More them any other topic in the foundations of physics, the problem of the arrow (or arrows!) of time seems to be characterized by a unique ‘slipperiness’: it is not only difficult to find answers to the questions once posed, but difficult to find meaningful questions to ask in the first place. Perhaps this is because an asymmetry with respect to the sense of time is built into us at an even deeper level than other ‘synthetic a priori’ conceptions about the world such as the continued existence of unknown objects. However that may be, in this situation, rather than trying to pose general questions which may turn out in the end to be ill-defined, there may be something to be said for trying to formulate much less speculative, indeed perhaps in retrospect trivial questions to which at least we have a hope of finding a definite answer. This is what I shall do in this essay: to be specific, I shall ask whether a test which is currently being designed concerning the validity of a certain ‘common-sense’ view of the macroscopic world (‘macrorealism’) would be affected if we were to relax our common-sense assumptions about the direction of causality in time. Let me start with a very brief review of established ideas concerning the formal (a)symmetry of the quantum theory with respect to the direction of time. The classic works on this subject are the paper of Aharonov et al. (‘ABL’) and the book by Belinfante. In these discussions the notion of ‘measurement’ is taken as primitive and undefined.
The treatment of time in relativity does not conform to that in quantum theory. In the context of quantum gravity this is called "the problem of time". A crucial difference is that time
t may be seen as an observable in relativity theory, just like position
x, whereas in quantum theory
t is a parameter, in contrast to the observable
x. Aiming to resolve the discrepancy, a formalization of time in the spirit of Kant's Copernican revolution is suggested, where it is required that the treatment of time in physics agree with our cognition. This leads to reconsideration of the notions of identity and change of objects, as well as the nature of physical states and their evolution. The formalization has two components: sequential time
n and relational time
t. The evolution of physical states is described in terms of
n, which is updated each time an event occurs. The role of
t is to quantify distances between events in space-time. There is a space-time associated with each
n, in which
t represents the knowledge at time
n about temporal distances between present and past events. A universal ordering of events in terms of
n can be postulated even though distances
t are relativistic. In short, it is argued that time as a sequential flow of events should be separated from time as a measure of distance between events. In physical models, these aspects of time can be expressed as one evolution parameter and one observable, respectively.
In relativistic quantum field theory the notion of a local operation is regarded as basic: each open space-time region is associated with an algebra of observables representing possible measurements performed within this region. It is much more difficult to accommodate the notions of events taking place in such regions or of localized objects. But how can the notion of a local operation be basic in the theory if this same theory would not be able to represent localized measuring devices and localized events? After briefly reviewing these difficulties we discuss a strategy for eliminating the tension, namely by interpreting quantum theory in a realist way. To implement this strategy we use the ideas of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We then consider the question of whether the resulting scheme can be made Lorentz invariant.
Abstract. Is the universe computable? If yes, is it computationally a polynomial place? In standard quantum mechanics, which permits infinite parallelism and the infinitely precise specification of states, a negative answer to both questions is not ruled out. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that NP-complete problems are intractable in the physical world. Likewise, computational problems known to be algorithmically uncomputable do not seem to be computable by any physical algorithms on the one hand, and physical computers on the other, finds a natural explanation if the universe is assumed to be algorithmic; that is, that physical reality is the product of discrete subphysical information processing equivalent to the actions of a probabilistic Turing machine. This assumption can be reconciled with the observed exponentiality of quantum systems at microscopic scales, and the consequent possibility of implementing Shor's quantum polynomial time algorithm at that scale, provided the degree of superposition is intrinsically, finitely upper-bounded. If this bound is associated with the quantum-classical divide (the Heisenberg cut), a natural resolution to the quantum measurement problem arises. From this viewpoint, macroscopic classicality is an evidence that the universe is in BPP, and both questions raised above receive affirmative answers. A recently proposed computational model of quantum measurement, which relates the Heisenberg cut to the discreteness of Hilbert space, is briefly discussed. A connection to quantum gravity is noted. Our results are compatible with the philosophy that mathematical truths are independent of the laws of physics.