Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0103041 · WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories?

Hans Halvorson, Rob Clifton

Published Nov 1, 2002• 37 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Several recent arguments purport to show that there can be no relativistic, quantum-mechanical theory of localizable particles and, thus, that relativity and quantum mechanics can be reconciled only in the context of quantum field theory. We point out some loopholes in the existing arguments, and we provide two no-go theorems to close these loopholes. However, even with these loopholes closed, it does not yet follow that relativity plus quantum mechanics exclusively requires a field ontology, since relativistic quantum field theory itself might permit an ontology of localizable particles supervenient on the fundamental fields. Thus, we provide another no-go theorem to rule out this possibility. Finally, we allay potential worries about this conclusion by arguing that relativistic quantum field theory can nevertheless explain the possibility of "particle detections," as well as the pragmatic utility of "particle talk."

DOI
10.1142/9789812776440_0010

Related papers

No Place for Particles in Relativistic Quantum Theories?

Hans Halvorson, Rob Clifton

David Malament (1996) has recently argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles. We consider and rebut several objections that have been made against the soundness of Malament's argument. We then consider some further objections that might be made against the generality of Malament's conclusion, and we supply three no-go theorems to counter these objections. Finally, we dispel potential worries about the counterintuitive nature of these results by showing that relativistic quantum field theory itself explains the appearance of “particle detections.”

Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 2002•187 citations

No place for particles in relativistic quantum theories?

Rob Clifton

Abstract It is a widespread belief, at least within the physics community, that there is no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles; and, thus, that the only relativistic quantum theory is a theory of fields. This belief has received much support in recent years in the form of rigorous no­go theorems by Malament (1996) and Hegerfeldt (1998a,b). In particular, Hegerfeldt shows that in a generic quantum theory (relativistic or non­relativistic), if there are states with localized particles, and if there is a lower bound on the system’s energy, then superluminal spreading of the wavefunction must occur. Similarly, Malament shows the inconsistency of a few intuitive desiderata for a relativistic quantum mechanics of (localizable) par­

•Sep 23, 2009•2 citations

Impact of relativity on particle localizability and ground state entanglement

Maria Papageorgiou, Jason Pye

Abstract Can a relativistic quantum field theory be consistently described as a theory of localizable particles? There are many known issues with such a description, indicating an answer in the negative. In this paper, we examine these obstructions by tracing how they (partially) subside in passing to an approximation of ordinary quantum mechanics in the non-relativistic regime. We undertake a recovery of the characteristic features of non-relativistic quantum mechanics beyond simply the Schrödinger equation. We find that once this is achieved, there are persisting issues in the localizability of particle states. A major focus is on the lingering discrepancy between two different localization schemes in quantum field theory. The non-relativistic approximation of the quantum field theory is achieved by introducing an ultraviolet cutoff set by the Compton scale. The other main undertaking of this paper is to quantify the fate of ground state entanglement and the Unruh effect in the non-relativistic regime. Observing that the Unruh temperature vanishes in the naive limit as the speed of light is taken to infinity motivates the question: is the Unruh effect relativistic? It happens that this is closely related to the former issues, as ground state entanglement causes obstructions to localizability through the Reeh–Schlieder theorem.

arXiv:1902.10684•Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical•Jul 25, 2019•13 citations

Localization in Relativistic Quantum Theories

Lars O. Herrmann

Although the concept of localization in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is mathematically well-defined there is no obvious and unambiguous way to generalize it to relativistic quantum theory. After a brief review of localization in quantum mechanics the Newton-Wigner localization scheme is introduced and it is shown by the example of a massive spinless system how it leads to a position operator with seemingly unphysical properties. This motivated the development of several theorems which claim to rule out the existence of localizable particles. A particularly important one of them is presented and its validity discussed. In the last section however it is shown that if localization is considered with respect to spacelike hyperplanes, the properties of the Newton-Wigner position operators are not necessarily unphysical and localizable particles can exist.

•Jun 1, 2010•5 citations

Quantum Mechanics, Fields, Black Holes, and Ontological Plurality

Gustavo Esteban Romero

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.

Philosophies•Jul 4, 2024•3 citations

Metaphysical Underdetermination in Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory

Matthias Egg

The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.

•Apr 21, 2017•0 citations
Several recent arguments purport to show that there can be no relativistic, quantum-mechanical theory of localizable particles and, thus, that relativity and quantum mechanics can be reconciled only in the context of quantum field theory. We point out some loopholes in the existing arguments, and we provide two no-go theorems to close these loopholes. However, even with these loopholes closed, it does not yet follow that relativity plus quantum mechanics exclusively requires a field ontology, since relativistic quantum field theory itself might permit an ontology of localizable particles supervenient on the fundamental fields. Thus, we provide another no-go theorem to rule out this possibility. Finally, we allay potential worries about this conclusion by arguing that relativistic quantum field theory can nevertheless explain the possibility of "particle detections," as well as the pragmatic utility of "particle talk."
David Malament (1996) has recently argued that there can be no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles. We consider and rebut several objections that have been made against the soundness of Malament's argument. We then consider some further objections that might be made against the generality of Malament's conclusion, and we supply three no-go theorems to counter these objections. Finally, we dispel potential worries about the counterintuitive nature of these results by showing that relativistic quantum field theory itself explains the appearance of “particle detections.”
Abstract It is a widespread belief, at least within the physics community, that there is no relativistic quantum theory of (localizable) particles; and, thus, that the only relativistic quantum theory is a theory of fields. This belief has received much support in recent years in the form of rigorous no­go theorems by Malament (1996) and Hegerfeldt (1998a,b). In particular, Hegerfeldt shows that in a generic quantum theory (relativistic or non­relativistic), if there are states with localized particles, and if there is a lower bound on the system’s energy, then superluminal spreading of the wavefunction must occur. Similarly, Malament shows the inconsistency of a few intuitive desiderata for a relativistic quantum mechanics of (localizable) par­
Abstract Can a relativistic quantum field theory be consistently described as a theory of localizable particles? There are many known issues with such a description, indicating an answer in the negative. In this paper, we examine these obstructions by tracing how they (partially) subside in passing to an approximation of ordinary quantum mechanics in the non-relativistic regime. We undertake a recovery of the characteristic features of non-relativistic quantum mechanics beyond simply the Schrödinger equation. We find that once this is achieved, there are persisting issues in the localizability of particle states. A major focus is on the lingering discrepancy between two different localization schemes in quantum field theory. The non-relativistic approximation of the quantum field theory is achieved by introducing an ultraviolet cutoff set by the Compton scale. The other main undertaking of this paper is to quantify the fate of ground state entanglement and the Unruh effect in the non-relativistic regime. Observing that the Unruh temperature vanishes in the naive limit as the speed of light is taken to infinity motivates the question: is the Unruh effect relativistic? It happens that this is closely related to the former issues, as ground state entanglement causes obstructions to localizability through the Reeh–Schlieder theorem.
Although the concept of localization in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is mathematically well-defined there is no obvious and unambiguous way to generalize it to relativistic quantum theory. After a brief review of localization in quantum mechanics the Newton-Wigner localization scheme is introduced and it is shown by the example of a massive spinless system how it leads to a position operator with seemingly unphysical properties. This motivated the development of several theorems which claim to rule out the existence of localizable particles. A particularly important one of them is presented and its validity discussed. In the last section however it is shown that if localization is considered with respect to spacelike hyperplanes, the properties of the Newton-Wigner position operators are not necessarily unphysical and localizable particles can exist.
The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies.
The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.