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arXiv:quant-ph/0104103 · Journal of Modern Optics

The breakdown flash of silicon avalanche photodiodes-back door for eavesdropper attacks?

Christian Kurtsiefer, Patrick Zarda, Sonja Mayer, Harald Weinfurter

Published Nov 1, 2001• 123 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible to near-infrared region for a wavelength <1000 nm. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown used to detect a photoelectron. This fluorescence light might have serious impacts on experimental applications like quantum cryptography or single-particle spectroscopy. We characterized the fluorescence behaviour of silicon avalanche photodiodes in the experimentally simple passive quenching configuration and discuss implications for their use in quantum cryptography systems.

DOI
10.1080/09500340108240905

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Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible to near-infrared region for a wavelength <1000 nm. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown used to detect a photoelectron. This fluorescence light might have serious impacts on experimental applications like quantum cryptography or single-particle spectroscopy. We characterized the fluorescence behaviour of silicon avalanche photodiodes in the experimentally simple passive quenching configuration and discuss implications for their use in quantum cryptography systems.
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We demonstrate the possibility of blinding attacks on silicon avalanche photodiodes operating at room temperature and used in quantum cryptographic systems for the detection of single-photon radiation pulses at a wavelength of 850 nm. The parameters of different silicon avalanche photodiodes in the event of their blinding are determined. The possibility of detecting blinding attacks on avalanche photodiodes by controlling the electrical current through the photodiode is established. According to the obtained results, different radiant exposures of multiphoton optical pulses are required to imitate single-photon pulses for different avalanche photodiodes, and the duration of the optical pulses must be shorter than 1 µs. We determine that information on the properties of the avalanche photodetector used in the quantum cryptographic system is required to select the intensity of the optical emission and radiant exposure of multiphoton optical pulses for executing a blinding attack. A schematic of the experimental setup used to investigate blinding attacks and oscillograms of the output signals of avalanche photodiodes under such conditions are presented.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.