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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Underdetermination, Conventionalism and Realism: The Copenhagen vs. the Bohm Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

James T. Cushing

Published Jan 1, 1993• 18 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-1185-2_13

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The Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics : a pitfall for realism

A. Matzkin, Nvrock

The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics (BM) has been favored as the preferred alternative to standard quantum mechanics on the ground that it allows a realist construal of the quantum world. We examine in the present work whether BM is consistent with scientific realism. Indeed, Bohmian mechanics makes strong ontological claims but accepts in principle the impossibility of generating epistemic warrants in support of its assumptions. We will argue that such a situation gives rise, at best, to an unsolvable underdetermination dilemma. This leads in turn to the following paradox: although Bohmian mechanics has frequently been invoked to reconcile quantum mechanics with realism, its status as a valid interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges nonetheless on nonevidential epistemological arguments traditionally associated with antirealism.

•Feb 1, 2004•0 citations
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics (BM) has been favored as the preferred alternative to standard quantum mechanics on the ground that it allows a realist construal of the quantum world. We examine in the present work whether BM is consistent with scientific realism. Indeed, Bohmian mechanics makes strong ontological claims but accepts in principle the impossibility of generating epistemic warrants in support of its assumptions. We will argue that such a situation gives rise, at best, to an unsolvable underdetermination dilemma. This leads in turn to the following paradox: although Bohmian mechanics has frequently been invoked to reconcile quantum mechanics with realism, its status as a valid interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges nonetheless on nonevidential epistemological arguments traditionally associated with antirealism.