How are quantum mechanics and realism related? This paper will discuss whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the doctrine of philosophical realism are compatible. To answer this question, this paper will first introduce quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation in terms of the particle in the box experiment. Then, philosophical realism will be introduced and defined. Finally, the relationship between the Copenhagen Interpretation and philosophical realism will be evaluated. Several points of the Copenhagen Interpretation appear to contradict philosophical realism; thus, it can be concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation is not compatible with philosophical realism.
How are quantum mechanics and realism related? This paper will discuss whether or not the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics and the doctrine of philosophical realism are compatible. To answer this question, this paper will first introduce quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation in terms of the particle in the box experiment. Then, philosophical realism will be introduced and defined. Finally, the relationship between the Copenhagen Interpretation and philosophical realism will be evaluated. Several points of the Copenhagen Interpretation appear to contradict philosophical realism; thus, it can be concluded that the Copenhagen Interpretation is not compatible with philosophical realism.
We present a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of the measurement process in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality, moving from micro to macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the related ontological problems, the question of the objectification of the wave function, and that of the definition of discernibility. We consider also an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics philosophical approach, that are modifying the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism and unified holistic approaches, such as the Primordial Dynamic Space.
This work presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics. From a philosophical point of view, the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism are highlighted, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined, as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the ontological problem, the problem of the objectification of the wave function and the problem of the definition of discernibility. This is followed by an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories, and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics that profoundly modify the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism, the unified holistic approach.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is investigated from a philosophical point of view. It is justified the opinion that the philosophical attitude the Copenhagen interpretation is based on is in principle inevitable for a real comprehension of quantum theory. This attitude is mainly related to epistemological arguments. However, the measurement problem often seems not to be treated clearly enough within the interpretation. By referring to the property of the necessity to use macroscopic measurement instruments obeying classical concepts it is made the attempt to solve the measurement problem. According to this consideration the indeterministic character of quantum theory seems to have its origin in a lack of knowledge and thus it appears in a similar but more principle way than in statistical mechanics. It is emphasized the ontological character of the uncertainty relation and the related non locality of quantum theory suggesting that the existence of a position space is not as fundamental as the assumptions of general quantum theory.
Foundational attitudes towards quantum theory have recently thrown off much of the old philosophical baggage largely associated with Niels Bohr to which Einstein famously objected, including the central ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ concept. A ‘neo-Copenhagen’ interpretation, it is suggested, has arisen. This development is placed in its historical context and contrasted to philosophical allegations of anti-realism. The neo-Copenhagen interpretation remains wedded to Heisenberg's uncertainty and observer-dependent values of particles. However a discussion of Nick Herbert's ‘rainbow analogy’ suggests that subatomic particles are emergent from a ‘nonlocal’ level of reality outside the domain of space and time. Critical realism recognizes that emergent systems have an irreducibly ontologically character, and in its combination of epistemological relativism and ontological realism, provides a basis for the proposition that realists who support Einstein's objections must now recognize that their realism must be redefined.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
Heisenberg is one of the founders of quantum mechanics, and one of the pioneers and intellectual leaders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. He proposed in two seminal papers in 1925 and 1927, the fundamentals of matrix mechanics (1925) as the first formalism of quantum mechanics, and then the uncertainty relations (1927) as one of the essential components of the Copenhagen interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to formulate Heisenberg's philosophical approaches during the formation of quantum mechanics and its Copenhagen interpretation. The main question of the paper is whether philosophical approaches can be formulated in the development of quantum mechanics through Heisenberg's works? To answer this question, two seminal papers by Heisenberg (1925 and 1927) are examined. The research method of the paper is based on the content analysis of the text (physics) of Heisenberg's papers. The findings of this study show that three crucial principles - observability, correspondence, and analogy-can be formulated from Heisenberg's 1925 paper, which has played a key role in the formation of the fundamentals of matrix mechanics. Moreover, from his 1927 paper, some issues are addressed including interpretation, understanding and classical-quantum relation, the role of experience and measurement, the subject of causality, as well as reality. Finally, it is concluded that through these works of Heisenberg, four philosophical approaches can be formulated including empiricism, Unificationism, indeterminism, and anti-causality, as well as anti-realism, which themselves include other sub-approaches.