An analysis using classical stochastic processes is used to construct a consistent system of quantum counterfactual reasoning. When applied to a counterfactual version of Hardy's paradox, it shows that the probabilistic character of quantum reasoning together with the ``one framework'' rule prevents a logical contradiction, and there is no evidence within this approach for any nonlocal influences. Counterfactual reasoning can support a realistic interpretation of standard quantum theory (measurements reveal what is actually there) under appropriate circumstances.
An analysis using classical stochastic processes is used to construct a consistent system of quantum counterfactual reasoning. When applied to a counterfactual version of Hardy's paradox, it shows that the probabilistic character of quantum reasoning together with the ``one framework'' rule prevents a logical contradiction, and there is no evidence within this approach for any nonlocal influences. Counterfactual reasoning can support a realistic interpretation of standard quantum theory (measurements reveal what is actually there) under appropriate circumstances.
The traditional Bayes' rule lays the foundation for causal reasoning and finding relations between cause (input) and effect (output). This causal reasoning is universally applied to all physical processes to establish causal relations. Here we show that it does not establish correct causal correspondence between quantum causes and effects in general. In fact, there are instances within the framework of quantum mechanics where the use of the traditional Bayes' rule leads to inconsistencies in quantum measurement inferences. We consider two such cases, inspired by Frauchiger-Renner's and Hardy's setups, where the traditional Bayes' rule results in paradoxical situations even after assuming quantum mechanics as a nonlocal theory. As a remedy, we introduce an input-output causal relation using the reasoning based on a quantum Bayes' rule. It applies to general quantum processes even when a cause (or effect) is in coherent superposition with other causes (or effects), involves nonlocal correlations as allowed by quantum mechanics, and applies in the cases where causes belonging to one system induce effects in some other system as happens in quantum measurement processes. This enables us to propose a resolution to the contradictions that appear in the context of Frauchiger-Renner's and Hardy's setups. Our results thereby affirm that quantum mechanics, equipped with a quantum Bayes' rule, can indeed consistently describe the use of itself.
Some mostly recent theoretical and mathematical advances can be linked together to yield a new consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. It relies upon a unique and universal interpretative rule of a logical character which is based upon Griffiths consistent historie. Some new results in semi-classical physics allow to derive classical physics from this rule, including its logical aspects, and to prove accordingly the existence of determinism within the quantum framework. Together with decoherence, this can be used to retrieve the existence of facts, despite the probabilistic character of the theory. Measurement theory can then be made entirely deductive. It is accordingly found that wave packet reduction is a logical property, whereas one can always choose to avoid using it. The practical consequences of this interpretation are most often in agreement with the Copenhagen formulation but they can be proved never to give rise to any logical inconsistency or paradox.
Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.
A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.
A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.