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arXiv:quant-ph/9806088 · Physical Review Letters

Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies

Jens Eisert, Martin Wilkens, Maciej Lewenstein

Published Oct 11, 1999• 1,062 citations
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Abstract

We investigate the quantization of nonzero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy which always gives reward if played against any classical strategy.
DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.83.3077

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This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.
In a normal form, prisoners' dilemma (PD) is represented by a payoff matrix showing players' strategies and payoffs. To obtain the distinguishing trait and strategic form of PD, certain constraints are imposed on the elements of its payoff matrix. We quantize PD by a generalized quantization scheme to analyze its strategic behavior in the quantum domain. The game starts with a general entangled state of the form and the measurement for payoffs is performed in entangled and product bases. We show that for both measurements, there exist respective cutoff values of entanglement of the initial quantum state up to which the strategic form of the game remains intact. Beyond these cutoffs the quantized PD behaves like the chicken game (CG) up to another cutoff value. For the measurement in the entangled basis the dilemma is resolved for sinξ > 1/7 with Q ⊗ Q as a Nash Equilibrium (NE). However, the quantized game behaves like PD when sinξ > 1/3; whereas in the range 1/7 < sinξ < 1/3 it behaves like CG with Q ⊗ Q as an NE. For the measurement in the product basis the quantized PD behaves like classical PD for with D ⊗ D as an NE. In region , the quantized PD behaves like classical CG with C ⊗ D and D ⊗ C as NEs.
The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.
Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, only single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been studied, therefore nothing is known for infinitely repeated quantum game. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games does not much differ from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma and repeated classical prisoner's dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma.