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arXiv:0704.1665

Approach to Physical Reality: a note on Poincare Group and the philosophy of Nagarjuna

David Vernette, Punam Tandan, Michele Caponigro

Published Apr 13, 2007• 1 citation
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Abstract

We argue about a possible scenario of physical reality based on the parallelism between Poincare group and the sunyata philosophy of Nagarjuna. The notion of "relational" is the common denominator of two views. We have approached the relational concept in third-person perspective (ontic level). It is possible to deduce different physical consequence and interpretation through first-person perspective approach. This relational interpretation leave open the questions: i)we must abandon the idea for a physical system the possibility to extract completeness information? ii)we must abandon the idea to infer a possible structure of physical reality?

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0704.1665

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We argue about a possible scenario of physical reality based on the parallelism between Poincare group and the sunyata philosophy of Nagarjuna. The notion of "relational" is the common denominator of two views. We have approached the relational concept in third-person perspective (ontic level). It is possible to deduce different physical consequence and interpretation through first-person perspective approach. This relational interpretation leave open the questions: i)we must abandon the idea for a physical system the possibility to extract completeness information? ii)we must abandon the idea to infer a possible structure of physical reality?
We argue about a possible scenario of physical reality based on the parallelism between Poincar\'{e} group and the sunyata philosophy of Nagarjuna. The notion of "relational" is the common denominator of two views. We have approached the relational concept in third-person perspective (ontic level). It is possible to deduce different physical consequence and interpretation through first-person perspective approach. This relational interpretation leave open the questions: i)we must abandon the idea for a physical system the possibility to extract the completeness information? ii)we must abandon the idea to infer a possible structure of physical reality?
The underlying physical reality is a central notion in the interpretations of quantum mechanics. The a priori physical reality notion affects the corresponding interpretation. This paper explore the possibility to establish a relationship between philosophical concept of physical reality in Nagarjuna's epistemology (emptiness) and the picture of underlying physical reality in Einstein, Rovelli and Zeilinger positions. This analysis brings us to conclude that the notion of property of a quantum object is untenable. We can only speak about relational property of the object. On this basis, we are stimulated to build a new ontology of underlying physical reality: a relational ontology. Finally, we argue that Nagarjuna's view is comparable with Rovelli's interpretation of quantum mechanics. These views eliminate the privileged role of the observer.
In the Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, " 'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' of a place, .... But they are connected with names. ... [And] it is characteristic of physics not to use these words." This statement expresses the dominant way of thinking in physics: Physics is about the impersonal laws of nature; the "I" never makes an appearance in it. Since the advent of quantum theory, however, there has always been a nagging pressure to insert a first-person perspective into the heart of physics. In incarnations of lesser or greater strength, one may consider the "Copenhagen" views of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli, the observer-participator view of John Wheeler, the informational interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and Caslav Brukner, the relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli, and, most radically, the QBism of N. David Mermin, Ruediger Schack, and the present author, as acceding to the pressure. These views have lately been termed "participatory realism" to emphasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they are often accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any third-person perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of instrumentalism or antirealism, these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to make a deep statement about the nature of reality. This paper explicates the idea for the case of QBism. As well, it highlights the influence of John Wheeler's "law without law" on QBism's formulation.
This paper proposes a new interpretation of quantum physics that encompasses the first-person and third-person perspective and provides a solution to the mind-body problem. First, a definition of phenomenal existence and a simple metaphysical model of mind are derived from the principles of irreducibility, distinction and persistence. Then it is shown that this process of existence can be associated, within physical representation, with the wave function collapse of quantum physics. A new interpretation of quantum physics, close to the relational interpretation, follows and the relational nature of our scientific knowledge is emphasised. Finally, in light of this interpretation, I analyse the differences between plain existence and consciousness and determine the physical condition for emergence of the latter. This view is confronted with neuroscientific models of consciousness.
Are absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view.