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arXiv:quant-ph/0401179 · International Journal of Quantum Information

THIS ELUSIVE OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Jun 1, 2004• 11 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749904000183

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Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
Quantum are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither of Nature nor states of knowledge. There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of problem posed by apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in way of a consistent ontological interpretation of quantum theory is our habit of projecting into quantum world detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails existence of an evolving state. An objective probability measure is formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, such as positional indefiniteness that contributes to fluff out matter. An objective indefiniteness entails that values of certain observables are extrinsic (possessed because they are indicated) rather than intrinsic (indicated because they are possessed). This dependence on value-indicating facts is not a dependence on anything external to quantum world. The latter constitutes a free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, information, or our interventions into the course of Nature.
Quantum "states" are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not the time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither states of Nature nor "states of knowledge." There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of the problem posed by the apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in the way of a consistent ontological interpretation of the quantum theory is our habit of projecting into the quantum world the detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails the existence of an evolving state. An objective probability measure is the formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, such as the positional indefiniteness that contributes to "fluff out" matter. An objective indefiniteness entails that the values of certain observables are extrinsic (possessed because they are indicated) rather than intrinsic (indicated because they are possessed). This dependence on value-indicating facts is not a dependence on anything external to the quantum world. The latter constitutes a free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, "information," or our interventions into "the course of Nature."
This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.
In resisting attempts to explain the unity of a whole in terms of a multiplicity of interacting parts, quantum mechanics calls for an explanatory concept that proceeds in the opposite direction: from unity to multiplicity. Being part of the Scientific Image of the world, the theory concerns the process by which (the physical aspect of) what Sellars called the Manifest Image of the world comes into being. This process consists in the progressive differentiation of an intrinsically undifferentiated entity. By entering into reflexive spatial relations, this entity gives rise to (i) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is not taken into account, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. If there is a distinctly quantum domain, it is a non-spatial and non-temporal dimension across which the transition from the unity of this entity to the multiplicity of the world takes place. Instead of being constituents of the physical world, subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules are instrumental in its manifestation. These conclusions are based on the following interpretive principle and its more direct consequences: whenever the calculation of probabilities calls for the addition of amplitudes, the distinctions we make between the alternatives lack objective reality. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that, owing to the indefiniteness of positions, the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete: the existence of a real-valued spatiotemporal background is an unrealistic idealization. This guarantees the existence of observables whose values are real per se, as against “real by virtue of being indicated by the values of observables that are real per se.” Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it implies that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are numerically identical and thus identifiable with the aforementioned undifferentiated entity.
The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem of finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of the physical world. The standard, substantival, set-theoretic conception of space is inconsistent with quantum mechanics, and so is the doctrine of local realism, the principle of local causality, and the mathematical physicist's golden calf, determinism. The said problem is made intractable by our obtruding onto the physical world a theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world. This framework portraits space and time as infinitely and intrinsically differentiated, whereas the physical world is only finitely differentiated spacewise and timewise, namely to the extent that spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by facts. This has the following consequences: (i) The contingent properties of the physical world, including the times at which they are possessed, are indefinite and extrinsic. (ii) We cannot think of reality as being built "from the bottom up", out of locally instantiated physical properties. Instead we must conceive of the physical world as being built "from the top down": By entering into a multitude of spatial relations with itself, "existence itself" takes on both the aspect of a spatially differentiated world and the aspect of a multiplicity of formless relata, the fundamental particles. At the root of our interpretational difficulties is the "cookie cutter paradigm", according to which the world's synchronic multiplicity is founded on the introduction of surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters. The neurophysiological underpinnings of this insidious notion are discussed.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state SSS with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains many elements ZZZ. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time nnn can be separated from relational time ttt, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each nnn, in which ttt represents the knowledge at sequential time nnn about the temporal relations between present and past events.