What is fundamentally quantum? We argue that most of the features, problems, and paradoxes – such as the measurement problem, the Wigner's friend paradox and its proposed solutions, single particle nonlocality, and no-cloning – allegedly attributed to quantum physics have a classical analogue if one is to interpret classical physics as fundamentally indeterministic. What really characterizes non-classical effects are incompatible physical quantities, which, in quantum quantum theory are associated to the fundamental constant ℏ .
What is fundamentally quantum? We argue that most of the features, problems, and paradoxes – such as the measurement problem, the Wigner's friend paradox and its proposed solutions, single particle nonlocality, and no-cloning – allegedly attributed to quantum physics have a classical analogue if one is to interpret classical physics as fundamentally indeterministic. What really characterizes non-classical effects are incompatible physical quantities, which, in quantum quantum theory are associated to the fundamental constant ℏ .
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
Is there a quantum reality which is distinct from a ‘classical reality’? Or is there only one reality determined by physical measurements? The observation by Dalitz and Duarte – ‘Already in 1948, observations agreed with quantum mechanics, not with local realism’ – appears to suggest a departure from classical reality. However, going back to the inescapable truth that Nature describes herself via the experiment , then such divergence between quantum and classical realities is not all that transparent since what made the quote above possible is the nonlocality of the photon . And the nonlocality of the photon is a measurable physical phenomenon. This observation suggests that quantum reality is grander and includes, as a subset, ‘classical reality.’
There has been a surge of recent interest in the Wigner's Friend paradox, sparking several novel thought experiments and no-go theorems. The main narrative has been that Wigner's Friend highlights a counterintuitive feature that is unique to quantum theory, and which is closely related to the quantum measurement problem. Here, we challenge this view. We argue that the gist of the Wigner's Friend paradox can be reproduced without assuming quantum physics, and that it underlies a much broader class of enigmas in the foundations of physics and philosophy. To show this, we first consider several recently proposed Extended Wigner's Friend scenarios, and demonstrate that some of their implications for the absoluteness of observations can be reproduced by classical thought experiments that involve the duplication of agents. Crucially, some of these classical scenarios are technologically much easier to implement than their quantum counterparts. Then, we argue that the essential structural ingredient of all these scenarios is a feature that we call "Restriction A": that a physical theory cannot give us a probabilistic description of the observations of all agents. Finally, we argue that this difficulty is at the core of other puzzles in the foundations of physics and philosophy, and demonstrate this explicitly for cosmology's Boltzmann brain problem. Our analysis suggests that Wigner's Friend should be studied in a larger context, addressing a frontier of human knowledge beyond quantum foundations: to obtain reliable predictions for experiments in which these predictions can be privately but not intersubjectively verified.
Despite its remarkable empirical success and predictive power, quantum theory is riddled with mysteries. One such conceptual puzzle is the measurement problem: why do quantum systems in superposition collapse to a single-valued outcome upon being measured? The scenario of Wigner's friend illustrates this tension, with recent extensions deriving strong no-go results for the nature of reality. Another fundamental puzzle arises at the interface of quantum theory and general relativity---the black hole information paradox. This thesis further explores these two foundational paradoxes. Part I of this thesis focuses on extensions of the Wigner's friend scenario. We introduce several novel extended Wigner's friend arguments, and establish connections with notions of nonclassicality, i.e. the study of quantum phenomena that evade classical explanation. Key results are a refined version of the Frauchiger--Renner paradox, new extended Wigner's friend scenarios based on contextuality, and an argument against the absoluteness of free choices based on the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph theorem. The latter result complements the Local Friendliness no-go theorem, which challenged the absoluteness of experimentally obtained measurement outcomes. In Part II of this thesis, we turn to black hole puzzles and the interplay of quantum theory and gravity. We present a paradox that unifies extended Wigner's friend arguments with black hole puzzles, strengthening the cloning and firewall paradoxes. After discussing subtleties in these paradoxes, we next present an analysis combining elements of quantum theory with gravity, analyzing the detector response near a superposed black hole using elements of quantum reference frames.
After the review by Hauge and Stovneng the old question of "How long does it take to tunnel through the barrier?" has not still lost its relevance. As before, there is no clear answer to this question even for the one-dimensional completed scattering (OCS). In this paper we show that this seemingly simple question stands alongside with such fundamental problems of quantum mechanics (QM) as the Schrodinger's-cat and and EPR-Bohm paradoxes. Their common feature is that the states of a scattered particle, a radioactive atom and electron EPR-pair represent pure {\it micro-cat} states. It is widely accepted that the EPR-Bohm paradox implies the non-existence of local hidden variables (LHVs), the cat paradox represents a macro-objectification problem and the tunneling time is an observer-dependent quantity whose definitions must be 'operational'. At the same time, according to the probabilistic approach (Accardi, Khrennikov, Philipp, Hess {\it et al.}) to Bell's inequality that underlies the EPR-Bohm experiments, its experimental violation means simply that it contains probability distributions associated with mutually incompatible statistical data. We argue that this approach must be extended onto micro-cat states because they describe, too, mutually incompatible statistical data. The current practice to interpret the squared modulus of a micro-cat state as the probability density should be recognized as erroneous. It is this practice that makes QM incompatible with classical physical theories and, thereby, makes the micro-world 'unspeakable'. The known 'operational' tunneling-time concepts, elaborated in line with this practice, are logically inconsistent. We argue that the TTP and the cat paradox must be solved at the level of single electrons and atoms, without resorting to environment and measurement contexts. We present a new model of the OCS and solve the TTP on its basis.