The underlying physical reality is a central notion in the interpretations of quantum mechanics. The a priori physical reality notion affects the corresponding interpretation. This paper explore the possibility to establish a relationship between philosophical concept of physical reality in Nagarjuna's epistemology (emptiness) and the picture of underlying physical reality in Einstein, Rovelli and Zeilinger positions. This analysis brings us to conclude that the notion of property of a quantum object is untenable. We can only speak about relational property of the object. On this basis, we are stimulated to build a new ontology of underlying physical reality: a relational ontology. Finally, we argue that Nagarjuna's view is comparable with Rovelli's interpretation of quantum mechanics. These views eliminate the privileged role of the observer.
The underlying physical reality is a central notion in the interpretations of quantum mechanics. The a priori physical reality notion affects the corresponding interpretation. This paper explore the possibility to establish a relationship between philosophical concept of physical reality in Nagarjuna's epistemology (emptiness) and the picture of underlying physical reality in Einstein, Rovelli and Zeilinger positions. This analysis brings us to conclude that the notion of property of a quantum object is untenable. We can only speak about relational property of the object. On this basis, we are stimulated to build a new ontology of underlying physical reality: a relational ontology. Finally, we argue that Nagarjuna's view is comparable with Rovelli's interpretation of quantum mechanics. These views eliminate the privileged role of the observer.
We reconsider briefly the relation between "physical quantity" and "physical reality in the light of recent interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. We argue, that these interpretations are conditioned from the epistemological relation between these two fundamental concepts. In detail, the choice as ontic level of the concept affect, the relative interpretation. We note, for instance, that the informational view of quantum mechanics (primacy of the subjectivity) is due mainly to the evidence of the "random" physical quantities as ontic element. We will analyze four positions: Einstein, Rovelli, d'Espagnat and Zeilinger.
This article offers a critical analysis of Carlo Rovelli’s conceptual positions in works devoted to interpretations of quantum mechanics and the notion of time. Attention is paid to the relational interpretation developed by the author in “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution” and to its philosophical foundations, which go back to the ideas of Ernst Mach and Nagarjuna. The article examines key elements of the quantum-mechanical formalism, including the superposition principle, interference effects, and commutation relations, with emphasis on their interpretive consequences. The article also analyzes Rovelli’s critical remarks on alternative approaches, such as Hugh Everett III’s many-worlds interpretation, hidden-variable theories associated with the works of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm, as well as models that propose a physical explanation of wave-function collapse. It is shown that some of the author’s arguments are limited in scope and do not consider contemporary experimental results, in particular studies that cast doubt on the epistemological interpretation of the wave function. Special attention is given to internal contradictions in Rovelli’s relational approach, including the problem of the ontological status of objects and the reconciliation of the principle of relationality with the existence of invariant physical quantities. The interpretation of time given by Rovelli in works such as The Order of Time and A Brief History of Time is also examined. The limitations of his ontological approach to time within loop quantum gravity are emphasized.
The present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory.
This article explores the relationship between Kantian epistemology and QBism, a modern interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism reconceives scientific objects not as independent entities but as phenomena synthesized through the observer's active role. It emphasizes the interdependence of knowledge and observation, rejecting the notion of a pre-existent, absolute reality. Much like Immanuel Kant's assertion that the thing-in-itself lies outside human cognition, QBism denies ontological status to the unobservable or unexperienced, grounding objectivity in intersubjectivity: the shared cognitive structures of human agents. Within this Critical framework, I address an objection raised by Carlo Rovelli, who critiques QBism for anchoring reality to the observer, claiming it risks falling into idealism by positioning the subject outside nature. Rovelli defends a relational view, situating the observer within the world as describable by the same physical laws that apply to all objects. In response, I argue that the QBist observer represents a universal human subject, not a single determinate agent and that intersubjective agreement ensures objectivity without collapsing into solipsism.
We argue about a possible scenario of physical reality based on the parallelism between Poincare group and the sunyata philosophy of Nagarjuna. The notion of "relational" is the common denominator of two views. We have approached the relational concept in third-person perspective (ontic level). It is possible to deduce different physical consequence and interpretation through first-person perspective approach. This relational interpretation leave open the questions: i)we must abandon the idea for a physical system the possibility to extract completeness information? ii)we must abandon the idea to infer a possible structure of physical reality?
The article highlights those discoveries of quantum physics, the philosophical understanding of which leads researchers to compare its ontology with Buddhist ontology. These are phenomena that reveal the subjectivism of physics. Thus, the discovery of the fundamental role of the observer for quantum mechanical processes and the collapse of the wave function became a «bridge» for the rapprochement of quantum mechanics and Buddhist philosophy, which asserts the relative nature of reality. The phenomenon of quantum non-locality or the plurality of parallel worlds became another basis for seeing the similarity of quantum physics and Buddhism. The idea of universal interdependence, characteristic of relational interpretations of quantum physics, also contributes to strengthening the idea of its similarity with Buddhist ontology. However, as the analysis of two representative comparative approaches shows – one developed by W. Mansfield from the side of physics, and the other developed by A. A. Terentyev from the side of Buddhism – the general tendency to compare the ontology of quantum physics and Buddhism is based on the incorrect reduction of Buddhist ontology to the doctrine of dependent origination and the wrongful identification of emptiness with dependent origination. Although the perception of Buddhist ontology as «Indra’s net» serves for comparativists from the side of physics, as well as for a wide circle of intellectuals, as the first step towards understanding the closeness of Buddhist philosophy to modern science, nevertheless, such popular interpretations are not entirely correct.