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Relationalism versus realism: a dilemma for relational quantum mechanics

Jacobs, Caspar, Read, James

Published Aug 6, 2025• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Are absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view.

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Are absolute representations of reality---i.e., representations of reality from no particular point view---possible? Moore (1997) has offered abstract arguments for the following answer to this question: 'yes, invariably'. But there are questions regarding whether (and how) this conclusion can be compatible with modern physics, where absolute representations often seem hard to come by. These questions were taken up by Jacobs & Read (2025) in the context of classical spacetime physics; here, we turn our attention to quantum mechanics. In particular, when the arguments of Moore (1997) are brought into contact with the 'relational quantum mechanics' of Rovelli (1996) and collaborators, one finds that the latter is unstable: either it is not relational view, or it is not a realist view.
Abstract The following paper explores the metaphysical significance of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). For this, I will first outline Rovelli’s philosophical framework, and then offer a reconstruction of Rovelli’s seminal argument in favour of RQM. I will then explore some healthy lines of philosophical work that may be undertaken to strengthen RQM. First, I will frame RQM in the debate between realist and antirealist readings of QM and defend the general claim that RQM is compatible with realism. Then, I discuss the main ontological interpretations of RQM, which I classify as “dispositional”, “transcendental” and “structural”, and argue that all of them remain committed to substantialist assumptions that limit the radicality of Rovelli’s proposal. Finally, I analyse recent developments on RQM’s ontology and suggest that preserving its ontological originality requires an assessment on the concept of “pattern”.
I suggest a contextual realist interpretation of Carlo Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics. The principal point is a correct understanding of the concept of reality and taking into account the categorical distinction between the ideal and the real. Within my interpretation, consciousness of the observer does not play any metaphysical role. The proposed approach can also be understood as a return to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, corrected within the framework of contextual realism. The contextual realism allows one to get rid of the metaphysical problems encountered by various interpretations of quantum mechanics, including the relational one. A wave function neither literally reflects an “exterior reality”, nor is it merely a predictive mathematical tool. In particular, an entangled wave function can be viewed as the formal cause of quantum correlations whose reality is contextual. The reduction of a wave function is not a real physical process. And there are no autonomous quantum events which would be different from the facts of their representation. The quantum measurement problem results from a confusion between the categories of the ideal and the real. It is dissolved logically. The quantum theory plays the role of a Wittgensteinian rule (norm), “measuring” physical reality within a language game of its application.
Abstract According to Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) the wave function ψ\psiψ ψ is considered neither a concrete physical item evolving in spacetime, nor an object representing the absolute state of a certain quantum system. In this interpretative framework, ψ\psiψ ψ is defined as a computational device encoding observers’ information; hence, RQM offers a somewhat epistemic view of the wave function. This perspective seems to be at odds with the PBR theorem, a formal result excluding that wave functions represent knowledge of an underlying reality described by some ontic state. In this paper we argue that RQM is not affected by the conclusions of PBR’s argument; consequently, the alleged inconsistency can be dissolved. To do that, we will thoroughly discuss the very foundations of the PBR theorem, i.e. Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization of ontological models, showing that their implicit assumptions about the nature of the ontic state are incompatible with the main tenets of RQM. Then, we will ask whether it is possible to derive a relational PBR-type result, answering in the negative. This conclusion shows some limitations of this theorem not yet discussed in the literature.
Recent no-go theorems challenging the absoluteness of events have highlighted the possibility that dynamical facts in quantum theory are observer-relative. This thesis examines the metaphysical and conceptual foundations of quantum relativism, focusing on Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). It analyzes arguments for relativism through Wigner’s Friend and Extended Wigner’s Friend thought experiments, explores the link between relative physical facts and experiences, and offers the first metaphysical definition of "relative facts." The thesis argues: RQM supports a perspectival retro-determination of past events based on later acquisition of information; Quantum relativists must also relativize facts about observers’ experiences; the strongest arguments for relativism lead to unbounded higher-order relativity, precluding any absolute 'view from nowhere'; Only a metaphysical framework that relativized the composition of reality itself can accommodate such an unrestricted iteration. These conclusions deepen our grasp of a thoroughly perspectival quantum world.
A realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is proposed - Contextual Quantum Realism (CQR) - according to which there exists a categorical distinction between the ideal (theory, observation instrument) and the real (quantum physical systems, properties), and, consequently, quantum ontology is context-sensitive. CQR is compared with QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), both of which also claim to offer realist interpretations. However, both approaches conflate the ideal and the real, thereby introducing an anti-realist dimension. RQM is an objectivist (physicalist) interpretation that naturalizes epistemic concepts, whereas QBism is subjectivist (phenomenological). RQM and QBism share a common presupposition of (post-)Modern philosophy - namely, the reduction of reality to objectivity - which CQR explicitly rejects.
In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned.