Given the multiplicity of interpretations of quantum mechanics that give rise to very different ontologies, it is worth asking whether it is possible to find criteria with some empirical basis that make some interpretations preferable to others. If empirical evidence were found for the existence of quantum systems in the brain such as those necessary to adopt a form of panpsychism that resolves the problems of combination of subjects, qualities, and structures recognized since the time of William James, their underlying ontologies would be favored by allowing us to account for our conscious experiences. Quantum panprotopsychism has proven particularly well-suited to addressing the combination problems of panpsychism. It is based on an ontology of states and events with clearly identified physical and phenomenal counterparts and would therefore be recognizable if these physical elements were part of brain function.. Such an ontology could provide criteria for preferring certain quantum interpretations over others. Here we will analyze the interpretations that would be favored or challenged by the ontology resulting from this form of panprotopsychism.
Given the multiplicity of interpretations of quantum mechanics that give rise to very different ontologies, it is worth asking whether it is possible to find criteria with some empirical basis that make some interpretations preferable to others. If empirical evidence were found for the existence of quantum systems in the brain such as those necessary to adopt a form of panpsychism that resolves the problems of combination of subjects, qualities, and structures recognized since the time of William James, their underlying ontologies would be favored by allowing us to account for our conscious experiences. Quantum panprotopsychism has proven particularly well-suited to addressing the combination problems of panpsychism. It is based on an ontology of states and events with clearly identified physical and phenomenal counterparts and would therefore be recognizable if these physical elements were part of brain function.. Such an ontology could provide criteria for preferring certain quantum interpretations over others. Here we will analyze the interpretations that would be favored or challenged by the ontology resulting from this form of panprotopsychism.
We will argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness, similar to that of Husserl, shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events, with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
In a previous paper, we have shown that an ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects, that is, a form of pan-protopsychism, is well suited to explaining consciousness. We have proved there that the palette and grain combination problems of panpsychism and pan-protopsychism arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience that are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. In this article, we address what is probably the first and most important combination problem of panpsychism: the subject-summing problem originally posed by William James. Due to the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics and its causal openness, this ontology also seems to be suitable for the analysis of the remaining aspects of the structure combination problem that treat about how the structuration capacity of consciousness evolved from primitive animals to humans.
We argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness similar to that of Husserl shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
In previous papers, we demonstrated that an ontology of quantum mechanics, described in terms of states and events with internal phenomenal aspects (a form of panprotopsychism), is well suited to explain consciousness. We showed that the combination problems of qualities, structures and subjects in panpsychism and panprotopsychism stem from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics regarding supervenience, which are not applicable at the quantum level. Within this view, consciousness arises in entangled quantum systems coupled to the neural network of the brain. In entangled systems, the properties of individual parts disappear, giving rise to an exponential number of emergent properties and states. Here, we analyze self-consciousness as the capacity to view oneself as a subject of experience. The causal openness of quantum systems provides self-conscious beings the ability to make independent choices and decisions, reflecting a sense of self-governance and autonomy. In this context, the issue of personal identity takes a new form free from the problems of the simple view or the reductive approaches.
Whereas the technological applications of quantum mechanics are extraordinarily abundant, its ontological implications are very controversial. Not only did several interpretations of the original quantum formalism develop throughout the last century, but modifications of the primitive formalism were also proposed, introducing new relevant theoretical elements, which gave rise to very different quantum ontologies. This article highlights that the diversity of quantum ontologies reveals the impossibility of establishing an exclusive inference from the empirical success of a theory and its ontological truth. Since scientific objectifications in general —and those of quantum mechanics in particular— have a limited cognitive scope, they don’t allow choosing a specific interpretation of the theory among the many possible ones, so that meta-scientific criteria are required.
In this paper I contend that standard quantum theory has a minimal interpretation, on which all physicists agree. That interpretation is sufficient for every application of quantum theory and it has been confirmed by a countless number of experiments. However, it provides neither an overall picture of the quantum world nor an intended ontology for quantum theory. For those reasons, several full interpretations have been proposed in order to complete the minimal interpretation. I then argue that those interpretations –which are empirically equivalent, but mutually incompatible- are metaphysical ventures that cannot be confirmed by any conceivable experience. Moreover, I claim that the program of finding the ontology for quantum theory rests on the false assumption that there is a unique ontology compatible with each physical theory. I conclude that there is no direct path either from the formalism of quantum theory to its intended ontology, or from determinate metaphysical assumptions to the quantum formalism.