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Philosophy of Science

Realism and Neo-Kantianism in Professor Margenau's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

Adolf Grünbaum

Published Jan 1, 1950• 14 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Professor Margenau's paper presents an analysis of physical theory which has the great merit of exhibiting classical physics and modern quantum mechanics as different aspects of the same epistemological and methodological framework. By maintaining that “there is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave length and my construct of it” he is denying that the constructs of ordinary common sense and, a fortiori, the theoretical constructs of the physical sciences denote entities existing independently of our rational manipulation of them. This denial then enables him to treat constructs like “tree” and “electric current” exactly on a par with the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics not only methodologically but also ontologically. Once this is granted, he has prepared the ground for his synthesis of classical physics with quantum mechanics and is justified in inferring that “In quantum mechanics, then, the basic mode of description has remained unaltered while the rules of correspondence have undergone radical changes.”

DOI
10.1086/287064

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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 2020•0 citations
Professor Margenau's paper presents an analysis of physical theory which has the great merit of exhibiting classical physics and modern quantum mechanics as different aspects of the same epistemological and methodological framework. By maintaining that “there is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave length and my construct of it” he is denying that the constructs of ordinary common sense and, a fortiori, the theoretical constructs of the physical sciences denote entities existing independently of our rational manipulation of them. This denial then enables him to treat constructs like “tree” and “electric current” exactly on a par with the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics not only methodologically but also ontologically. Once this is granted, he has prepared the ground for his synthesis of classical physics with quantum mechanics and is justified in inferring that “In quantum mechanics, then, the basic mode of description has remained unaltered while the rules of correspondence have undergone radical changes.”
I distinguish two senses in which one can take a given physical theory to be `complete'. On the first, a complete physical theory is one that, in principle, completely describes physical reality. On the second, a complete physical theory is one that provides all of the conceptual resources one needs to describe any (in general probabilistic) physical phenomenon to any level of detail one likes, in principle. I argue that while the (neo-)Everettian approach to interpreting quantum mechanics aims to show that it is complete in the first sense, the (neo-)Bohrian approach begins from an understanding of quantum mechanics as being complete in the second sense. I then discuss some of the essential differences between how classical and quantum theory describe phenomena, and the way in which the quantum description can be thought of as a ``natural generalisation'' (to use Bohr's phrase) of the classical description. Finally, I elaborate upon the two visions of physics from which one can motivate the first and the second sense of completeness, respectively: \emph{metaphysical realism}, on the one hand, and what I will call \emph{methodological realism}, on the other -- and discuss what one can say about the significance of the differences between quantum and classical description from each of these points of view. I suggest that there is a sense in which the views of (neo-)Everett and the views of (neo-)Bohr can be understood to be mutually supporting positions, from their respective perspectives, even though they are diametrically opposed.
This work presents a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics. From a philosophical point of view, the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism are highlighted, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of measurement in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined, as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality moving from the microcosm to the macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the ontological problem, the problem of the objectification of the wave function and the problem of the definition of discernibility. This is followed by an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories, and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics that profoundly modify the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism, the unified holistic approach.
We present a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of the measurement process in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality, moving from micro to macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the related ontological problems, the question of the objectification of the wave function, and that of the definition of discernibility. We consider also an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics philosophical approach, that are modifying the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism and unified holistic approaches, such as the Primordial Dynamic Space.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the framework of Putnam’s pragmatic realism (Putnam, 1999; Bernstein, 2005). I illustrate my claim through the analysis of a case of Duhem-Quine underdetermination originating in the violation of Bell’s Inequalities and involving several contemporary conceptions of quantum mechanics: the instrumentalist approach called ‘no interpretation view’ (Fuchs and Peres, 2000), Bohmian Mechanics (Dürr and Teufel, 2009), the veiled reality conception (d'Espagnat, 2011) and the approach with extended probabilities (Gell-Mann and Hartle, 2012). First, I briefly expose how the violation of Bell’s Inequalities can be understood as imposing a necessary trade-off between epistemic values usually satisfied in the context of classical physics. This allows conceiving the proponents of the studied approaches as standing in “faultless” or “rational” disagreement (Gattei, 2008; Pritchard, 2009). However, while the idea of faultless disagreement becomes more and more accepted, pluralism is rarely advocated for beyond the epistemological (cognitive) human sphere. Indeed, while it is often acknowledged that several competing theories can all be reasonably endorsed (Kelly, 2005), admitting that more than one is really is usually considered as opening the door to anti-realism (about entities described by scientific theories and about truth) or to relativism. I then mobilize Putnam’s pragmatic realism to challenge this last claim, in discussing the possibility of admitting a plurality of true theories while preserving scientific realism and realism about truth. The core of Putnam’s conception is to reject sense data (or inner theater) epistemology in considering that genuine aspects of reality (and not mere mental phenomena) are met in our ordinary perception (Putnam, 1999, 2013). Putnam arrived at this conclusion after a long intellectual path initiated with the rejection of metaphysical realism and its associated understanding of truth as a unique (and transcontextual) substantive property (of correspondence to the metaphysical reality). Putnam first opposed to this type of view his internal realism in which truth becomes intimately connected to standards of rational acceptability, opening the road for conceptual pluralism (Putnam, 1981). However, this first attempt proved unsatisfying, providing no sufficient ground for realism and for discrimination between truth and verification. Putnam diagnosis is then radical: in the framework of sense data epistemology, one cannot escape the forced choice between metaphysical realism and verificationism – this is the antinomy of realism (Putnam, 1999). With pragmatic realism and the rejection of the inner theater picture, Putnam proposes an interesting alternative. It becomes possible to admit the disquotational conception of truth from Tarski while 1) escaping its deflationist interpretation without returning to metaphysical realism and 2) maintaining conceptual pluralism. According to pragmatic realism, the way a knowledge claim can be responsible to reality – can be true – is neither unique nor fixed in advance. As it will be illustrated with the discussion of the disagreement about quantum mechanics, this pragmatic realism framework permits the combined admission of conceptual pluralism and scientific realism. • Bernstein, R. J. (2005). In Y. Ben-Menahem (Ed.), Hilary Putnam (pp. 251-265): Cambridge University Press. • D'Espagnat, B. (2011). Foundations of Physics, 41(11), 1703-1716. • Dürr, D. and Teufel, S. (2009). Bohmian Mechanics: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. • Fuchs, C. A. and Peres, A. (2000). Physics Today, 53(3), 70-71. • Gattei, S. (2008). Thomas Kuhn's "Linguistic Turn" and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism: Incommensurability, Rationality and the Search for Truth: Ashgate. • Gell-Mann, M. and Hartle, J. B. (2012). Physical Review A, 85(6), 062120. • Kelly, T. (2005). In T. Szabó Gendler and J. Hawthorne
Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version