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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

On the Nature of Measurement Records in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Nov 1, 2002• 20 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A resolution of the quantum measurement problem would require one to explain how it is that we end up with determinate records at the end of our measurements. Metaphysical commitments typically do real work in such an explanation. Indeed, one should not be satisfied with one's metaphysical commitments unless one can provide some account of determinate measurement records. I will explain some of the problems in getting determinate records in relativistic quantum field theory and pay particular attention to the relationship between the measurement problem and a generalized version of Malament's theorem.

DOI
10.1142/9789812776440_0009

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A resolution of the quantum measurement problem would require one to explain how it is that we end up with determinate records at the end of our measurements. Metaphysical commitments typically do real work in such an explanation. Indeed, one should not be satisfied with one's metaphysical commitments unless one can provide some account of determinate measurement records. I will explain some of the problems in getting determinate records in relativistic quantum field theory and pay particular attention to the relationship between the measurement problem and a generalized version of Malament's theorem.
Abstract Each formulation of quantum mechanics we consider in the book seeks to explain why we have determinate measurement records distributed according to the standard quantum statistics. The explanation we get relies on the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the particular theory. Metaphysics here does real explanatory work in accounting for our experience. While it is not at all clear what specific metaphysical commitments best explain our experience, one can distinguish between different types and degrees of empirical adequacy each formulation provides. Stronger notions of empirical adequacy might be characterized in terms of such things as the plausibility that one’s experience in fact supervenes on the sort of records a particular theory provides and the richness of the account of experience provided by the theory.
Preface. In defense of dogma: why there cannot be a relativistic quantum mechanics of (localizable) particles D.B. Malament. Just how radical is hyperplane dependence? G. Fleming. Is there superluminal causation in relativistic quantum field theory? M. Redei. EPR, relativity, and the GHZ experiment C. Pagonis, et al. Hidden quantum non-locality N.D. Mermin. Royer's measurements - the rise and fall of (yet another) signalling scheme I. Pitowsky. Tails of Schrodinger's cat D.Z. Albert, B. Loewer. Wavefunction collapse models with nonwhite noise P. Pearle. The emergence of classical properties from quantum mechanics L.E. Ballentine. Relativism S. Saunders. Wave and particle concepts in quantum field theory P. Teller. The conceptual relation between standard quantum mechanics and quantum field theory D. Robinson. What measurement problem? J.T. Cushing. Bovine metaphysics: remarks on the significance of the gravitational phase effect in quantum mechanics H.R. Brown. Exotic (quixotic?) applications of Bohm theory R. Weingard. Complementarity and the orthodox (Dirac-von Neumann) interpretation of quantum mechanics J. Bub. Logical reflections on the Kochen-Specker theorem J.L. Bell. Construction of quantum mechanics via commutative operations S. Kochen.
I suggest that measurement in quantum theory should be regarded as a sense of time (of things happening), which is as important as the conventional relativistic notion of time. A key question -- of basic physical interest whether one accepts the arguments here or not -- is, What physical criteria determine when a measurement takes place? I suggest a way in which the answer to this may be bound up with the resolution of some pathologies associated with the stress-energy operator, and may at the same time determine the cosmic flow of time. The problem of reconciling the quantum sense of time (measurement) and the conventional relativistic one gives some indication that the the correct "quantization" of gravity is essentially different from that of other fields.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
Abstract We consider a number of radically different ways that Everett’s pure wave mechanics has been understood. Each of these reconstructions aims to provide a stronger variety of empirical adequacy than Everett’s own formulation of the theory. Among the alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we consider are splitting worlds, decohering worlds, many minds, many threads, and many maps. Each of these differs in its metaphysical commitments and, hence, in how it explains determinate measurement records and probabilities. We focus, in particular, on the problem of accounting for the standard quantum probabilities. To this end, we consider the relationship between typicality and probability and contrast synchronic and forward-looking probabilities. We conclude with a brief discussion of epistemological, pragmatic, and information-theoretic formulations of quantum mechanics. A recurring issue in this chapter concerns what it should mean for a physical theory to be empirically adequate.