This article offers a critical analysis of Carlo Rovelli’s conceptual positions in works devoted to interpretations of quantum mechanics and the notion of time. Attention is paid to the relational interpretation developed by the author in “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution” and to its philosophical foundations, which go back to the ideas of Ernst Mach and Nagarjuna. The article examines key elements of the quantum-mechanical formalism, including the superposition principle, interference effects, and commutation relations, with emphasis on their interpretive consequences. The article also analyzes Rovelli’s critical remarks on alternative approaches, such as Hugh Everett III’s many-worlds interpretation, hidden-variable theories associated with the works of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm, as well as models that propose a physical explanation of wave-function collapse. It is shown that some of the author’s arguments are limited in scope and do not consider contemporary experimental results, in particular studies that cast doubt on the epistemological interpretation of the wave function. Special attention is given to internal contradictions in Rovelli’s relational approach, including the problem of the ontological status of objects and the reconciliation of the principle of relationality with the existence of invariant physical quantities. The interpretation of time given by Rovelli in works such as The Order of Time and A Brief History of Time is also examined. The limitations of his ontological approach to time within loop quantum gravity are emphasized.
This article offers a critical analysis of Carlo Rovelli’s conceptual positions in works devoted to interpretations of quantum mechanics and the notion of time. Attention is paid to the relational interpretation developed by the author in “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution” and to its philosophical foundations, which go back to the ideas of Ernst Mach and Nagarjuna. The article examines key elements of the quantum-mechanical formalism, including the superposition principle, interference effects, and commutation relations, with emphasis on their interpretive consequences. The article also analyzes Rovelli’s critical remarks on alternative approaches, such as Hugh Everett III’s many-worlds interpretation, hidden-variable theories associated with the works of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm, as well as models that propose a physical explanation of wave-function collapse. It is shown that some of the author’s arguments are limited in scope and do not consider contemporary experimental results, in particular studies that cast doubt on the epistemological interpretation of the wave function. Special attention is given to internal contradictions in Rovelli’s relational approach, including the problem of the ontological status of objects and the reconciliation of the principle of relationality with the existence of invariant physical quantities. The interpretation of time given by Rovelli in works such as The Order of Time and A Brief History of Time is also examined. The limitations of his ontological approach to time within loop quantum gravity are emphasized.
This review is dedicated to a critical analysis of C. Rovelli’s book Helgoland: The Strange and Beautiful Story of Quantum Physics. The author presents the history of the emergence of quantum mechanics, primarily focusing on Heisenberg’s matrix formalism and the advent of the Schrodinger equation, in an engaging and lucid manner. For the Russian reader, the book is of additional interest as it examines the polemic between V.I. Lenin and A.A. Bogdanov surrounding the former’s work, Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Rovelli himself aligns with Bogdanov’s position, which is connected to E. Mach’s relational philosophy. In his book, much like Mach, Rovelli rejects the mechanistic assumption of a reality based on objects moving in space and time. Building upon this relational approach, Rovelli unfolds his own radical framework for interpreting quantum theory. Furthermore, he espouses a position akin to Nāgārjuna’s concept of the “emptiness” (śūnyatā) of the intrinsic nature of things. The review also examines certain contradictions inherent in this approach from a physics perspective.
I am not sure whether space or matter existed or not but i am sure enough that time always existed, but actually we dont have control over it” I present a critical argument on the essay by Prof. Carlo Rovelli. ”Forget Time” is a 2008-2009 essay by physicist Carlo Rovelli arguing that time is not a fundamental feature ofthe physical universe, but rather an emergent, subjective, or relativistic concept. It proposes that quantum gravity requires abandoning the notion of a universal,independent time variable in favor of relational, ”thermal” time. Several modern approaches to quantum gravity propose that time is not a fundamental elementof nature, but rather an emergent or purely relational concept. In this work we critically examine this claim from an operational and dynamical standpoint. We demonstrate that the elimination of time undermines the mathematical and experimental foundations of physics itself. Core structures such as quantum evolution, wave propagation, conservation laws, thermodynamics, and cosmological expansion all require an explicit temporal parameter to retain physical meaning. Without time, the notions of dynamics, causality, and prediction collapse,rendering physical theory observationally empty. We argue that while the classical notion of absolute time may require generalization, the complete removalof time from fundamental theory is neither mathematically consistent nor physically viable. A successful theory of quantum gravity must therefore incorporate time as an indispensable structural element, rather than discard it. Time may be refined, reinterpreted, or extended—but it cannot be eliminated.
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist) ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about.
In classical information theory (represented by Shannon's framework), the study of information transmission typically presupposes a fixed "channel" endowed with absolute attributes. This assumption implicitly holds that the properties of the channel are determinate and observer-independent, remaining unchanged regardless of perspective or the state of the channel itself. However, contemporary physics---particularly the development of quantum mechanics---fundamentally challenges the very notion of "absoluteness." As Carlo Rovelli has emphasized in one of his core arguments, quantum mechanics compels us to abandon the conception of states and properties as "absolute" and "observer-independent." The insistence on such absoluteness is precisely what underlies many of the paradoxes and interpretative difficulties that plague quantum theory. Rovelli extends this general philosophical critique of "absoluteness" consistently into the domain of information theory, thereby provoking a profound re-examination and critique of the classical presupposition of the "absolute channel." From this relational perspective, information should not be conceived as an abstract entity existing independently of physical relations, but rather as an observable measure of relative relations between systems. Accordingly, the reconstruction of classical information theory on the basis of relational ontology---namely, the reconstruction of information theory itself---is not only a demand of theoretical coherence but also a necessary step in responding to the challenge of quantum reality and in building a more universal theory of information.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument, Bell’s theorem, and Hardy’s paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie–Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
This article explores the relationship between Kantian epistemology and QBism, a modern interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism reconceives scientific objects not as independent entities but as phenomena synthesized through the observer's active role. It emphasizes the interdependence of knowledge and observation, rejecting the notion of a pre-existent, absolute reality. Much like Immanuel Kant's assertion that the thing-in-itself lies outside human cognition, QBism denies ontological status to the unobservable or unexperienced, grounding objectivity in intersubjectivity: the shared cognitive structures of human agents. Within this Critical framework, I address an objection raised by Carlo Rovelli, who critiques QBism for anchoring reality to the observer, claiming it risks falling into idealism by positioning the subject outside nature. Rovelli defends a relational view, situating the observer within the world as describable by the same physical laws that apply to all objects. In response, I argue that the QBist observer represents a universal human subject, not a single determinate agent and that intersubjective agreement ensures objectivity without collapsing into solipsism.