "relativity" what can be interpreted erroneously) and with Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy (better: "lack of epistemic determinism") are frequently interpreted as a removal of the causality from physics.We argue that this is wrong.There are no indications in physics, either classical or quantum, that physical laws are indeterministic, on the ontological level.On the other hand, both classical and quantum physics are, practically, indeterministic on the epistemic level: there are no means for us to predict the detailed future of the world.Additionally, essentially all physical principles, including the arrow of time and the conservation of energy could be, hypothetically, violated (with some exceptions in the world of heavier quarks, and probably, the cosmological arrow of time).However, in contrast to Hume's skepticism, we have no experimental evidence that the causality can be removed or even "hung on" in any case.The text contains some didactical-like issues, as well.