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Journal of Optical Technology

Detection of variable-intensity optical emission using an avalanche photodiode in photon-counting mode

Иван Романович Гулаков, А. О. Зеневич, O. V. Kochergina, Eduard Valerievich Novikov, S. A. Goibov

Published Nov 1, 2021• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We demonstrate the possibility of blinding attacks on silicon avalanche photodiodes operating at room temperature and used in quantum cryptographic systems for the detection of single-photon radiation pulses at a wavelength of 850 nm. The parameters of different silicon avalanche photodiodes in the event of their blinding are determined. The possibility of detecting blinding attacks on avalanche photodiodes by controlling the electrical current through the photodiode is established. According to the obtained results, different radiant exposures of multiphoton optical pulses are required to imitate single-photon pulses for different avalanche photodiodes, and the duration of the optical pulses must be shorter than 1 µs. We determine that information on the properties of the avalanche photodetector used in the quantum cryptographic system is required to select the intensity of the optical emission and radiant exposure of multiphoton optical pulses for executing a blinding attack. A schematic of the experimental setup used to investigate blinding attacks and oscillograms of the output signals of avalanche photodiodes under such conditions are presented.

DOI
10.1364/jot.88.000620

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Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible to near-infrared region for a wavelength <1000 nm. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown used to detect a photoelectron. This fluorescence light might have serious impacts on experimental applications like quantum cryptography or single-particle spectroscopy. We characterized the fluorescence behaviour of silicon avalanche photodiodes in the experimentally simple passive quenching configuration and discuss implications for their use in quantum cryptography systems.
In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.
We demonstrate an efficient photon number detector for visible wavelengths using a fast-gated silicon avalanche photodiode. Using sub-nanosecond voltage gates with a self-differencing circuit, the device is able to resolve up to four photons in an incident optical pulse, with a detection probability of up to 91.1 % at 1 GHz. With this performance and close to room temperature operation, fast-gated silicon avalanche photodiodes are ideal for optical quantum information processing that requires single-shot photon number detection.
A study was made of the characteristics of photodetectors for fiber-optic communication lines using quantum cryptographic systems – germanium avalanche photodiodes operating in the photon counting mode. In particular, it was established at what highest temperature the implementation of the photon counting mode is possible, and the influence of temperature and overvoltage on the sensitivity of photodiodes is also considered. An experimental setup has been developed for the research. It has been determined that the highest ambient temperature at which LFD-2 germanium avalanche photodiodes operate in the photon counting mode is 243 K. It has also been found that the highest sensitivity of germanium avalanche photodiodes corresponds to the optical radiation wavelength range of 1310÷1490 nm. Lowering the temperature leads to an increase in the sensitivity of germanium avalanche photodiodes. It was found that the dependence of the signal-to-noise ratio on overvoltage has a maximum corresponding to overvoltage ΔU = 0.1 V. Lowering the temperature led to an increase in sensitivity and signal-to-noise ratio. Since there was no shift in the maximum dependence of the signal-to-noise ratio on the overvoltage, it was therefore concluded that when the avalanche photodiode operates in the photon counting mode, in order to ensure maximum sensitivity, it is necessary to select the overvoltage corresponding to the maximum signal-to-noise ratio. The results obtained can be used in quantum cryptographic systems, technical means of protecting information transmitted over fiber-optic communication lines, and for the metrology of single-photon radiation sources.