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The Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics : a pitfall for realism

A. Matzkin, Nvrock

Published Feb 1, 2004• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics (BM) has been favored as the preferred alternative to standard quantum mechanics on the ground that it allows a realist construal of the quantum world. We examine in the present work whether BM is consistent with scientific realism. Indeed, Bohmian mechanics makes strong ontological claims but accepts in principle the impossibility of generating epistemic warrants in support of its assumptions. We will argue that such a situation gives rise, at best, to an unsolvable underdetermination dilemma. This leads in turn to the following paradox: although Bohmian mechanics has frequently been invoked to reconcile quantum mechanics with realism, its status as a valid interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges nonetheless on nonevidential epistemological arguments traditionally associated with antirealism.

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•Jan 1, 2016•0 citations
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics (BM) has been favored as the preferred alternative to standard quantum mechanics on the ground that it allows a realist construal of the quantum world. We examine in the present work whether BM is consistent with scientific realism. Indeed, Bohmian mechanics makes strong ontological claims but accepts in principle the impossibility of generating epistemic warrants in support of its assumptions. We will argue that such a situation gives rise, at best, to an unsolvable underdetermination dilemma. This leads in turn to the following paradox: although Bohmian mechanics has frequently been invoked to reconcile quantum mechanics with realism, its status as a valid interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges nonetheless on nonevidential epistemological arguments traditionally associated with antirealism.
Bohmian mechanics also known as de Broglie-Bohm theory is the most popular alternative approach to quantum mechanics. Whereas the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on the complementarity principle Bohmian mechanics assumes that both particle and wave are concrete physical objects. In 1993 Peter Holland has written an ardent account on the plausibility of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. He proved that it fully reproduces quantum mechanics if the initial particle distribution is consistent with a solution of the Schrödinger equation. Which may be the reasons that Bohmian mechanics has not yet found global acceptance? In this article it will be shown that predicted properties of atoms and molecules are in conflict with experimental findings. Moreover it will be demonstrated that repeatedly published ensembles of trajectories illustrating double slit diffraction processes do not agree with quantum mechanics. The credibility of a theory is undermined when recognizably wrong data presented frequently over years are finally not declared obsolete.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Bohmian mechanics is endowed with an ontological package that supposedly allows to solve the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. We are concerned in this work by the emergence of classicality from the quantum mechanical substrate. We will argue that although being superficially attractive, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation does not shed new light on the quantum-to-classical transition. This is due to nature of the dynamical law of Bohmian mechanics by which the particles follow the streamlines of the probability flow. As a consequence, Bohmian trajectories can be highly non-classical even when the wavefunction propagates along classical trajectories, as happens in semiclassical systems. In order to account for classical dynamics, Bohmian mechanics needs non-spreading and non-interfering wave packets: this is achieved for practical purposes by having recourse to decoherence and dense measurements. However one then faces the usual fundamental problems associated with the meaning of reduced density matrices. Moreover the specific assets of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation – in particular the existence of point-like particles pursuing well-defined trajectories – would play no role in accounting for the emergence of classical dynamics.
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is known to make the vagueness of the Copenhagen interpretation precise. What this actually means is that it offers a purely materialist framework for understanding quantum mechanics, as opposed to a dualist or idealist framework. The Copenhagen interpretation introduces conscious observers into its ontology and therefore lacks the precision of a materialist scientific theory expressible in terms of mathematics. The corollary of this is that using the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation as a proof by contradiction, it can be shown that if consciousness is not epiphenomenal but instead has causal efficacy, then the Born rule probabilities must be incomplete, and both the de Broglie-Bohm and Copenhagen interpretations are incomplete.
This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion of how to interpret the Bohmian ontology. Bohmian Mechanics is a quantum theory that describes the motion of particles, whose trajectories are determined by the quantum wave-function. This theory faces two key questions. The former concerns the metaphysical characterization of the particles; the latter relates to the ontological status of the wave-function. \nAfter briefly presenting two possible metaphysical characterizations of the particles, I dedicate the bulk of this work to investigating the status of the wave-function. In particular, I analyse the realist view (which regards the wave-function as a multi-dimensional field) and the nomological view (which considers the wave-function as a law-like entity). My investigation touches upon different levels of inquiry. First, I show that these two ontological interpretations depend on contrasting formulations of the law that dictates the particle motion. Second, I argue that both views defend very problematic ontologies that not only violate familiar metaphysical criteria but also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the relation between the particles and the wave-function. Third, I spell out the implicit methodologies that underlie the two views, arguing that they conflate three important categories that should rather be kept separate: the informationally-complete representation of the system, the ontologically-complete representation of the system, and the ontology itself. \nFinally, I present and advocate structural realism as the metaphysical framework for investigating and understanding the Bohmian ontology. According to the structuralist interpretation, the wave-function represents a network of modal relations whose relata are the particles. I argue that this third view provides the best account of the Bohmian system for three reasons. First of all, it offers a parsimonious ontology that does not create any issue of metaphysical underdetermination. Secondly, it supplies an explanatorily powerful ontology. Thirdly, it relies on a sound methodological program. I conclude with an interesting insight: this structuralist interpretation can be regarded as reconciling the realist view and the nomological view given that it takes on aspects of both views and is compatible with both formulations of the law of motion for the particles. \n
In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail commitment to such a view, and I propose to consider a form of realism that dissolves the measurement problem. It is simply a stripped down version of realism. I derive the methodological questions in this form of realism, speculating that within it a novel realist interpretation of quantum mechanics could be conceived.