Quantum "states" are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not the time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither states of Nature nor "states of knowledge." There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of the problem posed by the apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in the way of a consistent ontological interpretation of the quantum theory is our habit of projecting into the quantum world the detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails the existence of an evolving state. An objective probability measure is the formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, such as the positional indefiniteness that contributes to "fluff out" matter. An objective indefiniteness entails that the values of certain observables are extrinsic (possessed because they are indicated) rather than intrinsic (indicated because they are possessed). This dependence on value-indicating facts is not a dependence on anything external to the quantum world. The latter constitutes a free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, "information," or our interventions into "the course of Nature."
Quantum "states" are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not the time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither states of Nature nor "states of knowledge." There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of the problem posed by the apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in the way of a consistent ontological interpretation of the quantum theory is our habit of projecting into the quantum world the detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails the existence of an evolving state. An objective probability measure is the formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, such as the positional indefiniteness that contributes to "fluff out" matter. An objective indefiniteness entails that the values of certain observables are extrinsic (possessed because they are indicated) rather than intrinsic (indicated because they are possessed). This dependence on value-indicating facts is not a dependence on anything external to the quantum world. The latter constitutes a free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, "information," or our interventions into "the course of Nature."
Quantum are objective probability measures. Because their dependence on a time is not time dependence of an evolving state, they are neither of Nature nor states of knowledge. There is no such thing as an evolving state. This disposes of problem posed by apparent existence of two modes of evolution. What essentially stands in way of a consistent ontological interpretation of quantum theory is our habit of projecting into quantum world detached, intrinsically differentiated spatiotemporal background of classical physics, for this is what entails existence of an evolving state. An objective probability measure is formal expression of an objective indefiniteness, such as positional indefiniteness that contributes to fluff out matter. An objective indefiniteness entails that values of certain observables are extrinsic (possessed because they are indicated) rather than intrinsic (indicated because they are possessed). This dependence on value-indicating facts is not a dependence on anything external to quantum world. The latter constitutes a free-standing reality that owes nothing to observers, information, or our interventions into the course of Nature.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
It has always been the ideal of science to discover laws of nature on which we can all agree. Agreement requires evidence independent of individual judgment, i.e., objective evidence. We apply the term objective to such unbiased scientific evidence because we associate it with an external world of objects that we conceive to be the origin of our information. This external world is instinctively invented by each of us as a means of dealing with invariant patterns in his private world of experience. The invention is validated and elaborated as a consequence of the fact that it turns out to be sharable. In fact the common content of all our invented external worlds is so unambiguous and independent of individual bias that it can form the universally accepted basis for communication and action in an organized society. The consistency of the patterns of experience associated with the external world is such that we are under severe psychological compulsion to assign to this world an existence independent of our experience and a reality superior to that of any small part of our experience. Physical science is devoted to the study of the “laws” of the external physical universe, i.e., to the behaviour of the objects in it. Hence there is a strong tendency to project into the external world the information gathered by scientifically objective methods and even the theoretical concepts in terms of which the information is interpreted. Whatever is so projected is objective in a second sense of the term, i.e., assigned by us to the external world of objects.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
Scientific realism holds that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or activities of scientists and those scientific theories are true of that objective world. This is antithetical to the posits of quantum physics, a body of knowledge taken as the seal of the sciences because of its incredible feat, which emphasizes observer created reality, and to that end subjective and probabilistic understanding of realities. Given this background, we contend that, if the thesis of scientific realism were to be taken as sacrosanct, nature would have remained somewhat unfavourable since nobody would have dared to ‘create’ reality other than those originally imposed by nature. And to the quantum physicist, the resort to probabilistic conception of reality is an obvious indication that nature in its dynamism is uncanny and still has billions of tricks for mankind.