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HENRY MARGENAU’S ‘LATENCY’ APPROACH TO QUANTUM MECHANICS

Mauricio Suárez

Published Aug 19, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Henry Margenau (1901-1997) was one of the pioneers of philosophy of science as a discipline in the United States, and one of the great early champions of a role for philosophy within the practice of physics. He was known in the 1950s and 1960s for his foundational work on the measurement problem and what he called latent observables. In this paper I briefly trace the Neo-Kantian roots of Margenau’s ideas and carefully distinguish his views from the dominant logical positivism of his time. I argue that when properly understood as rejecting the eigenstate-eigenvalue link (e/e link), latencies offer a distinct and superior alternative to other dispositional approaches to quantum mechanics – including the better-known propensity interpretation of probability due to Karl Popper (1902-1994). I conclude that the prospects of latencies are significant either as addition or clarification of extant approaches, including collapse interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, and relative-state interpretations.

DOI
10.1098/rsta.2025-0364

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Henry Margenau (1901-1997) was one of the pioneers of philosophy of science as a discipline in the United States, and one of the great early champions of a role for philosophy within the practice of physics. He was known in the 1950s and 1960s for his foundational work on the measurement problem and what he called latent observables. In this paper I briefly trace the Neo-Kantian roots of Margenau’s ideas and carefully distinguish his views from the dominant logical positivism of his time. I argue that when properly understood as rejecting the eigenstate-eigenvalue link (e/e link), latencies offer a distinct and superior alternative to other dispositional approaches to quantum mechanics – including the better-known propensity interpretation of probability due to Karl Popper (1902-1994). I conclude that the prospects of latencies are significant either as addition or clarification of extant approaches, including collapse interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, and relative-state interpretations.
Several philosophers of science have claimed that the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics can be resolved by appealing to a particular interpretation of probability theory. For example, Popper bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the propensity interpretation of probability, and Margenau bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the frequency interpretation of probability. The purpose of this paper is (i) to consider and reject such claims, and (ii) to discuss the question of whether the ψ-function refers to an individual system or to an ensemble of systems.
(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.
Professor Margenau's paper presents an analysis of physical theory which has the great merit of exhibiting classical physics and modern quantum mechanics as different aspects of the same epistemological and methodological framework. By maintaining that “there is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave length and my construct of it” he is denying that the constructs of ordinary common sense and, a fortiori, the theoretical constructs of the physical sciences denote entities existing independently of our rational manipulation of them. This denial then enables him to treat constructs like “tree” and “electric current” exactly on a par with the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics not only methodologically but also ontologically. Once this is granted, he has prepared the ground for his synthesis of classical physics with quantum mechanics and is justified in inferring that “In quantum mechanics, then, the basic mode of description has remained unaltered while the rules of correspondence have undergone radical changes.”
Popper's program in the foundations of quantum mechanics defending objectivity and realism developed out of a profound dissatisfaction with the point of view associated with Bohr, which is usually designated the Copenhagen interpretation. Here I will argue that while Popper's aim is a noble one, his program does not succeed on two counts: he does not succeed in showing that Bohr's philosophy must be rejected as a variety of subjectivism, and his alternative interpretation of indeterminacy rests on a highly questionable assumption according to which simultaneously precise conjugate parameters are possible. Nevertheless I like Popper's propensity interpretation of probability and think that the propensity idea deserves further research. Quanta 2012; 1: 33–57.
We present a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of the measurement process in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality, moving from micro to macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the related ontological problems, the question of the objectification of the wave function, and that of the definition of discernibility. We consider also an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics philosophical approach, that are modifying the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism and unified holistic approaches, such as the Primordial Dynamic Space.
In his 1939 Lectures, the prominent Soviet physicist L. I. Mandelstam proposed an interpretation of quantum mechanics that was understood in different ways. To assess Mandelstam's interpretation, we classify contemporary interpretations of quantum mechanics and compare his interpretation with others developed in the 1930s (the Copenhagen interpretation and the statistical interpretations proposed by K. R. Popper, H. Margenau, and E. C. Kemble). We conclude that Mandelstam's interpretation belongs to the family of minimal statistical interpretations and has much in common with interpretations developed by American physicists. Mandelstam's characteristic message was his theory of indirect measurement, which influenced his discussion of the “reduction of the wave packet” and the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen argument. This article also reconstructs what lay behind Mandelstam's interpretation of quantum mechanics. This was his operationalism, by virtue of which his interpretation resembled Kemble's, in which the statistical and Copenhagen views had been combined. Like Popper and Margenau, Mandelstam followed R. von Mises's empirical conception of probability. Mandelstam, like the other proponents of the statistical approach to quantum mechanics, was affected by the culture of macroscopic experimentation with its emphasis on statistical (collective) measurement.